

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Providing greater clarity on the current US administration's worldview, President Donald Trump's recently unveiled national security strategy (NSS) is perhaps the most important American policy document of the year. It lays out what Trump's 'America First' principle means in terms of Washington's foreign policy and delineates friends, foes and frenemies. It identifies Russia and China as countries that challenge American influence, values and wealth, perceives Iran and North Korea as rogue nations, and squarely acknowledges the threat posed by transnational terror groups and crime syndicates. The document has several positives for India. India has been recognised as a leading global power, with Trump administration stating it will deepen its strategic partnership and support India's leadership role in maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific. The US has been forthright about Pakistan's role in fomenting terrorism, calling upon Islamabad to desist from destabilising Afghanistan and end support to terror groups.

The current issue of CASS Journal carries an article, 'Some aspects of President Trump's move concerning Jerusalem' which analyses the controversial decision by the US President. The author points out that the President is the target of harsh and incessant invective from his domestic political opponents and, after his announcement on Jerusalem, from all around the globe. However, all considered, he is not to be underestimated. A seasoned observer of international relations has assessed that, more than President Carter who in 1979 brought about the Egypt-Israel Accord at Camp David, President Donald Trump could be the US President who, by his bold as well as subtle and secret moves contributed most to Peace. Article on Jointness and Substantive Integration – The Need for Pragmatism by

R Chandrashekhar brings out that there is at present, no unanimous Tri-Services visualisation regarding future security decision-making structures and of their own envisaged role in these. By default, therefore, the Services accept the formulations prescribed by the Committees. It is time the Services take an initiative to draw up their own considered solutions that are compliant to the requirements of present day warfare that would be their responsibility to wage. A vigorous 'in-house' discussion within the Services themselves, to confront contentious issues such as the CDS and Integrated Commands upfront and draw up practical solutions would be the appropriate first step. They would otherwise be left to implement and adjust to solutions derived by others to what are essentially their core issues.

Lt Gen PG Kamath in the article 'Armed Forces And Security Of The Nation' feels that It is naïve to expect that some other external power will take care of the security of our nation. The battles that a country has to fight have to be fought by her citizens. The alternative is slavery. A nation of 1.3 billion people cannot outsource her security. Unless our public opinion develops and questions the politicians on strategic vision of the country; they are content to neglect larger issues. It is the public opinion that alone would ensure that we have strong armed forces that serve as an effective instrument of state policy. India's move to construct harbour at 'Chabahar' in Iran has been discussed at length in this issue. As compared to Gwadar the port at Chabahar is far superior on all counts. It gives India access to 10 nations. India can trade with Baltic nations and Russia at 50% of less time and costs by developing INSTC. India should not miss this golden opportunity to trade in cost effective manner to more than ten nations.

Aerospace power will proliferate & find utility with many more agencies. Because of its inherent flexibility & rapid response, it will become the preferred tool for many more contingencies. It will be able to offer up more options to the leadership in times of national crises. But the same pluses will raise fundamental questions of management, policy, org structures & ownership. This is the conclusion drawn by Air Chief Marshal P V Naik in his piece 'Future Of Aerospace Power'. There is no doubt that aerospace power is the power of the future. We must, therefore, invest in the Power & the Technology. We need to spread this awareness to the Nation. Policymakers need to appreciate that they are stakeholders too. We need to institutionalize policy guidelines to prevent reversals of decisions. We need to create an environment that facilitates Pvt & Public sector participation. Article on 'Role of social media and Its Impact on India's National Security' reminds us that With the recent growth of social media in the past ten years as a new staple in our modern culture, it has emerged as a growing threat

to national security. As the Internet and social media are constantly growing and changing, national security has lagged behind. National security experts and policy makers must now adapt quickly to emerging threats or face major national security breaches.

The next article 'National security for national development Internal security is fundamentally central' highlights that the greatest danger to system is always from within, whereas, the controllers of public opinion will point towards outside elements as the visible threat. If we want solid unassailable Internal Security to fortify National Security then let us be intrepid in seeing the danger from all aspects. Thus security of our nation has to be taught and imbibed into our culture as a collective and singular responsibility to preserve and protect our very being and existence. Article on 'Psychological pressure of military operations against terrorists on army persons and their families' deals with a contemporary subject which is so often ignored. Stress, which was usually considered as menace of modern society, has gradually crept into Army too. The soldier is no more immune from changed socio-economic set up and their aspirations have also increased manifold. The stress related casualties are conspicuous in combat as well as non-combat environment; however, the statistics of suicides/ attempted suicides indicates that these incidents are higher in a peace environment. The last article on 'Global Security Environment and Focus on India's Regional and Strategic Role' by Dr Gautam Sen deciphers Asia's balance of power, particularly the role of China and details the counter-encirclement measures taken by India through a range of strategic initiatives with other powers, including the US, Japan and Australia, and with a number of other nations in Southeast and East Asia.

Wishing all our readers a Happy New Year.



(BN Gokhale)
Air Marshal (Retd)
Director, CASS

Date: 30th December 2017

Jointness and Substantive Integration – The Need for Pragmatism

R Chandrashekhar

As per the American Doctrine for its Armed Forces, Jointness implies “cross-service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts”. It further states that “joint forces require high levels of interoperability and systems that are conceptualised and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies. This level of interoperability reduces technical, doctrinal and cultural barriers that limit the ability of joint force commanders to achieve objectives. The goal is to employ joint forces effectively across the range of military operations”.

The Joint Doctrine for India’s Armed Forces issued by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff on 18 April 2017 states that “Jointness implies or denotes possessing an optimised capability to engage in Joint War-Fighting and is not limited to just Joint War Fighting (Joint Operations). The attention to detail is in the placing of the hyphen. It needs to be clearly understood and discerned that Jointness is a ‘Concept’, whereas Joint operations are evolutions, of both, Joint operations as well as single-Service operations are sub-sets of the larger whole of ‘conceptual Jointness’. Cooperative centralised planning enables appropriate concentration of forces, with the right mix at the right time and place. With Jointness, a high level of cross-domain synergy is attained and vastly enhances success potential, resulting in maintenance of high morale, camaraderie and spirit. Jointness needs active investment; Commanders need to invest in people, time and resources to develop Jointness amongst personnel of the Armed Forces”.

In regard to Integration, India's Joint Doctrine mentions that *"the more common use of the term 'Integration' in contemporary Military matters is in reference to the integration of 'processes' across all operational domains of land, air, maritime, cyberspace and aerospace, towards optimisation of costs and enhancing readiness. Integration is embodied across all functions; Operations, Intelligence, Technology Management, Perspective Plans, Logistics, Human Resources Development (HRD). It does not imply physical integration. Such embodiment enables common understanding leading to efficient and optimised responses. Beyond the Armed Forces, it also requires collaboration with the Diplomatic, Economic and Information instruments of the National Power, at all levels - strategic, operational and tactical. An Integrated approach comprises, pro-active engagement and shared understanding to bring distinct professional technical and cultural disciplines of entities and sub-entities together; this approach requires structures to be developed to further 'shared understanding'".*¹

A cardinal assumption underlying these propositions is that such a Theatre Commander is well versed and possesses the understanding of the various dimensions of battle, the land, the sea and air along with the capabilities of the three Services components operating under his command to deliver the operational objectives.

JOINTNESS IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

There was indeed a time when India's Armed Forces were a 'Joint' Force under one overarching single point command. In the annals of India's military history, Field Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE, the last Commander-in Chief of the British Raj, remains till date, the last 'tri-services' Commander of India's Armed Forces with command over every aspect of military operation and an authority to render requisite considered and thought through 'single point advice' to the Government. Till the formation of the Interim Government in 1946, the C-in-C, as a member of Viceroy's Council and essentially a component of the Government itself.

1 Emphasis added by Author.

THE MILITARY 'DISTANCED'

With Independence, the appointment of C-in-C was split into three separate Cs-in-C, one for each of the Armed Forces. The authority to make final decisions on matters military was vested in Defence Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister (also at the time the External Affairs Minister) with the Deputy Prime Minister (Home Minister), the Finance Minister and Defence Minister as its members. This was Independent India's very first 'Higher Defence Control' organisation.

On 29th August 1947, all Departments of the Government of India were designated as Ministries and the then Defence Department, hitherto a 'sheltered' department under the Raj, came to be the Government of India's Ministry of Defence. The coordinating role to be played by the fledgling Ministry, in the words of HM Patel, one of its earliest Secretaries is that "... while the Government was convinced of the undoubted importance of allowing the three services to developing its own way in matters which are distinctly its own, it was no less convinced that the necessary separation should not be pushed too far, for matters in which common organisation was possible could obviously be dealt with efficiency and economy if so organised, and what is more important would in the process assist in building up a feeling of the essential oneness of the defence organisation".

THE ISMAY PROPOSALS

The advice of General Hastings Lionel "Pug" Ismay, a British Indian Army officer and diplomat with unique experience of a prolonged association with higher defence structures in England and then Chief of Staff to the Viceroy was sought regarding how the higher defence management of the Armed Forces of newly Independent nation should be organised. Taking into consideration various factors prevailing at that time, he recommended a hierarchy of structures that would support the Cabinet Committee on Defence in its functioning. These are:

- A Defence Minister's Committee with the Defence Minister as Chairman, the Cs-in-C, Defence Secretary and the Financial Adviser as members.
- Defence Secretary's Committees for each of the three Services with the concerned Service Chief, Financial adviser and the Joint Secretary concerned with the Service as members. (These functioned until 1949 where after, they were converted to the Defence Minister's Committees for the Army, Navy

and the Air Force with the Defence Minister as Chairman and the concerned Service Chief, Defence Secretary and Financial Adviser as members).

- The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) consisting of the three Service Chiefs. Significantly, there was no separate Chairman for the COSC and the mantle of Chairmanship came upon the Chief who had been longest serving on the Committee.
- Other 'Inter-Services' Committees also set up such as the Joint Planning Committee, Joint Training Committee (JTC), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Inter-Services Equipment Policy Committee (ISEPC) and the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC). In addition were the Principal Personnel Officers Committee and the Principal Supply Officers Committee which were differently composed in that, apart from the concerned PSOs of the three Services Headquarters, they also had as Members representatives of the Ministry of Defence and Finance (Defence).
- A 'Military Wing' was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat to function under a Deputy Secretary (Military) as its head. The incumbent for this appointment was a Services officer of the rank of Brigadier and the post was held in rotation by the three Services.

“Organisation, Functions, Powers and Procedure of Defence Headquarters, 1952”: The Services Headquarters had continued to be an integral component of the Ministry of Defence and were part of the 'Apex Structure' of the Government of India until the issue of the Organisation, Functions, Powers and Procedure of Defence Headquarters in 1952 by which the Services HQ were designated as 'Attached Offices' of the Department of Defence. Much of the present day discord in Civil Military Relations is rooted in the issuance of these Rules. The non-inclusion of role of Services Chiefs or the Services Headquarters in the Allocation of Business Rules and the Transaction of Business Rules issued in 1961 only ratified the 'Attached Office' status of the Services Headquarters.

'JOINTNESS' IN POST-INDEPENDENCE OPERATIONS

How conjointly have the Indian Armed Forces operated in its post-Independence operations? The J&K Operations in 1947-48 were essentially fought by the Army, with the Air Force providing support to transport personnel and air support to a limited extent. The Air Force was not deployed in the 1962 war with China, a decision prominent military experts have assailed as a poor one. The Navy did not come into play at all.

The 1965 Indo-Pak war saw all three Forces participating in operations, but not on the basis of any pre-formulated operations plan. Late Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh, then war-time Air Chief had mentioned of his being asked for air support much after hostilities had broken out. Thereafter, the Air Force did participate in battle with much glory, but whether there had been a synergy with the Army in operations remains a moot question. The Navy's participation though having lent a psychological edge, is militarily viewed as a supportive role with no direct impact on the result of the war as such. There having being no Inquiry of the nature of the Kargil Review Committee on aspects of how the war was conducted, it is the accepted belief that India won the war, a victory claimed equally by Pakistan.

The 1971 war is the first military operation in which involved all three of India's Armed Forces. Field Marshal Manekshaw having sought time to join battle only after due preparation and after the northern mountain passes were snow bound did provide adequate time for joint planning, but did our Forces use that time draw up and operate under an overarching plan? Instances such as the attack on Chittagong being altered to Cox's Bazaar, the IAF attack of boats of the Mukti Bahini leading to own casualties are indicators to each force, in the words of Late Lt Gen JFR Jacob, 'doing their own thing'. In the bright glow of victory, no need was felt for an in-depth analysis of shortcomings on the battlefield. On the other hand, victory in war became an endorsement to the efficacy of the extant 'systems' no review was felt necessary.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka only established how far distant the three Forces were to any operational integration or jointness. The then GOC-in-C Southern Command, Lt Gen Depinder Singh was appointed Overall Force Commander (OFC) and a formal Directive was issued for the OFC to undertake the ordered missions with Commanders from all three Forces placed in subordination to him. The fissures in operating together surfaced very soon with the Cs-in-C of the Southern Air and Eastern Naval Commands not delegating command. This led to Component Commanders being designated and functioning as Liaison Officers between the OFC and their respective Cs-in-C.

The COSC itself saw dissensions and rifts and there was no authority to enforce directions. The Army component increased from one to four Divisions over the two years. Effectively, the OFC remained a Commander of the Army forces with the Navy and Air Force cooperating, but at levels far short of being integrated operations.

The two month long Kargil War of 1999 again highlighted points of functional discord between the Armed Forces, particularly Army and Air Force. Though essentially a land war, there was a critical requirement for Air support which, reportedly, came had come with some reluctance. The board room battles between the then Army and Air Force leadership have also been well reported. The Navy's decision for an enhanced concentration on the western seaboard has been militarily viewed by some analysts as being disproportionate to the extent of the envisaged naval threat. A significant aspect of the Army – Air Force standoff is whether the Air Force sought political approval for deployment of his force. On a point of principle, the Air Force has consistently maintained an independent role and status as a strategic asset as apart from a support force to the Army.

The Ministry of Defence is reluctant to let go of any portion of its vast controlling charter. The political leadership, whose authority in any case final, also do not perceive any pressing urgency in disturbing the status quo. Substantive Integration of the Services is hence still a far way off with no one bearing responsibility to provide it the requisite traction.

EARLY RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO REFORM

The Estimates Committee of India (1958): Headed by Shri Balwantrai Mehta, the Committee carried out a functional evaluation of the Defence Organisation after ten years of Independence. It recommended a 'Council System' as in the UK and for the Railway Board Administrative System be studied for adoption to the Defence Services. Some pertinent observations of the Committee are that there is an *"imbalance in the distribution of responsibility between Services Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence"*. And that the *"... existing system was inefficient, not making for economy or speedy decision making, ridden by considerable duplication with various segments functioning in a compartmentalised manner instead of moving jointly towards achieving common objectives"*.

Administrative Reforms Committee (1966): As head of a Sub-Committees that reviewed the higher defence organisation and presented their findings before the Nawab Ali Yavar Jang visualised regarding the need to appoint a CDS that *"(the Defence Services) 'should retain their separate identities but all operational matters need to be coordinated and operations eventually integrated.... We believe there is a need for a Chief of Defence Staff who would be the coordinator and the executive at the top echelon of all the three operational commands. The structure in peacetime should*

conform to the requirements of war". On an integrated Defence Ministry, he states: 'there is a factor to consider seriously of duplication of work which constitutes a waste, both financial and in terms of talent and time. Such duplication occurs mainly in the name of coordination and supervision, it contributes little except delay'.

THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

The next High-powered Committee to address the aspect of integration of the Ministry of Defence was the Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) headed by Shri Arun Singh, erstwhile Raksha Rajya Mantri with Gen K Sundarji and Shri K Subrahmanyam as its other members). Though the CDE Report is not in the public domain, its major recommendations, as gleaned from various references available, are:

- Integration of the three service headquarters and the setting up of a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) from among any service. He would represent the forces collectively in the Defence Ministry who would also have direct access to the Defence Minister.
- Measures to preclude triplication of duties at different levels - Ministry of Defence, Service Headquarters and Finance to cut delays and reduce bureaucratic interference.
- Enhanced financial powers to Service Chiefs who could directly channel funds according to priorities.
- Integration of the Ministry of Defence with the Services Headquarters with the Defence Secretary being nominated as the Principal Administrative Adviser to the Defence Minister with functions including coordination Perspective Plans, Budgets etc.
- Setting up of 'Services Boards' for the management of individual Services to improve efficiency in functional and administrative matters.

THE KARGIL REVIEW COMMITTEE

The K Subrahmanyam Committee was set up in 1999 to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions. On the aspect of National Security Management and Apex Decision-Making, the following extracts from the Committee's Report are relevant:

“India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure”.

“Army Headquarters has developed a command rather than a staff culture. Higher decisions on equipment, force levels and strategy are not collegiate but command-oriented. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister do not have the benefit of the views and expertise of the Army Commanders and their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force so that higher level defence management decisions are more consensual and broad-based. The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters”.

“The Committee is of the view that the present obsolete system, bequeathed to India by Lord Ismay, merits re-examination. An effective and appropriate national security planning and decision-making structure for India in the nuclear age is overdue, taking account of the revolution in military affairs and threats of proxy war and terrorism and the imperative of modernising the Armed Forces”, and that “the entire gamut of national security management and apex decision-making and the structure and interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters be comprehensively studied and reorganised”.

TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE

This Task Force, one of the four task Forces set up to consider the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee was headed by Shri Arun Singh with ten other members. Its terms of reference included examination of existing organisations and structures and recommend such changes, as considered necessary, for improving the management of the country’s defence, to inter alia examine the evolution and the changes that have taken place in other parliamentary democracies, to examine the apex decision making structure and the interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters and to examine the desirability, necessity and modalities of setting up an integrated command structure for the Armed Forces.

The major recommendations of the Task Force include the creation of an of appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), setting up of Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) Organisation and the creation of the Tri-Services command at Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC).

THE GROUP OF MINISTERS' REPORT ON "REFORMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM"(2001)

It is however the recommendations of the Report of the Group of Ministers on "Reforming the National Security System" submitted to the Prime Minister in February 2001 that are cardinal to the structural and systemic reforms that followed. Some pertinent extracts from the Report on the major systemic and structural changes it considered are given in succeeding paragraphs.

On Integration of Services Headquarters Into Government: The first of the fault lines the GOM sought to obliterate was that of the Services HQ being 'Attached Offices' of the Ministry of Defence. Attributing the 'erroneous perception' regarding these not being part of the Apex Governmental structure, the GOM recommended that *"in order to remove this impression, the Service Headquarters may be designated as "Integrated Headquarters" of the MoD. In order to give effect to this arrangement, the Transaction of Business Rules and Standing Orders should be appropriately amended and issued"*.

Alongside, the GOM recognised that the existing procedures involve multiplicity of levels/channels often lead to delays in decision-making and the need to progressively decentralise decision-making and delegate powers to the Service Headquarters, wherever feasible and, at the same time, *"for efficacious exercise of delegated financial and administrative powers, the decision-making apparatus within the Services needs to be upgraded and strengthened"*.

On appointing a CDS: The Committee observed that *"The COSC has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate. It needs to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS and a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS)"*. The envisaged role of the CDS is to Provide Single-Point Military Advice to the Government, to administer the Strategic Forces i.e. *"exercise administrative control, as distinct from operational military control"* over them and to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Planning Process through intra and inter-Service prioritisation besides ensuring the required "Jointness" in the Armed Forces, with functions and status of the CDS being that he *'may be a 4-star officer drawn from one of the three Services in rotation. He shall function as a permanent Chairman of the COSC with the VCDS as its Member-Secretary. Accordingly, he should rank primus inter pares in the COSC and function as the "Principal Military Adviser" to the Defence Minister'*.

On the Role of the Defence Secretary: The GOM also considered it "extremely important that there is no dilution in the role of the Defence Secretary as the "Principal Defence Adviser" to the Defence Minister". The

Defence Secretary should be officially designated in standing orders as the “Principal Defence Adviser” and rank *primus inter pares* among the secretaries in the MoD. This measure is intended to reinforce the view that this individual, *irrespective of pay scale or inter-service status*, is a vital element in the higher management of Defence and should be so recognised unequivocally in civilian and military hierarchies. Standing orders need to be promulgated specifying that the Defence Secretary has the primary responsibility for advising the Defence Minister on all policy matters and for the management of the Department, including financial management besides being responsible to the Defence Minister for Policy Advice, Besides supervising the Department of Defence, co-ordinating the functioning of all departments in the Ministry, the Defence Secretary bears the responsibility for co-ordinating the finalisation of the complete MoD Long Term Defence Perspective Plan, the five year and Annual budget for approval by the Defence Minister.

The GOM Report sought to resolve the long-standing issue of parity between civil and military functionaries by unequivocally emphasising that *“the Defence Secretary will function as “Principal Defence Adviser” to the Defence Minister in a manner similar to the role to be performed by the CDS as the “Principal Military Adviser” and both will enjoy an equivalent status in terms of their working relationship as distinct from the Warrant of Precedence. Similarly, the Defence Secretary must enjoy an equivalent status vis-à-vis the Chiefs of Staff, in so far as their functional relationship is concerned. Meetings convened by the Defence Secretary on issues concerning him shall be attended by the CDS as necessary and vice versa. The Chiefs of Staff will also attend the meetings convened by the Defence Secretary, if required and vice versa. The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that the aspect of Warrant of Precedence does not vitiate the working environment of the Ministry.*

The GOM has categorically placed primacy on functional efficacy over all other considerations such as status, pay scale etc.

THE NARESH CHANDRA TASK FORCE

The Report of the Task Force on National Security Management under the Chairmanship of Shri Naresh Chandra, though not in the public space, as gleaned from various media reports and discussions, made the following recommendations:

- (a) The Services HQ being given a specific role under the AOB and TOB Rules 1961, with the responsibility for the defence of the country being placed on the Services rather than on the Defence Secretary as at present.
- (b) The Services Headquarters are to be designated as 'Departments' of the Government of India under the Ministry of Defence, with the internal administration of each department being under the respective Vice Chiefs.
- (c) Induction of Military personnel into the Ministry of Defence, which would bring in professional knowledge and advice seemingly lacking at present.
- (d) Appointment of a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee who would coordinate and prioritise long-term procurement plans, administer tri-services institutions and agencies, the A&N Command as also other Commands such as the Special Forces Command. The PC COSC would also provide single-point military advice to the Government with direct access to the Raksha Mantri. The PC COSC is intended to be a precursor to the eventual appointment of the CDS on which a decision could be taken in due course.
- (e) The Service Chiefs also to have direct to the Raksha Mantri on individual service aspects.
- (f) The Department of Defence to administer all aspects with tri-services implications as also residual aspects, including the coordination between various departments of the Ministry of Defence, Defence Budget, control of Defence lands and properties, CSD, etc.

MAJOR FAULT-LINES

A summation of the major existing functional and systemic fault-lines that need to be addressed are:

- (a) No formal direct institutional Interface with Political Authority for the Services Chiefs.
- (b) Services Chiefs and Services HQ not yet included into the Apex structure of Government by their inclusion of their roles and functions into the AOB and TOB Rules. Though a re-designation of the Services HQ has been accepted as per the recommendations of the GOM and two are cosmetically known as 'Integrated HQ of the Ministry of Defence' all three Services HQ till now remain to be Attached Offices" of the Ministry of Defence for all practical purposes.
- (c) No visible traction towards creation of the appointment of CDS or even the

PC COSC.

- (d) The erstwhile procedures and systems continue as hitherto. The much required 'single file' system has not been resorted to which ensures the denial to Services HQ of how proposals forwarded for approval by them have been considered thereby depriving them of the knowledge domain to be noted and applied for future proposals.
- (e) Services Officers not yet been formally inducted into the Ministry of Defence who see no urgent requirement for an induction of professional 'hands on' expertise supporting the decision making process.
- (f) The Defence Minister functions through far too many Committees with varied members which slows down the decision making process and obfuscates authority with lack of accountability commensurate with responsibility.
- (g) Present apparatus headed by CISC more 'nodal' with no authority to overrule. Needs empowerment.
- (h) Budget allocation is not linked to requirements, which impacts comprehensive capability building.

JOINTNESS AND INTEGRATION IN PRESENT DAY CONTEXT

The two terms that many acclaim to be the "soul" and "body" of the emergent 'purple force'. At times used interchangeably, both need to be understood with due clarity on how they need to be applied to the Indian Defence and Defence apparatus in present day context.

There are a however concerns that need to be carefully addressed while charting out a future path of evolution towards an Integrated Indian Armed Force and some definitive caveats to comply.

Firstly, substantive integration does not restrict to between the three Armed Forces alone. There is but one overarching national military-security architecture for the nation which includes and incorporates besides the Military, several agencies, several even outside the control of the Ministry of Defence. Integration is therefore a multi-layered and multi-faceted process – not just within the Military but equally between the Services and the Ministry of Defence, as also between the Services and the Ministry of Defence on the one side and other Security related organisations on the other.

There is no gainsaying that tomorrow's wars would be 'non-linear' and fought across several dimensions including the cyber and information space.

Operations in the future operations would necessarily require to adopt methods of integrated war fighting so as to ensure a synergistic application of military power. It requires the Services' role in the overall National Security architecture being clearly defined and Armed Forces Commanders be made an intrinsic part of the 'Apex Structure' of Government, duly sanctified by their functions and roles being stipulated in the AoB and ToB Rules.

Furthermore, The Armed Forces would need to work closely at both the planning and execution levels, along with a host of other agencies, some even outside of the military-security canvas. The contours of how these agencies shall functionally integrate, particularly at times of operations, would need to be explicitly laid down, closely understood and regularly game-planned.

The role of the CDS in such a context needs to be pragmatically charted. There are several sharp questions to seek answer to. If he is to render 'single point military advice' what would he be advising about? On what basis and on whose inputs would that advice be based? Do any of the critical inputs on which he bases his advice sourced in agencies outside his command and control? If so, how does he validate the substance of those inputs? A useful reference on this is the book 'A Cabinet Secretary Looks Back' by Shri BG Deshmukh, erstwhile Cabinet Secretary who details how the then Chairman COSC, Gen K Sundarji, while rendering 'single point advice' on which basis IPKF operations were lodged had either missed or discounted intelligence assessments from the R&AW and the subsequent embarrassment that he and the Government had to face. The bottom line: Don't seek to shoulder a responsibility for a role whose successful execution is critically based upon inputs from others on who there is no direct control.

It is also imperative that there is an institutionalised participation of the Defence Services in all organisations whose policy initiatives / operational inputs have bearing on their execution of responsibilities, commencing first with the Ministry of Defence and extending to organisations such as the National Security Council Secretariat, the NTRO and the R&AW.

Other systemic changes that need to be brought about in the Ministry of Defence are a reversion to a Single File System between Min of Def and Services HQ and informed, specially trained and committed bureaucracy across the Defence Ministry and the Services Headquarters.

Ground realities have changed immensely in the seventeen years since submission of the GOM Report. Asymmetric and 4G warfare, not much

known at that time, are an ominous reality today and have altered the very nature of warfare. The efficacy of existing decision-making structures to respond adequately and in time to meet the challenges of emerging threats is, quite frankly, doubtful. The delay in approval of the CDS and Integrated Commands should be seized as an opportunity to revisit the solutions offered by the GOM Report and by the Naresh Chandra Committee. Only this time, the centrality of the debate must be centred within the Armed Forces.

There is at present, no unanimous Tri-Services visualisation regarding future security decision-making structures and of their own envisaged role in these. By default, therefore, the Services accept the formulations prescribed by the Committees. It is time the Services take an initiative to draw up their own considered solutions that are compliant to the requirements of present day warfare that would be their responsibility to wage. A vigorous ‘in-house’ discussion within the Services themselves, to confront contentious issues such as the CDS and Integrated Commands upfront and draw up practical solutions would be the appropriate first step. They would otherwise be left to implement and adjust to solutions derived by others to what are essentially their core issues.

SHRI. R CHANDRASHEKHAR



Shri R Chandrashekhar, former member of the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service held a unique string of select appointments during his thirty-five year career including extended tenures in the Chief of Army Staff Secretariat, which provided him a ring side view of the dynamics of Civil Military Relations as they played out. He is an alumni of the Fergusson College and the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Pune, he has attended the Executive Course at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies at Honolulu, Hawaii USA. Post his superannuation in 2013 as Additional Director General in 2013, he is presently Senior Fellow at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi. An ardent student of Civil Military Relations, his book ‘Rooks and Knights Civil Military Relations in India’ is regarded as a seminal treatise on the subject.

Armed Forces and Security of The Nation

Lt Gen PG Kamath (Veteran)

India occupies a unique geo strategic location in the world. It dominates the Sea Lines of Communication linking Middle East with Western Pacific countries. Economies of China, Japan, South Korea and Philippines are sustained by the oil from the Middle East. India by virtue of her dominant position virtually straddles this import sea route.

India has 14,000 Kms of land borders with six of her neighbours and maritime borders with eight countries. There are major disputes on the 4057 Kms long Sino-Indian Borders, bordering Tibet, 740 Kms long 'Line of Actual Control' of the 2900 Kms of Indo-Pak Border. It has disputed 96 Kms of disputed borders with Pakistan at Sir Creek. It further has over 4000 Kms borders with Bangladesh.

Pakistan claims the whole of Kashmir in addition to illegally occupied 78,114 Sq Kms. She has ceded 5280 Sq Kms of Saksgam Valley, a part of Indian territory to China. China in addition to the Saksgam Valley has illegally occupied 37,555 Sq Kms of Aksaichen. China also claims the whole of Arunachal Pradesh ie 90,000 Sq Kms as her territory and calls it Southern Tibet.

Further to that, we have a festering Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir since 1988. An insurgency in our strategic but vulnerable North East India though largely controlled however by no means dead and a simmering Left Wing Extremism (Maoists) along the Jungle Belt from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh and further spilling over to Karnataka and Kerala, has indeed become one of the major internal threats to the country.

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Two of our adversaries; China and Pakistan are nuclear and missile powers. The entire Indian Ocean is nuclearized. Suffice to say that India is one of the most dangerous places on earth. Little do we realise that peace in our neighbourhood can go up in flames in matters of minutes. Security is like air, as we only feel its absence and never recognise its presence, as we take it for granted. To provide the security that we live in today, our armed forces and other security forces are guarding the country day and night. George Orwell says “People sleep peacefully at night because rough men stand vigil to do violence on their behalf”. The very fact that one of the most dangerous places on earth has been made peaceful; we owe it to our security forces.

The primary role of the Armed Forces is to protect the country from external forces and safeguard the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Its secondary role is to accomplish internal security duties, when called upon to do so. If the law and order situation goes beyond the capacity of police and Central Armed Police Forces, the armed forces can be called to restore law and order in any part of the country. The Armed Forces can also be called upon to provide aid to the government during natural and artificial disasters like floods, earthquakes, cyclones and tsunami. All of us remember the way the Central Command of the Army and Airforce worked in ‘Operation Surya Hope’ during the unprecedented floods in Uttarkhand in 2013 and the deluge in Kashmir in 2014?

To safeguard the security of the nation, a nation can employ any or all her instruments of National Power. A country’s ‘Comprehensive National Power’ (CNP) has many constituents such as Economic, Political, Diplomatic, Science and Technology and Military Power. The cumulative effect of all the powers is called CNP.

ECONOMIC POWER

A country’s strength in economy is measured in terms of her trade, GDP, Per Capita Income, FDI and her Foreign Exchange Reserves. There are many other indicators that perceive the health of economy of the country. A country that has adequate financial resources would not only have a strong military but also would have substantial influence in the comity of nations. Money power can make friends out of enemies and isolate our adversaries in international fora. All other powers can be leveraged with greater financial powers. India

needs to overcome her poverty through socio-economic development. With over 300 million people living below the poverty line we cannot claim the status of a great power?

POLITICAL POWER

It is that power that is vested in the government after winning in elections through a legitimate election process as per the constitution. The collective will of over 1.3 billion people coalesced in the hands of the legitimate government, empowers it with political power to take sagacious decision for the good of the country without having to appease any section of the population. This power of people is what makes our country one of the strongest democracies in the world with a robust institutional mechanism for accountability.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL POWER

It is the power of Science and Technology that has driven the development of a nation. A country should aim at alleviating the distress and bringing about socio-economic development of her people through Science and Technology. India imports 70% of her arms, ammunition and equipment from foreign countries. It is due to our wrong policies that we are not able to increase our indigenous capability and are forced to depend on foreign sources for our arms requirements. Such dependency in times of war disables our strategic autonomy. Presently we have reached a sordid state, where we do not have a rifle; the basic weapon of a soldier. The 5.56 Insas Rifle has failed to live up to the operational expectations. We do not have a 'Light Machine Gun' the prime weapon at a section level and we do not have carbine that is carried by junior leaders in war. It is unbelievable but true that a country that is facing dangers from all its frontiers besides involved in insurgencies has reached a stage, where she does not have basic weapons for her fighting soldiers.

We have developed Prithivi and Agni series of Surface to Surface short range tactical and long range ballistic missiles respectively. In joint collaboration with Russia we have also developed Brahmos Cruise Missiles. Our endeavours in Surface to Air Missile though experimentally successful, we have not been able to operationalise it so far. There is a need for the country to focus our development in Science and Technology to assert our Strategic Autonomy and to give the required teeth to our armed forces. 'Make in India' program is

indeed the need of the day.

DIPLOMATIC POWER

It is the application of statecraft to meet a nation's objective. The power to assert, persuade, award, threaten, reward, punish, entice and coerce another sovereign nation to act in our interest is diplomacy. The props for diplomatic activity are our other elements of national power. Subtlety has to be used to ensure that the target nation is left with no other alternative but to respond in a way desired by us. Very hard bargains must not be attempted as the victim nation would only wait for an opportunity to avenge. It is the art of diplomacy that has to be cultivated by our diplomats. When the diplomacy fails the war starts; rather war is a failure in diplomacy. "Even if the snake is non-poisonous it should pretend to be poisonous" said Chanakya. It is the art of diplomacy to make the enemy perceive greater strength than, what one actually has.

The Great Chinese Military Thinker and General, 'Sun Tzu' had said that one should win a war without fighting a battle. As per him, it is the acme of 'Generalship'. What he meant was by manoeuvre, one gets to a position of advantage and the enemy forces are left with no choice but to seek surrender. Modifying the same to 'statecraft' a diplomat should convince the adversary that he has no chance to win and he will only bring death and destruction to his troops and civil populace should he join the war: Hence, it is in his best interest to adhere to some terms that would go a long way in keeping intact the prestige of his country and peace to his people. Similarly a diplomat need to use all the instruments of national power to get another nation to do what it otherwise would not have done.

MILITARY POWER

When any organisation, agency, establishment fails in the country then the armed forces are called to accomplish the mission. Be that a war against our adversaries or even routine but vital tasks. During the Commonwealth Games hosted at Delhi the footbridge meant for the athletes collapsed, while under construction; injuring 28 workers. Time was running short and no alternative was left with the government. The army was requisitioned and the bridge was constructed in a matter of six days and was handed over to the administration. It saved the nation its prestige. The present task of building three commuter

bridges in Mumbai is indeed avoidable as it is not a national emergency. Similarly a couple of years back, when electric cable got severed that was supplying power to the Kashmir Valley in the height of winters, it was the Indian Air force that laid fresh cables from helicopters and restored power to the valley.

When all the other powers that a country has; fails to meet our objectives then the Military power is unleashed on our adversary, in combination with other elements of national power. The capacity of a country to wage war and defend herself on land, sea, air, space, cyber and in conventional and sub-conventional wars in a nuclear biological and chemical environment, is the military power of a nation. Military power is the ultimate power-broker in a geo-strategic power play. Nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, Inter-continental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, anti-satellite missiles, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles along with our army, air force, navy, Central Armed Police forces are the elements of Military Power. Clausewitz has said that “war is politics by other means”. To wage a war is a political decision to meet the nation’s objective. Mao has said “political power flows through the barrel of a gun”. There is a saying that one can go far with a smile but he can go much farther with a smile and a gun. President Franklin Roosevelt, the US President during the Second World War had said “Speak softly but carry a Big Stick”. The ‘Big Stick’ he referred was the Military Power of United States.

SERIES OF STRATEGIC BLUNDERS

It was in Sep 1947, the first C in C of independent India Gen Robert Lockhart went with ‘Defensive Plan for India’ for Nehru’s approval to which he had retorted “ We are Non Aligned and Non-violent ; we have no enemies; scrap the army and all we need is a police force”. It was Pakistan led aggression on the state of Jammu and Kashmir a month later that perhaps saved the army from being scrapped but we lost one third of Jammu and Kashmir due to our seeking the UN help and asking for cease-fire on 01 Jan 1949. It can be called as one of the most disastrous decision ever taken in our history, where in one stroke we gave away a third of Jammu and Kashmir to the Pakistan as a reward for her perfidy and proving our pacific and supine credentials as a soft state that is high on ideals but lacking strategic vision to act in our national interest.

We also complained to UN against Pakistan under Chapter 6 of UN Charter that deals with ‘pacific settlements of disputes’ and not under Chapter 7 that deals with an aggression. This grave error limited the UN from using

force and brought in the Cease Fire and the dispute has not been resolved to this date. We thus promoted an 'aggressor' into a 'disputant'. It was indeed an unpardonable blunder by the government in 1949 under Pandit Nehru.

In spite of facing an Indo-Pak war over J & K in 1947-48, we still continued to reduce the strength of our armed forces by two lakhs. Not a single rifle was added since independence till Sino-Indian war of 1962. C in C's appointment was rescinded and Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy and Air Force were created though the three service chiefs continued to be operational commanders of their respective services. As per Government of India, Allocation of Business Rules, 1961 and Transaction of Business Rules it is the Department of Defence under the Defence Secretary that is responsible for the defence of India. All the three service chiefs and all military personnel have been left out of the ambit of the rules thereby depriving them of all powers. The Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters were made attached offices of the Ministry of Defence. To this day they continue not to be a part of the Ministry and have remained as attached headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. Thus the service headquarters have been giving no powers to function leading to the most humiliating defeat that the country faced in 1962.

The shortages that the country faces even to today, is as a result of divorcing the power, responsibility and accountability in the organisational structure of the Ministry of Defence. The Chief of Army Staff had also written to PM of the country in Mar 2012 stating his concern of the colossal hollowness that continue to persists in the Indian Army in terms of weapons, equipment, ammunition and the serious deficiencies adversely affecting our night fighting capabilities. Who is responsible for the sordid state of affairs? Why did Admiral Joshi the Chief of Naval Staff resign and note the haste the defence minister Anthony accepted the resignation? Why the Defence Secretary, who is vested with all the powers, not resign? Why the defence minister did not resign?

India an ancient civilisation, with war like traditions and an army that had fought so gloriously in both the World Wars suffered an inglorious defeat at the hands of Chinese in 1962? Half a billion people; the population of the country at that time were made to genuflect before a foreign power? A nation that was colonialized for over two centuries under foreign rule, should have been more prudent in ensuring its security and safeguarding its sovereignty after independence. Instead, we made a mess of our armed forces; denigrating them and lowering their status and leaving them out of defence policy structure thus downsizing a potent instrument of national power to meet the inevitable

fate of humiliating defeat by the Chinese? Who is responsible for the defeat? Where is the Henderson Brooks Report? Though the defence minister had to resign; what happened to the Defence Secretary who was responsible as per the Business of India Rules? Does anyone know who the Defence Secretary was then? It is one; O Pulla Reddy, who was brought by Krishna Menon and exited a month after his resignation after serving as defence secretary for four years and masterminding the defeat of our country? Has there been any inquiry against him for letting down the nation? Has he been put in jail for letting down the nation? Similarly the Defence Secretaries who presided over the virtual demise of Indian Navy and hollowness in the Indian Armed Forces from 2009 to 2013; Pradeep Kumar and Shashi Kant Sharma; what has happened to them? After their retirement one became a CVC and the other a CAG. The government has indeed rewarded them post retirement with exalted appointments to honour their services to our adversaries?

In 1971 Operations, Indian Armed Forces in conjunction with Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Force) overran the whole of East Pakistan in matter of two weeks. A new nation was born and Pakistan was totally defeated both in the East and West. India had over 93000 prisoners of war, who were camped in India till the decision on Shimla Accord. There was a great public pressure in Pakistan to get their soldiers home. It was indeed a right time to sort out the Kashmir issue; once and for all in return of prisoners. The strategic victory on the banks of Padma was converted into a political fiasco in the mountains of Shimla. The entire 93000 prisoners of war were released without having taken one strategic advantage except a verbal understanding from PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that he would go back and sort out the Jammu & Kashmir Issue. Mrs Indira Gandhi and DP Dhar believed in a Pakistani statesman, who probably had never uttered a truth in his life? Even the war criminals required for massive genocide in erstwhile East Pakistan were not tried? The diplomacy of Bhutto was matched by naivety of Mrs Indira Gandhi?

EXTERNAL THREATS

There are number of external threats such as environmental, drug, terrorists, nuclear, biological, chemical and lastly conventional war with nuclear dimension, which are faced by India. If one reads the books written by Pakistan Army Officers after the 1965 war, they always rue as to; why did they not attack India in conjunction with China in 1962? Even in 1965 they knew for sure it

was the Chinese pressure from the North that brought about India to accept the ceasefire. China had carried threatening move from the North including concentration of troops, violations across different points on the Line of Actual Control to pressurise India to accept ceasefire. The roles played by both US and the Soviets again hastened the Ceasefire. Again in 1971 the Americans sided with Pakistan and Kissinger went out of the way to cajole China to move against India telling in specifics that they would not intervene, if they do so. It was only China's wisdom that she did not enter the war in conjunction with Pakistan, as she wanted to show to the world that she was a responsible power, prior to her induction in to UN as permanent member of the Security Council and member of general assembly in place of Taiwan.

Currently we are actually facing two and half front war; China, Pakistan and insurgency situation caused by both Pakistan and China to internally disrupt communications, destroy infrastructures such as roads, railways, telecommunications, cause mayhem and confusion in hinterland thus ensuring large forces are tied down for protection and security duties. Pakistan has already declared that the terrorist organisations are her strategic assets and they will unite in a war against India. She has cultivated these terrorist organisations separately and has taken action only against those like TTP (Tehrike Taliban Pakistan) that is fighting against the state of Pakistan. Other terrorists organisations like Al Qaida, Afghan Taliban, Haqqanis and others designed to fight against India like LeT, Harkat ul Ansar, Lakshar e Jhangvi and many more have been cultivated and supported to be used as strategic assets against India, Afghanistan and US.

India needs to build up her capacities to fight this two and half front war. The infrastructure on our borders, procurement of weapons and equipment, raising of a mountain offensive corps, operationalising the mountain artillery with light weight howitzers, developing enhanced ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and developing a thermo-nuclear weapon have long gestation periods. The country has to plan now for the next two decades. The preparations have to be done on war footing lest we miss the bus? The only way, we can keep the Chinese minding their own business is to develop a strong deterrence against them. A deterrence with offensive content i.e. if China attacks; she should not have doubts that we will not only absorb the attack but also will have the offensive capacity to capture another military or terrain objective in her territory, where she will lose her face in front of the world community. Two offensive mountain corps and hydrogen bombs with megaton yield, with

MIRV capability with launch range of 15000 Kms from land, air and under-sea configuration alone will make China respect us. The question always rises if the threat materialises before we build up our capacities? It is for this reason we want the public opinion to form in the country that can put pressure on the government. A country that was enslaved for nearly three centuries and also having lost a war against China; just cannot be complacent on security.

India also needs to shape the geo-political and geo-strategic situation around India in such a way that the two countries China and Pakistan do not collude against India. We need a long term perspective of the world affairs and fine skills of diplomacy. We need to play our cards well in our relations with US, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, rest of ASEAN countries and Australia. We need to side with Japan in East China Sea Dispute. We need to support rim countries of South China Sea in their dispute with China; uphold the judgement of Permanent Court of Arbitration of UNCLOS. We have strategic interest in Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics and Mongolia. We need to combine with Russia to ensure that our strategic presence and trade flourishes with these countries through Chabahar port that has been partially operationalised. We have even agreed to develop the hinterland of the port in conjunction with Iran. We should have strategic cards to exploit internal dissensions in Baluchistan, Sinkiang and Tibet to our strategic advantage.

INTERNAL THREATS

India became a union after forging together of over 600 independent princely states. The present states were formed on basis of language to ensure the regional identities are maintained within the national framework. The constitution was made federal to ensure that there is unity in diversity.

North East Insurgency - The Naga insurgence started in early 1950s and it spread to other states in the North East India. Soon Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura were under the sceptre of insurgency. Later, it spread to Assam and Meghalaya and two southernmost districts of Tirap and Changlang of Arunachal Pradesh. A combination of military actions and political effort has been able to sort out most of the insurgency problems. Naga talks are in the most advanced stage and it is hoped peace will be restored earlier than later. The Manipur insurgency is still festering. The Assam insurgence though largely controlled and talks are on with ULFA sans the militant faction headed by Paresh Barua. Bodo militants are still largely active in the Brahmaputra

Valley. Large and small; there are over 40 militant groups operating in North East India. The entire North East is linked to India by a narrow corridor of 21 Kms through which passes vital road and railway communications, electrical transmission grid, oil pipelines and information highways. The narrow corridor is tri-junction of Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh and very close to it lies the Southern tip of Chumbi Valley of Tibet that is controlled by China. Recent China's attempt to construct road in the Dolam Plateau; a territory of Bhutan has been stymied by Indian forces. China wanted to push the Southern tip of Chumbi valley further closer to the strategic tri-junction. This is likely to be a flash point in future.

Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir - With the total defeat faced by Pakistan against India in 1971 operations; with the dismemberment of her eastern portion; Pakistan has understood that she would not be able to fight a conventional war against India. She has also developed a nuclear capability against India so that the conventional edge in favour of India is neutralised. As also, she has resorted to fight a proxy war with India by using Terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Her active cultivation, training and equipping the anti-India terrorists for terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India like parliament and Mumbai attacks is her execution of policy of proxy war. Though the policy to support terrorism has proved her very costly that she has become a victim of her own state policy. Tehrike Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has become so strong that it is posing an existential threat to Pakistan. She has been forced to use her army and air force to clear the terrorists from Waziristan. A number of airbases, naval base, army headquarters, and her troop convoys have been attacked by an emboldened TTP. The Baluchistan Liberation Front is also posing a threat to liberate Baluchistan from Pakistan. The sectarian strikes between Shia and Sunni are almost a daily happening in Pakistan. The ongoing struggle between MQM, Al Qaida and Government forces for control over Karachi has resulted in Karachi being one of the most violent cities in the world today. The recent capitulation of Pakistan's civil government to 'Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah' is a case in point that shows the gradual erosion of the writ of the elected government.

India also cannot rest content till the POK is liberated from foreign yoke and brought under the democratic set up of India. We cannot accept the loss of POK and Northern Territories of over 78000 Sq Kms to Pakistan? Our political leaders need to remind our public and build up our economic and military power to be able to take back the entire J & K from both Pakistan

and China. The country needs to be reminded of the resolution adopted by the parliament on 14 Nov 1962 to take back every inch of land invaded by China? It was PM Narshimha Rao, who said that the only thing unresolved with Pakistan is the return of POK. This policy need to be pursued.

Left Wing Extremism (Maoist) - Today the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) has spread to over 230 districts of India. It extends though the red corridor of jungles from Pashupati (Nepal) to Tirupati, further spilling over to Karnataka and Kerala. It comprises of those exploited section of Indian population; mainly tribal and peasants, where even rudimentary civilisation has not reached. The Dandakaranya belt of jungles in Chhattisgarh has not yet been surveyed even after 70 years of independence. It is in these areas, where health and education has not reached. Roads and railways have reached selected places to enable exploitation of rich raw materials and deprive the people of their livelihoods. Contractors and multinational are exploiting the rich mineral resources of the area, impoverishing the countryside economically and environmentally. The administrative machinery is non- existing and if it does exists, it is only to exploit local people. The people are being exploited by revenue and forest officials and the police machinery. The environment has become conducive to the birth and sustenance of Maoist insurgency. The local youths were given arms and trained by the leadership basically from Andhra Pradesh to fight the India Union and bring about a revolution and take over the country by violent means. The strategy is take over the entire countryside and later strangle the cities and brings about a revolution to take over the entire country under a red flag. Currently it is posing the gravest threat to the country?

The root cause of the entire problem is 'poor governance'. Since independence, even semblance of administration has not reached them? Who is responsible for the poor governance that has plummeted the country to one of its worst internal crisis? There is no doubt the political leadership in various states and the country has failed the nation. However there is one more agent of administration that has failed the country? It is the bureaucracy. Had all the district collectors in each district since independence had worked sincerely in their respective districts bringing about administrative changes and extending facilities to them in terms of education, health, employment and socio-economic development: would we have reached the present state where over 230 districts are affected by LWE? Why is the country not asking the hard question as to who is responsible for this sordid state of affairs? Do we have to continue with the same system of administration as hither-to-before that has proved its

inadequacy time and again? Don't we have to transform the administration and bring in technocrats and specialists in administration and not merely depend upon the existing system to administer this country?

CIVIL – MILITARY DIVIDE

As on today the Civil – Military Divide is deep in the higher defence organisation. Its genesis is attributed to Nehruvian Policy of keeping out the defence forces outside the ambit of policy making. Nehru always believed that the Armed Forces were an instrument of British Imperialism. He was also fearful of the Armed Forces as he always feared a coup by them? Many countries in the middle of 20th century got their independence from colonialism and some like Egypt, Sudan, Columbia, Cuba, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey and North Yemen came under military rule. Nehru's intrinsic fear that the 'man on the horse back' will come and incarcerate him and take over the country was so deep rooted that he undermined and relegated the Armed Forces to the nadir and relied on his close advisers and bureaucrats to administer the country. The defeat at the hands of Chinese humbled and humiliated him and he died in next year and half, before he could make changes in the administration.

Nehru's lack of experience in handling Armed Forces was obvious that during Indo- Pak War of 1947-48 the Defence Committee Meetings of independent India were presided over by Lord Mountbatten. It is unbelievable but true that the first two Cs in C of independent India, who fought the war were British Generals. The first C in C, Gen Robert Lockhart was confided by General Gracy, Pakistan Army Chief, warning him about the tribal invasion planned by Pakistan Army against Jammu and Kashmir. Gen Robert Lockhart did not disclose this important information to Nehru and when questioned by the latter as to why he did not inform; put in his resignation. The second C in C, Gen Robert Roy Bucher was again a British. With Lord Mountbatten presiding over the Defence Committee Meetings and British C in C, commanding Indian Armed Forces; it is little wonder we complained to UN prematurely under wrong provisions and brought UN sponsored Ceasefire on 1 Jan 1949 leaving over 78000 Sq Kms of J & K in the hands of Pakistan.

Post Kargil operations the 'Kargil Review Committee' headed by the doyen of India Strategic thinking, K Subramanian gave out several important recommendations. It was followed by the recommendations of 'Group of

Ministers' under the then Deputy Prime Minister, LK Advani. Some cosmetic changes were done but the main parts of recommendations i.e. to appoint a Chief of Defence Forces to give direct advice on Military Matters to Raksha Mantri and integration of Ministry of Defence with officers from Armed Forces for better comprehension and coordination of the armed forces have not been done so far? This was followed by Naresh Chandra Committee as to why the recommendations of the earlier committees have not been implemented? The Naresh Chandra Committee gave out its recommendations in 2012 almost on the same lines of the earlier committees; which have again put in cold storage as the bureaucrats in the Ministry do not want to implement the recommendations that would curb their powers. The service headquarters are also content with statuesque rather than upset the applecart that will see the service chiefs subordinated to 'Chief of Defence Staff'.

Today we have a headless Headquarters of Integrated Defence Staff with no CDS. The headquarters report to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, largely a ceremonial appointment held by the senior most service chief, who has little time or inclination or powers of a CDS to do his job effectively. It leaves the Defence Secretary with no idea on defence matters to take important decision thus endangering the security of the country. The Ministry of Defence with no uniformed personnel integrated in its hierarchy take the Raksha Mantri up the garden path of ignorance and naivety resulting in massive hollowness in the armed forces and near depletion of Indian Navy with over 11 accidents in the years 2012-13? The Ministry of Defence with only civilians with no knowledge on defence matters derive comforts in collective ignorance and keep the Defence Minister cocooned from professional military advice, save for the files, which the Minister has no time or inclination to understand. The smart shadow file of the ministry is always preferred by the Minister to the unwieldy professional file of the service headquarters leading to the decisions as desired by the bureaucrats ignoring professional recommendations; thus willy-nilly endangering the security of the country. The new defence minister; hopefully would do a better job?

The civil – military divide in the country is deep and wide. It cannot be bridged by cosmetic changes but needs transformation of higher defence organisation. If this is not done the country will continue to suffer. With 70 years after independence, over 70% of arms and equipment imported, the fourth largest army in the world continue to languish without basic weapons; a depleted air force with only 32 operational squadron against a sanctioned

strength of 44 and a depleting navy. Though new orders have been given to get the Navy to its strength, however it would still take more that 5-7 years before the Navy comes back to their minimum acceptable operational readiness. The country's politicians continue to live under the illusion of 1971 victory with no thought for the future? So much for the security of a nation; that was enslaved for 300 years and still not learnt to treasure their freedom?

CONCLUSION

Indian Armed Forces is an instrument of our country. It is the military power that a nation needs, to preserve her sovereignty and integrity. Its battle-worthiness at all times, keeps the country ticking. The Armed Forces preserve and uphold the constitution of the country so that everyone else can contribute to growth and development of the country. It is naïve to expect that some other external power will take care of the security of our nation. The battles that a country has to fight have to be fought by her citizens. The alternative is slavery. A nation of 1.3 billion people cannot outsource her security. All citizens have a stake in the wellbeing and combat capacity of the Armed Forces of the country. Unless our public opinion develops and questions the politicians on strategic vision of the country; they are content to appease minorities and dole out largesse for vote bank politics and neglect larger issues. It is the public opinion that alone would ensure that we have strong armed forces that serve as an effective instrument of state policy. An economically strong India with strong armed forces can alone ensure the country has deterrence to keep our enemies at bay and bring about socio economic development of our nation.

LT GEN. P. G. KAMATH



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Some Aspects of President Trump's Move Concerning Jerusalem

Shrinivasrao S. Soboni I.A.S. (Retd.)

On 2 November 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour informed the influential Zionist and leader of high finance, Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, about the British Cabinet headed by Prime Minister David Lloyd George having approved a policy statement which came to be known later as the "Balfour Declaration".

Of just 67 words but finely nuanced and momentous, the text of the Declaration read: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

Into the third year of the Great War, British policy-makers had calculated that in lieu of support of Zionism, Jewish banking and high finance interests would share the British Government's growing war expenses, and they would also induce the United States to join the War.

Meanwhile, even as the Communist Revolution of 1917 convulsed Russia, and Europe remained mired in WWI, a British Expeditionary Force consisting of British, Indian, Australian and New Zealand troops was fighting a series of arduous battles against Turkish and German troops, for Jerusalem.

Following several hard-fought actions, Gen. Sir Edmund Allenby, commander of the British Expeditionary force entered Jerusalem on 8 December 1917.

Thus ended no less than 973 years of Muslim rule over Jerusalem including 400 consecutive years of oppression by Turkey.

It is to be noted what four centuries of Turkish overlordship had entailed. During the entire period the non-Muslim population of Jerusalem had had to endure pernicious impositions of Islamic practices and procedures as per the Sunnah and Shari'a.

Under pain of death by torture and decapitation, completely outlawed was the open practice of any religion other than Islam. The building of churches and synagogues was verboten; church bells were forbidden; non-Muslims (termed *Dhimmis*, like the Nazi German term 'Untermenschen') stood deprived of basic human rights, and had to pay the 'Jizya' tax, i.e. the poll tax levied on all who adhered to a religion other than Islam. Numerous other disabilities and prohibitions and inflictions obtained under a plethora of Civil, Military, and Criminal laws standard in Dar'ul Islam.

Furthermore, in 1915, a terrifying call had gone out throughout the Ottoman Empire (Turkish-ruled territories) to kill and get rid of each and every Christian. In Armenia alone, one and a half million were massacred. In and around Jerusalem, Jewish and Christian people lived in fear under the specter of horrific carnage, rapine, and slavery.

(NB: Here a historical detail may be of particular interest to Indian readers. Two Indian Regiments, viz. the Mysore and the Jodhpur Lancers, by their spectacular martial intervention had led to the liberation of beleaguered Jerusalem. Together they had attacked and overpowered vital and well-entrenched German-Turkish positions in the crucial Battle of Haifa; capturing as many as 1,350 German and Turkish prisoners, including two German officers, 35 Turkish officers, 17 artillery guns, a 6-inch naval gun, 11 machine guns, and 4 camel guns. The Lancers' own casualties had amounted to eight killed and 34 wounded. 60 horses were killed and another 83 injured.)

For the British Government, the victorious campaign afforded a dominant military presence in the region -- territorial suzerainty of far-reaching significance.

Apart from the prestige and sentimental importance of freeing Jerusalem from the repressive Turkish yoke, there were invaluable politico-military and economic gains.

Control in this part of the world enabled Great Britain to safeguard its trade and strategic communications to India, and all across the Indo-Pacific region including Australia, New Zealand, and other Island territories; as also to keep at an arm's length any other strategic power.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War (1939-1945), however, a shrunken and debilitated Great Britain ceded strategic space and status to the United States of America. On the discovery of vast reservoirs of oil in Arabia in 1931, the US had struck timely long-term deals with the Al Saud regime to avail of vital hydrocarbon resources, and exploit Saudi Arabia's strategic value in worldwide geopolitics.

Arranging to ensure unhindered supply of oil for itself from diverse producers in

region, the US saw in Israel an able and willing ally and proxy policeman. The Jewish community in the US and Europe including leaders of global finance proved bulwarks of support for the US-Israel alliance.

Thus, even as the US remained heavily dependent on Arab oil supply, primarily from Saudi Arabia, the US-Israeli symbiotic relationship commenced and then continued through seven decades. Israel became the recipient of by far the greatest quantum and range of financial, military, and political support from the US of any country in the world.

Over the past decade, the US, via development of fracking technology, augmented its domestic oil production capacity, succeeded in achieving self-sufficiency in oil, and graduated to becoming a major net exporter of oil.

No longer having to rely on Oil supplies from the Middle East, afforded the US wide ambit to reorient and recalibrate its foreign policy, and define and pursue revised goals, strategy and operational programs in West Asia, the Levant, and North Africa. Meanwhile, linkages of US political parties and special interests with Jewish high finance expanded. All along, the US Government, Legislature, and public opinion remained supportive of Israel's position in relation to Palestine and Jerusalem.

Full one hundred years after the Balfour Declaration and ending of the millennium-long Muslim rule over Holy Jerusalem, it became feasible for US President Donald Trump to make a major move on Jerusalem. He had promised it during his Presidential campaign to resonate especially with Christian evangelists and the influential and financially powerful Jewish community.

Still, his announcement of 6 December 2017 took the world community by surprise, and is reverberating round the globe.

President Trump read from a prepared text on teleprompters. It was not something off-the-cuff and extempore that he spoke. Each sentence, phrase, and word in it is to be construed with due attention. Per the official Whitehouse site, www.whitehouse.gov the text of the statement was as follows:

"When I came into office, I promised to look at the world's challenges with open eyes and very fresh thinking. We cannot solve our problems by making the same failed assumptions and repeating the same failed strategies of the past. Old challenges demand new approaches.

My announcement today marks the beginning of a new approach to conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

In 1995, Congress adopted the Jerusalem Embassy Act, urging the federal government to relocate the American embassy to Jerusalem and to recognize that that city -- and so importantly -- is Israel's capital. This act passed Congress by an overwhelming bipartisan majority and was reaffirmed by a unanimous vote of the Senate only six months ago.

Yet, for over 20 years, every previous American president has exercised the law's waiver, refusing to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem or to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital city.

Presidents issued these waivers under the belief that delaying the recognition of Jerusalem would advance the cause of peace. Some say they lacked courage, but they made their best judgments based on facts as they understood them at the time. Nevertheless, the record is in. After more than two decades of waivers, we are no closer to a lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. It would be folly to assume that repeating the exact same formula would now produce a different or better result.

Therefore, I have determined that it is time to officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

While previous presidents have made this a major campaign promise, they failed to deliver. Today, I am delivering.

I've judged this course of action to be in the best interests of the United States of America and the pursuit of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. This is a long-overdue step to advance the peace process and to work towards a lasting agreement.

Israel is a sovereign nation with the right like every other sovereign nation to determine its own capital. Acknowledging this as a fact is a necessary condition for achieving peace.

It was 70 years ago that the United States, under President Truman, recognized the State of Israel. Ever since then, Israel has made its capital in the city of Jerusalem -- the capital the Jewish people established in ancient times. Today, Jerusalem is the seat of the modern Israeli government. It is the home of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, as well as the Israeli Supreme Court. It is the location of the official residence of the Prime Minister and the President. It is the headquarters of many government ministries.

For decades, visiting American presidents, secretaries of state, and military leaders have met their Israeli counterparts in Jerusalem, as I did on my trip to Israel earlier this year.

Jerusalem is not just the heart of three great religions, but it is now also the heart of one of the most successful democracies in the world. Over the past seven decades, the Israeli people have built a country where Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and people of all faiths are free to live and worship according to their conscience and according to their beliefs.

Jerusalem is today, and must remain, a place where Jews pray at the Western Wall, where Christians walk the Stations of the Cross, and where Muslims worship at Al-Aqsa Mosque.

However, through all of these years, presidents representing the United States have declined to officially recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. In fact, we have declined to acknowledge any Israeli capital at all.

But today, we finally acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel's capital. This is nothing more, or less, than recognition of reality. It is also the right thing to do. It's something that has to be done.

That is why, consistent with the Jerusalem Embassy Act, I am also directing the State Department to begin preparation to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This will immediately begin the process of hiring architects, engineers, and planners, so that a new embassy, when completed, will be a magnificent tribute to peace.

In making these announcements, I also want to make one point very clear: This decision is not intended, in any way, to reflect a departure from our strong commitment to facilitate a lasting peace agreement. We want an agreement that is a great deal for the Israelis and a great deal for the Palestinians. We are not taking a position of any final status issues, including the specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, or the resolution of contested borders. Those questions are up to the parties involved.

The United States remains deeply committed to helping facilitate a peace agreement that is acceptable to both sides. I intend to do everything in my power to help forge such an agreement. Without question, Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues in those talks. The United States would support a two-state solution if agreed to by both sides.

In the meantime, I call on all parties to maintain the status quo at Jerusalem's holy sites, including the Temple Mount, also known as Haraam al-Sharif.

Above all, our greatest hope is for peace, the universal yearning in every human soul. With today's action, I reaffirm my administration's longstanding commitment to a future of peace and security for the region.

There will, of course, be disagreement and dissent regarding this announcement. But we are confident that ultimately, as we work through these disagreements, we will arrive at a peace and a place far greater in understanding and cooperation.

This sacred city should call forth the best in humanity, lifting our sights to what it is possible; not pulling us back and down to the old fights that have become so totally predictable. Peace is never beyond the grasp of those willing to reach.

So today, we call for calm, for moderation, and for the voices of tolerance to prevail over the purveyors of hate. Our children should inherit our love, not our conflicts.

I repeat the message I delivered at the historic and extraordinary summit in Saudi Arabia earlier this year: The Middle East is a region rich with culture, spirit, and history. Its people are brilliant, proud, and diverse, vibrant and strong. But the incredible future awaiting this region is held at bay by bloodshed, ignorance, and terror.

Vice President Pence will travel to the region in the coming days to reaffirm our commitment to work with partners throughout the Middle East to defeat radicalism that threatens the hopes and dreams of future generations.

It is time for the many who desire peace to expel the extremists from their midst. It is time for all civilized nations, and people, to respond to disagreement with reasoned debate — not violence.

And it is time for young and moderate voices all across the Middle East to claim for them a bright and beautiful future.

So today, let us rededicate ourselves to a path of mutual understanding and respect. Let us rethink old assumptions and open our hearts and minds to possible and possibilities. And finally, I ask the leaders of the region -- political and religious; Israeli and Palestinian; Jewish and Christian and Muslim -- to join us in the noble quest for lasting peace.

Thank you. God bless you. God bless Israel. God bless the Palestinians. And God bless the United States. Thank you very much. Thank you.” (Quotation ends)

The world's media suggests that President Trump's announcement was like a tectonic seismic shock to Muslims worldwide.

Across the Muslim world from North Africa and West Asia to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia, demonstrations and condemnations erupted against President Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel - although it had been functioning as such for decades - as mentioned in his address.

People set fire to US and Israeli flags and destroyed effigies of President Trump in Muslim-majority countries around the globe, including Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Muslim countries whether Sunni or Shi'i issued vociferous condemnations and protestations in public.

Speaking in Parliament, Iran's President Rouhani stated Tehran was willing to “restore good relations with Riyadh” (revealing two conditions for a rapprochement: “We want Saudi Arabia to stop two things, the misguided friendship with Israel and the inhuman bombardment of Yemen”).

Afghanistan is a country, eking out a hand-to-mouth existence almost completely dependent for its very survival on US financial handouts, yet its National Assembly called on Governments and peoples throughout the Muslim world to suspend ties with the US.

“Hezbollah”'s leader called the Trump statement a “Second Balfour Declaration”.

“Al-Qaida” urged its followers around the world to target vital interests of the United States, its allies and Israel. A statement posted on al-Qaida's media arm “as-Sahab” called for a “holy war” or Jihad, and described America as an oppressor of Muslims.

The “Palestinian Islamic Jihad”, and the “Palestine Resistance Camp” stressed the need for stepping up attacks, particularly against U.S. embassies, interests and troops, and even called for a new Intifada.

In an article titled “Either America or Jerusalem,” in the Lebanese daily *Al-Akhbar*, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, its influential editor-in-chief Ibrahim Al-Amin wrote: “We will not reclaim [even] one piece of Palestine unless we declare total war (on the U.S.) and make its life hell, its flag a symbol of disgrace, and its army a wild beast wandering the world...”

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also reiterated concerns of undermining the peace process, saying. “I have consistently spoken out against any unilateral measures that would jeopardize the prospect of peace for Israelis and Palestinians,”

Fourteen nations, aside from the United States, of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council held a meeting and derided the announcement. These 14 included the Japan, China, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal, Bolivia, Uruguay, and four European countries: UK, France, Italy, Sweden.

After attending the UNSC meeting, the Ambassadors of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, went so far as to issue a joint statement that President Trump’s decision was “not in line with Security Council resolutions and was unhelpful in terms of prospects for peace in the region”. Traditional allies of the US, most notably the UK, came out with critical and even derisive comment.

Sweden’s UN ambassador Olaf Skoog said the US action “contradicts international law and Security Council resolutions”, stressing that Jerusalem’s status is to be decided in direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

French ambassador Francois Delatorre expressed regret at the US decision, citing legal grounds, its impact on efforts to reach a two-state solution, and the potential escalation of violence. He said the United States must explain how Mr Trump’s action aligns with the legal foundation “on which all peace efforts are based”.

Sebastiano Cardi, from Italy, said Jerusalem’s status must be negotiated and expressed serious concern at “the risk of unrest and tensions in the region”.

Japan’s ambassador Koro Bessho said his government opposes “any unilateral measures” and feared the heightened tensions on the ground, saying violence “can easily snowball into larger crises”.

The European Union warned that the US decision could further destabilize the region.

To such statements was US UN Ambassador Nicky Haley’s retort. She urged all countries “to temper statements and actions in the days ahead,” and sounded a note of caution that anyone who used Mr Trump’s announcement as a pretext for violence would show that they were “unfit partners for peace”.

In view of the foregoing, certain indications emanating from sources in the Kingdom of Saudi Arab and the Muslim world are especially noteworthy.

What the respected and well-known Saudi Imams of the Grand Mosque in

Makkah Sharief, and in Madinah Munnawara say in their Friday sermons is always heard with great attention by Muslims around the world.

In the Masjid al Haraam, Makkah, the respected and well-known Sheikh Maher Bin Hamad Al-Mueaqley in his keenly watched Friday sermon, did not any mention of the issue of Jerusalem and the Al Aqsa Mosque.

Similarly, Shaikh Abdullah Al-Bu'ejan, who delivered the Friday speech in The Prophet's Mosque in Madinah, also did not mention the issue at all. Instead, he chose pointedly to dilate on Almighty All'ah's miracles in the "change of the seasons" throughout the year as stated in the Holy Qur'an!

In the wake of Trump's decision about Jerusalem, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed elucidated that the Saudi Royal Court had ordered the local media not to give the issue wide coverage.

The Saudi and Bahraini Embassies in Amman called on their citizens living in Jordan not to take part in the demonstrations organized to protest against the US move.

That President Trump's announcement was made only after "a raft of prior close consultations, pre-agreement, and coordination with Egypt and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, is well-known.

It is no Top Secret that the Saudis have quietly been supporting the surrender of at least part of Jerusalem to Israel as well as proposing the recognition of the Jewish State.

The Saudi Crown Prince was reported to have advised the Palestinian President to accept Abu Dis a town area on the outskirts of Jerusalem as an alternative site for a future Palestinian capital.

According to the Oslo Accords it is classified as Area B which is administered by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Several Israeli companies are known to be in talks with the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia about business opportunities in the country's ambitiously planned "smart city".

On Nov 20, Britain's 'Independent' newspaper reported Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz as saying that Israel has had covert contacts with Saudi Arabia amid common concerns over Iran. This could be the first public disclosure by any senior official from either country of long-rumored secret dealings. Significantly, Riyadh had no immediate response to Steinitz's remarks.

A former aide of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Saudi Arabia "doesn't care" about the Palestinians as long as it able to secure Israel's proactive support against Iran.

Equally noteworthy is the fact that, individuals in Saudi intelligentsia, middle class, and clergy who were strongly critical of any proposal that recognized Israel, were summarily cut to size in last month's crackdown in KSA.

Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's "Vision 2030", is based on his perceptions of KSA's having urgently to build an entirely new economic, political and social paradigm before its oil-based economy runs to the ground; and KSA's deep-set paranoia against Iran; and therefore, KSA's near-total strategic dependence on the US. KSA is already dependent on the US for a vast array of vital assistance including armament, and ongoing operational military and technical support.

KSA's Crown Prince, as the Kingdom's all powerful *de facto* head, has been spearheading an effort to fortify the USA-KSA relationship. His discussions in March with President Trump, in Washington were proclaimed by his advisers as a "historical turning point" in KSA-USA bilateral ties.

President Trump's first official visit as President was to Riyadh (and to Israel). The Saudi regime had summoned for President Trump to address fifty-two heads of Sunni Islamic countries. Of late, the US has been in a position to issue stiff critiques and thinly veiled warnings to the Saudi regime – reflective of its enhanced leverage with KSA and Riyadh's client status.

Questions have arisen therefore whether Riyadh was not pursuing a dual policy *viz.* of acting in close agreement, coordination, and alignment, with the US, whilst for public consumption posturing with Arab and Islamic countries as if against President Trump's recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and location of the US Embassy in Jerusalem.

The basic and obvious reality is that, Palestinians, Arab countries, and the bulk of the Muslim Umm'ah worldwide view the Jewish people with visceral hatred, and abhor even the bare existence of the Jewish State of Israel.

Notwithstanding the fact that Israel inflicted humiliating defeats on combined Arab armies in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, and that today Israel is even more militarily powerful than all of them put together, Israel's Arab neighbors have believed for seventy years that Israel can and shall be destroyed and wiped out by them.

The international community on its part has for seven decades pandered to Arab and Muslim sentiment. Western governments of all political hues have been mindful of their interests in cultivating good relations with oil-producing entities in and around the Arabian Peninsula. Attracting investments and funding, and maximizing profits from engaging the purchasing power and the economies of those petro-dollar-rich countries, has been a key priority of theirs. Of late, actively nursing the "Muslim vote" has become a feature of the domestic politics of democracies in the West.

On the other hand, anti-Semitic prejudice has long been ubiquitous. For Islamists, the Jews are a living negation of Prophet Mohammad's claim to be the "seal of the prophets" i.e. 'The Final Prophet'. It was from Jewish-dominated Makkah that the Prophet had to make good his escape. His numerous military engagements were against armies of which Jews were a prominent part. Makkah, till it was conquered by the Prophet, had been in Jewish possession, and had to be wrested under threat of use of force. In Islamist eyes Jews remain a cursed people.

For right-wing Christians of the Nazi type also, Jews were the problem-makers responsible for the Marxist and Bolshevik revolution, so they had to be eliminated.

Ironically, for Communists and the Left-wing adhering to the political doctrine propagated by Karl Marx (himself of a Jewish family), the Jews had to disappear for they were deemed part of the "bourgeois elite" – "the most evil Capitalist manipulators against Socialism".

One other aspect may be referred to here as it is germane to this discussion. Theological aspects relative to the status of Jerusalem are not to be overlooked, although for seven decades past since 1948, those have largely been ignored.

The Prophet Muhammad and his followers initially prayed with their faces towards Jerusalem because the Kaaba in Makkah Sharief contained idols and images of deities.

Muhammad's journey to the "Farthest Mosque" is mentioned in the Qur'an: "Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from Al-Masjidil-Haram : (المسجد الحرام, "The Place-of-Prostration The Sacred") to Al-Masjidil-Aqsa (المسجد الأقصى, "The Place-of-Prostration The Farthest"), whose surroundings We have blessed, to show him of Our signs. Indeed, He is the Hearing, the Seeing." -- Qur'an, Sura 17 (Al Isra, ayat 1) Also: "Glory to Him Who carried His servant by night from the Sacred Masjid to the Furthest Masjid, whose precincts We have blessed, to show him of Our wonders! He it is Who is All-Hearing, All-Seeing! (Ibid.)

It is specified in a Sahih Hadith attributed to Abu Hurraira, counted as one the most reliable narrators, that the Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa is indeed located in Jerusalem and "That he heard Allah's Apostle saying, "When the people of Quraysh did not believe me (i.e. the story of my Night Journey), I stood up in Al-Hijr and Allah displayed Jerusalem in front of me, and I began describing it to them while I was looking at it." Sahih Bukhari: Volume 6, Book 58, Number 226. Ibn Abbas according to At Tirmidhi added: "And The Prophets lived therein. There is not a single inch in Jerusalem where some prophet has not prayed or an Angel not stood."

Islamic Tafsirs (learned commentaries) hold the term "the Farthest Mosque" (al-Masjid al-Aqsa) to refer to the "Noble Sanctuary" in Jerusalem.

However, it is equally true and critically important to note that, after the conquest of Makkah, Muslims were instructed by the Prophet Muhammad to turn their faces away from Jerusalem, and towards the Kaaba in Makkah Sharief.

The two holiest places of Islam for the past fourteen centuries thus have been Makkah and Madinah, Jerusalem scarcely so,

Whereas for Christianity and Islam, Jerusalem contains some of their holy places, for Judaism and the Jewish people, Jerusalem is in itself completely holy and inviolate.

Any claim Christianity or Islam may make on the Holy City is of much later origination, secondary, and definitely cannot equal let alone replace the heart that Jerusalem is to Judaism.

In terms of theological history and centrality, Jerusalem primarily belongs to Judaism and the Jewish people.

In terms of History, Theology, and Political Science, the rationale set out in President Trump's announcement appears factual, logical, and undeniable.

Whether the decision boldly announced and the logistic steps indicated prove feasible and practicable in the world of international power balances and realpolitik, remains to be seen.

President Donald Trump is the target of harsh and incessant invective from his domestic political opponents and, after his announcement on Jerusalem, from all around the globe. However, all considered, he is not to be underestimated. A seasoned observer of international relations has assessed that, more than President Carter who in 1979 brought about the Egypt-Israel Accord at Camp David, President Donald Trump could be the US President who, by his bold as well as subtle and secret moves contributed most to Peace.

Incidentally, along the way, with his substantive electoral base in the US considerably enthused, President Trump may also have strengthened his chances for re-election in 2020 to the office of President of the USA.

SHRINIVASRAO S. SOHONI



Shrinivasrao S. Sohoni is a Governance Specialist and Strategic Analyst. Educated at The Doon School, Dehra Dun, and St. Stephen's College, Delhi, he entered the Indian Administrative Service in 1970. His over 45 years aggregate governance experience at State, Union Government and international levels, includes key assignments in the Government of India in the Department of Cabinet Affairs, Union Cabinet Secretariat; the Ministries of Defence and Industry; and the Parliament of India, and India's neighbourhood.

During a period of endemic political turbulence in the country, and four changes of government at the Centre, Sohoni was Secretary to the President of India/Visitor of Central Universities including the IITs, and Secretary-General of the Rajya Sabha, having previously served as Additional Secretary in the President's Secretariat and of the Rajya Sabha, and Secretary to the Governor of Maharashtra.

Through 2006 to 2014, Sohoni served as Senior Adviser in the Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, -- advising the Afghan President and mentoring the young Cabinet Secretary and senior officials in the President's Secretariat on a range of governance issues including, especially, subjects germane to Afghanistan's Constitutional, Political, and National Security perspectives.

A student of Comparative Religion, especially Islam, history of Islam, and connected trends and entities, Sohoni's current focus is on the problem of Islamic Extremism/Terrorism, and the organization of State and Civil Society approaches for purposes of Countering Extremism/Terrorism.

Chabahar Port - How Pakistan and China Will Get Checkmated.

Prof Ashok Soman

INTRODUCTION

India and Pakistan's relation continue to be hostile; primarily due to Kashmir issue. The Pakistan continues to sponsor terror in Kashmir valley and in other parts of India. China too has created Naxlite movement which affects more than 100 districts in India. It also provides help to terror groups in North Eastern states.

Recent China – India Standoff in 'Doklam' in Bhutan which lasted for more than 70 days was a wakeup call that India must create a geo-strategic situation, where a conventional war is not an option.

China has helped Pakistan in constructing the Karakoram highway. It has given a massive \$62Billions to Pakistan for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and also constructed a deep sea port at Gwadar. Pakistan has given the port of Gwadar at very favorable terms to China for a lease of 40 years, and Pakistan would get only 9% of the revenue.

Pakistan does not allow give India access for trade with Afghanistan by road or rail by giving a passage through it, even though Afghanistan is a part of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations. Afghanistan from India is just 350- 500 Km. Pakistan also does not allow over flights through its territory.

In this context India's move to construct harbor at 'Chabahar' in Iran is an excellent move to bypass Pakistan and to have a backdoor entry to Afghanistan and other nations.

In fact 'Chabahar' is far more important as India can trade with Iran, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizstan (Central Asian Nations). India can take a short cut to reach Russia, Baltic nations, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Eastern Turkey etc as the time to reach them is reduced by 10-12 days and reduces costs by \$ 2,500 per 15 tons.

IMPORTANCE OF IRAN IN BYPASSING PAKISTAN

During WWII when German Panzer divisions were at the gates of all important Soviet towns such as Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad. They were simultaneously advancing towards the Carpathian Mountains to reach the oil fields called 'Maikop oil fields' near Baku in Azerbaijan. These oilfields were supplying 80% of oil needs of Soviet Union. If Germans would have captured them, the Soviet Army may have lost the war.

The Allies knew the importance of Soviet oil fields in Azerbaijan. The allies sent war material through the Arctic Sea to the Soviet port at Murmansk. The Germans knew that this war material must not reach the Soviet army. The German Air force and Navy was sent to attack it. In those cold Arctic waters, some of the most fierce sea battles took place. Some allied convoys like PQ-17 lost more than 50% of ships.

When the attention of Germans was on Arctic convoys, the allies were sending war material through many Iranian ports like Bandar Busher and Banda Shahpur.

The cargo was sent by rail or road to Askabad and Baku (Capital of Azerbaijan). Even the Iranian ports on Caspian Sea were used to take the cargo by sea to Astrakhan, which was well connected by road and rail to rest of Soviet Union. A total of 4 Million tons of war material was sent through Iran, which saved the Soviets from getting defeated. The sea cargo was sent without any losses. Thus historically bypassing the enemy is a proven method.

GWADAR PORT

Actually the Gwadar village was a sleepy fishing village on the Makran Coast in Baluchistan and it belonged to the king of Muscat and Oman.

In 1958 Pakistan purchased it for Rs 337 Cr (Pakistani Rs 550 Cr). Pakistan could not pay even this small amount. Most of this money was paid by Prince Ali Salman Shah (Agha Khan). Reminder money was collected by Pakistan by levying a tax. One of the conditions of this deal was that people from Baluchistan should be allowed to join the Army of Oman.

The deep sea port of Gwadar is already completed and a road is being built up to Islamabad. There is already a Karakoram highway constructed by Chinese. It is of 600 Km and connects Islamabad to Kashgar (China). The Gwadar to Kashgar distance is 3,340 Km.

Strategic importance of Gwadar is that it is 605 Km from the 'Strait of Hormuz' which is a 'Choke point'. China will use Gwadar port for refueling its warships and submarines and stores.

China has also gifted \$230 Million Dollars for developing Gwadar International Airport. Once it will be completed, China can keep its Maritime patrol or Amphibious aircrafts and warplanes of its Air force. (PLA Air Force).

The Gwadar city has a population of 85,000; the rainfall in this region is just 4 inches per annum. When the army of Alexander the Great, when they were retreating to go back to Macedonia through the Makran coast, suffered heavily due to lack of water and extreme heat. They lost most animals and soldiers had to throw their armors and weapons to survive.

This water scarcity has to be addressed to supply water to Gwadar Port, Gwadar City and Gwadar industrial area.

It is planned to build a pipeline, road, optical fiber line from Gwadar to Kashgar, a distance of 3,340 Km, currently the Chinese tankers and container ships from Middle East have to take a sea route of 16,000 Km. The size of Tankers of Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC), and Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) gives an advantage of Economy of Scale and cost just one fifteenth of the cost by road to Kashgar.

Then why China wants to take oil to Xinjiang province which has 'Tarim Basin' a major oil producing region?

China will use Gwadar as an alternative route during a war like situation in which 'Strait of Malacca' gets blocked by India or USA. It can carry 3-4 % of the Energy requirements of China. Secondly China is also helping Pakistan by a massive \$62 Billion loan for its China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It has already completed 'Karakoram highway' a 600 Km road in most difficult terrain in the world. It is described as 8th Wonder of the World by Pakistani media.

Thirdly the money provided to all these projects is at very high rates of interest. It has assured rate of return of 7-8% and in some projects up to 17% per annum, which is absolutely unsustainable and China would be able to extract more concessions like they have done in Sri Lanka, it could be land measuring thousands of hectares in Industrial estates, demand of additional ports like Jiwani, and Pasani. It could be handing over Gwadar International Airport to China for military purposes. China may demand Dalbandin airport if Pakistan defaults in payment.

Fourth it is useful to keep a watch on 'Strait of Hormuz' an important 'Choke point'.

CHINA HAS PROVIDED TWO WARSHIPS PNS BASOL AND PNS HINGOL FOR PROTECTION OF GWADAR

China has provided two warships PNS Basol and PNS Hingol for protection of Gwadar. It is going to give two more which will be named PNS Dasht and PNS Zhob(Both districts of Baluchistan) Eventually there s a proposal to have 6 warships, of 1500 Tons and 600 tons. Both PNS Basol and PNS Hingol had gone Sri Lanka for naval exercises.



Picture of PNS Hingol , it is of 1500 tons and is for Pakistan Coast guard .Its helicopter deck can be seen.

Lastly it is part of over Ambitious 'One Belt One Road' project.

IMPORTANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN AND IMPORTANT CHOKE POINTS

Indian Ocean carries 80%of global Sea Trade. For India it is of utmost importance as 75% of India's energy requirements pass through it, primarily its oil and gas. Most of India's imports come through 'Strait of Hormuz' or 'Bab -al- Mandab'.

Strait of Hormuz

It is between Iran and Muscat and Oman /United Arab Emirates. Almost 40% of global Sea Trade passes through it. This Strait is 54 KM at its narrowest.

Chabahar harbor is 441 Km from 'Strait of Hormuz' and it is 318 Km from

Oman. The Strait of Hormuz is deep and Very Large Crude Carriers (ULCC)


And Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC) can pass through it. Saudi Arabia has vast oil reserves in 'Ras al Tanura' near Daharan, but takes the oil through a pipeline to the port of 'Yambo' primarily due to fear that Iran will choke the 'Strait of Hormuz'.

Bab-al Mandab Strait

It is a Strait between Yemen and Djibouti/Eritrea. It carries about 8% of global sea trade through it. The ships coming from Suez Canal pass through 'Red Sea' then go towards 'Gulf of Aden' to enter in Indian Ocean. This Strait is 18KM deep at its narrowest but only 2 Km of it is deep. Passing through this strait too has become dangerous due to a ongoing war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

In addition there is a problem of Pirates from Somalia who attack and capture merchant ships for a ransom.

USA has a massive base in Djibouti, now China too has an operational naval base in Djibouti. India can use a small base of Japan in Djibouti or look for a base in the region. Eritrea can provide a suitable base.



India dominates only Strait of Malacca

would have to break the security cordon of Indian Navy and Indian Air force.

Strait of Malacca

This Strait is between Indonesia and Malaysia. Every year 60,000 ships pass through it. India has got a vice like control on it due to its naval bases and Air bases in Andaman and Nicobar islands. In a war like situation China will have to take a circuitous route to go through 'Lombok Strait' or 'Sunda Strait' which are in Indonesia.

China has developed a deep sea port in Myanmar at 'Kyank Pue' in Rakhine

Province. It has laid a pipeline from 'Kyank Pue' to a major city Kunming. It would be difficult for Chinese oil/gas tankers to reach the port of 'Kyank Pue' because it

Strait of Lombok

This Strait connects Java Sea and South China Sea. At its narrowest it is 20 Km but it is 250 feet deep, so Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) can pass through it. Similarly submarines can pass through it in a dived condition.

Sunda Strait

It is in Indonesia between Java and Sumatra islands. At its narrowest it is 24 Km but on the Eastern Side it is only 20 Meters deep, so large tankers and submarines in dived position cannot use it.

In Hainan islands, China has a massive naval base. It also claims entire islands in South China Sea, like Paracel and Spartley Group. Many of these islands are in Exclusive Economic Zone of Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei. However China uses its military might as well as its method of continuous development and



If Strait of Malacca is blocked, China will have to use Sunda and Lombok Strait.

encroachment to occupy them. The nations in South China Sea are reluctant to have a confrontation with China.

CHABAHR PORT


Chabahar Port is in Iran and it was in limbo for more than 10 years, primarily because Iran was under sanctions, due to its nuclear program.

But now the economic sanctions are lifted. In May 2015 an agreement was signed by Indian Minister of Shipping and Surface Transport Mr Nitin Gadkari and

Dr Abbas Ali Akhundi of Iran. As per the treaty, India has to develop 'Chabahar' in 10 years. India has to make develop two container ports of 640 Meters and three multipurpose Container berths in 18 months .There is a grace period of 2 years. From the third year 30,000TEU (Twenty Foot Equivalent) containers should be transported and ultimately it should increase to 2, 50000 Containers. This deal was described by the Afghan Ambassador to India Mr Shaida Mohamd Abdali as “ heralding a new era on national integration and fulfilling hope and dreams of Billions”(Diplomat Article Jan 31 2017)

India is sending 1.1 million tons of Wheat as a gift to Afghanistan and first cargo of 15,000 tons of wheat has already reached Afghanistan. The first phase will be officially declared opened shortly by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on 3rd December 2017. (Hindu Nov 29 2017)

The Indian side was represented by Mr Pon Radhkrishnan Minister of State for shipping for opening ceremony of Chabahar Phase I. India has allocated \$235 Million for Phase II, and another \$500 Million for development of SEZ.



Location of Chabahar and Gwadar port. Location of Chabahar is closer to 'Strait of Hormuz' as well as gulf of Oman.

The opening ceremony was attended by representatives of 17 countries including India, Afghanistan, Pakistan , Turkmenistan and Oman.

The capacity of the Chabahar port is currently 2.5 million tons per annum .It is to be increased to 82-85 Million tons by end of 5th phase. The port is named as Shahid Bahesti Port, its distance from Kandla port is only 550 NM.

Chabahar port would be very important to Afghanistan to export its minerals like iron ore, Copper ores, Rare Earth Elements like Niobium, and Cobalt, Molybdenum, and above all very precious Lithium. (Financial tribune Mar 03 2015)

Chabahar is a good city with abundance of water. Even now ships of 100,000 tons can be berthed there.


Konarak Airport near Chabahar.

There is an airport of two runways in Konarak , one runway is of 3,800feet and other is of 3,000 feet. It has already International flights, using Airbus A-320. Till all road and rail network from Chabahar to Delaram (Afghanistan) is complete, India should start commercial flights and cargo flights via Konarak International Airport.

India should use existing road network to take cargo by Chabahar-Iran shahar-Zabol-Zarong-Delaram.

Chabahar to Delaram road and Railwayline

From Chabahar a road and rail way line to Iranshehar to Zabol to Zarong to Delaram (On Ring road in Afghanistan) to Hajigak should be completed without delay. After Rail line is complete, Steel Authority of India (SAIL) can take heavy machinery and equipment for that steel plant by Rail. When the Steel plant is complete, the rail way line will be ideal to carry raw material like coal, limestone. The rail route can become harbinger to change to Afghanistan as they can export surplus steel through the port of Chabahar.



The steel plant capacity at Hajigak is now set at 1.5 million tons per annum.

Hajigak has high quality of iron ore (62% iron content) and is estimated to have 2.2 Billion tons of it. The iron ore is sufficient for next 75 years.

Konarak Industrial Estate

It is close to Chabahar port and has an advantage of cheap gas in Iran. Iran wants Indian companies to invest more in Iran. Already in Konarak Industrial Estate there are many Indian companies like National Chemical Fertilizers Company and Gujarat State Fertilizer Company (GSFC) has a Joint venture with 'Fardast Energy'. It will have a capacity of 1.3 Million tons, which India can buy. National Aluminum Company (NALCO) is putting up an Aluminum smelter.

Indian companies have a vast scope of starting Petroleum Refinery units, Petrochemical Plants, Gas Cracker plants, Chemical Plants, Pipeline and Valve manufacturing plants in this industrial Estate.

Steel Authority of India (SAIL) has got a contract to supply 500Km of Rails valued at Rs2800 Cr.

If this Rail line is taken to Mashad another big Iranian town, then it is easy to enter Turkmenistan and other Central Asian nations like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan.



Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

Zarong to Delaram Road

This road connects the ring Road in Afghanistan is completed by Border Road Organization (BRO) . The 213 Km of road was completed even when there was danger and attacks by Pak sponsored terror groups like Taliban.

How India can get cheaper oil using SWAPs?

The oil prices of different grades are fixed and it is difficult to use negotiations to bring them down. However an innovative method of using SWAPs can reduce the transportation which adds to oil prices.

Iran's oil is located on the Persian Sea coast that is Southern part of Iran and Iran's refineries and major consumption is in Northern part of Iran. If India buys oil from the Caspian Sea nations either onshore or offshore and brings it to the Caspian



Note how Iranian roads are connected from Chabahar to Zahedan to Zabol. The road from Zehadan goes to Mashhad which is well connected to Turkmenistan.

Sea ports of Iran which are located in Anzali, Noshahar and Amirabad and give it to Iranians and take same quantity oil from its oil/Gas fields, India can save 1600 to 1,800 Km of transportation. This oil /Gas will come out of the Choke point at 'Strait of Hormuz'.

India can enter in a Joint venture with Iranian companies to lay a pipeline from its ports on Caspian Sea to the port of Chabahar. The pipeline will mostly travel in unpopulated area and deserts of Dasht -al -Kabir and Dasht -al- lut. Since only one nation is involved it would be easy as compared to Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan Pipeline which passes through three nations.

CURRENTLY HOW THE CASPIAN SEA NATIONS EXPORT THEIR OIL?

Baku -Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline

Caspian Sea nations are exporting their oil through a pipeline of 1,600 Km to Europe. It is called Baku (Capital of Azerbaijan)- Tbilisi (Capital of Georgia) and Ceyhan (In Iran on the Mediterian Coast), or BTC pipeline. It was constructed by about 10 Companies, including an Indian company. But for allowing the pipeline and protecting it Georgia gets \$ 600 Million and Turkey gets \$300 Million as transit fees.

HOW CHABAHAR CAN REDUCE THE COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION?

The distance from Ceyhan to Suez Canal is 554 Km, the Distance from Suez to Mumbai is 3,195 Km, so it is distance of 3,749Km. Generally between 12-24 hours are required to navigate the Suez Canal. Even if a Suez max ship (Maximum size of Ship that can pass through Suez Canal) will require 312 hours or around 13 days to cover 3,749Km. The current rate of a Suez max ship is \$30,000 to \$35,000 a day , so a sum of \$ 390000 that is Rs 29,575000 (About Rs 2.95Cr) per trip will be required. Whereas the same ship can come to Mumbai from Chabahar in just 3.5 days. At a cost of 3.5x \$35,000 that is just \$122,500 or INR Rs 7,962500 (About 7.9 million). A saving of about Rs 2 Cr per trip.

A Very Large Crude Carrier(VLCC), and Ultra Large Crude Carriers(ULCC) cannot pass through the Suez canal and they have to take a circuitous route through the Strait of Gibraltar and go around Cape of Good Hope. Whereas they can pass through the 'Strait of Hormuz' as it is deep enough. The distance from Ceyhan to Gibraltar to Cape of Good Hope to Mumbai is about 22,867 Km. A ship travelling at

12 Km per hour will require 80 days to reach Mumbai. It will cost about \$ 200,000 to \$300,000 per day. So a VLCC will cost for a trip from Turkey to Mumbai \$ 200,000 x 80 days that is \$16,000,000. (US Dollars 16 million) per trip or Indian Rupees 16 Million x Rs 65 /- That is INR 1,040 Million. Whereas a trip through Chabahar will only cost \$200,000 x 3.5 Days, that is \$700,000 Dollars, or INR 4.55 cr. A saving of Rs 5.85 Cr. The catch is a joint venture to lay a pipeline from Sothern Iranian ports on Caspian Sea to Chabahar port must be completed; otherwise the benefit accrued will be reduced as India will have to use port of Bandar Abbas which will add 669 KM distance and is already congested. Currently India will have to buy crude from Iranian oil/gas field in Persian Gulf ports, the closest port is Bandar Abbas which carries 86% of Iranian sea borne trade. So Chabahar can reduce congestion in Bandar Abbas , when it increases its capacity from current 2.5 Million tons to 12.5 Million tons.

North South Transport Corridor (NSTC)

Its members are India, Iran, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajgi stan, krygistan, Oman,, Syria Ukraine , and Bulgaria.

India is eyeing trade with Europe via Chabahar.

It is a multi-modal transportation established in St. Peterberg ,by Iran, Russia and India.

The new route reduces time to reach St. Petesberg (Earlier name Stalingrad) by 10 -12 days. (Teheran Times Nov 29 2017_

Two routes were checked for actual timing of sending the containers.

Mumbai to Baku Route via Bandar Abbas and Mumbai to Astrakhan on Caspian Sea .The cost of transportation came down by \$2,500 per 15 Tons of cargo. In Sep 2014 India had a trial run of an empty container with GPS from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas and then by road to Astrakhan on Caspian Sea, which is well connected to Russia.

A study by Freight Forwarding Corporation of India, found that the route is 30% cheaper and 30% shorter by time. India can use existing road and rail network of Iran and Russia to reduce expenditure.

Using existing road network in Iran.

IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN

As per kautilya's Arthashastra , our enemy's enemy is our friend. Thereby Afghanistan, Iran, five nations of Central Asia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, must be India's friends. This will explain why Chabahar is far more important than Gwadar.

Till 1970 Pakistan used to consider Afghanistan as so close friend that they used to think it as a defense in depth. It was Pakistan which created Taliban, and even today much of Afghanistan is still under Pakistan.

Up till now it was the American and NATO troops have withdrawn mainly, so the Taliban is again on resurgence.

Afghanistan is a resources rich country but was helpless due to its overdependence on Pakistan for trade. Now with Chabahar getting commissioned it can trade from the port of Chabahar. Afghanistan has massive reserves of high quality iron ore with 62% iron content, copper ores, Molybdenum etc. It also has 1.4 million tons of Rare Earth Elements (REE) Lanthanum, Cerium, and Neodymium and these Rare Earth Elements are very important for India, especially Neodymium, which is essential for making Wind power generators. So far China had a monopoly on supply of Neodymium.

Afghanistan also has such large quantity of 'lithium' that it is described as "What oil is to Saudi Arabia, Lithium is to Afghanistan". Lithium is required to make high quality Lithium ion batteries, that will power the cars of future. These batteries are required for buses, mobiles, computers, or two wheelers. India does not have Lithium deposits. In addition Afghanistan is having abundant dry fruits, Pine nuts, Pistachio etc.

Pakistan was officially exporting \$ 2 Billion Dollars of goods, but unofficially the trade was \$ 5 Billion Dollars. It is Rice, Wheat, Edible oil, Milk Products, building material, plastics, fruits and Machinery. India can provide all these items of higher quality. There is a preferential trade agreement between Iran, India and Afghanistan. India will have to complete the road and railway line rapidly. (The rail line is only 22%



Afghanistan has world's largest reserves of lithium in Gazanavi province.

complete).Till road /rail lines are complete India must give a transport subsidy to take care of Pakistan's short distance.

COUNTRIES THAT CAN BE SERVED FROM CHABAHAR.


Central Asian Nations- Central Asia has Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan.

China has stolen a march over India. Its bilateral trade with Central Asian nations was at \$ 460 Million Dollars in 2013 to \$50.2 billion. Whereas India's trade is only \$1.6 Billion Dollars.

***Turkmenistan** - It has 490 Million barrels of oil and 17.5 Trillion Cubic Meters (TCM) of gas, which is world's fourth biggest reserves. Turkmenistan can fulfill India's demand of gas imports is 18.9 Billion Cubic Meters from Turkmenistan and Iran.

Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) pipeline.

This 56 inches pipeline is 1814 Km. The gas fields are at Daultabad in Turkmenistan and pass through Herat, Kandahar (Afghanistan),then Queta, and Multan (Pakistan) and enters India in Indian Punjab at Fazilka.This pipeline can



Turkmenistan, Afghanistan ,Pakistan India (TAPI) pipeline and Iran -Pakistan-India pipeline.

fulfill 50% of India's needs as it can supply 7.6 Billion Cubic Meters of gas.(BCM). The cost of building the pipeline will be 7.6Billion US Dollars.

The critics of this pipeline have three objections. First the pipeline passes through earthquake prone zone, second there can be an accident and third there can be terror attack on the pipeline.

India must put following conditions in before joining this project.

- a) The nation from which the pipeline passes must have responsibility of protecting it from terror attacks.
- b) In case India or other partner nations does not get gas for any of the reasons equivalent gas should be purchased from other nations at same cost.
- c) The pipeline is rightly called 'Peace pipeline' as it has potential to bring permanent peace in the region.

Turkmenistan has high quality horses 'Akhil Teke' and they can help India to improve the horses with a cross breeding program. It also has a sheep by the name 'Karakul' which gives high quality wool.

***Kazakhstan** - This is a massive nation having 10 Million Sq Km, but has only 18 million people. It has 30 Million of oil and 85 Trillion Cubic Feet (TCB) of gas. It also has Strategic metals like Uranium, Chromium, and Zinc that are second largest in the world. It also has third largest reserves of Manganese and fifth largest of Copper.

It also produces long staple cotton and wheat. It is most important nation in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan - It is a poor nation amongst the Central Asian Nations due to which many youngsters have been radicalized and they have become terrorists. It has Molybdenum, Uranium, and gold deposits.

Tajikistan - It is close to Pakistan by distance. It has abundance of Dry fruits like Dry figs, Pears, Cherries etc. It has given two air bases to Indian Air force in Ayni and Fakhor.

Kirigistan- It has mines of Mercury and exports it.

Caspian Sea nations

***Azerbaijan** - It was a part of Soviet Union and in 19th Century was biggest producer of Crude oil and was supplying 80% of the Soviet Union's requirement. It has between 7 to 11 Billion Dollars of oil reserves. Its port at Baku and Astrakhan is very important as it is well connected by road and rail to other Russian nations.

Iran - It is a very important country for India, as Chabahar is located in it. Most of world's oil is in what is known as Shia triangle and Iran is a Shia majority country.

Iran has 48.7 Trillion Cubic Meters (TCM) of gas making it the second biggest

nation in the world in gas production. It also has 154.58 Billion Barrels of oil. Iran's oil production is 3.99 million barrels per day, so it is 5t in oil production.

India imports 82% of oil at 213 Million tons and spends \$63 Billion Dollars for it. India also imports 18.9 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) of gas .Therefore Iran is very important source to India.

Iran is number one in the world in Saffron, Caviar (Fish eggs) and second in world in Dates and Apricots.

Iran was refusing to take payment for oil from India in US Dollars, so that payment was pending to the tune of \$6 billion. India can make the payment by exporting Basmati rice, Wheat, Medicines and Engineering products. It will be beneficial to both the countries.

CHINESE STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA

China has a carefully thought Strategy in South Asia which has following elements.

- a) Keeping the India –China border peaceful. No bullets have been fired on the border from 1962, barring an exception of Chumbi valley skirmish when China lost 3 to 4 times more casualties than India.
- b) Keeping the Indo- Pak border on the boil by terror attacks, Artillery firing to cover infiltrators, commando attacks by BAT teams, and funding the separatists in Pak occupied Kashmir.
- c) Forcing India to keep large number of troops, Para military forces and police in Jammu and Kashmir.
- d) All three Strike corps of India faces Pakistan as a result.
- e) Using this lull to develop the infrastructure in Tibet of road, rail and airports.
- f) China has completed Golmud to Lhasa railway line , which is a bullet train.
- g) China is building rail way track from Chengdu to Lhasa.
- h) China has completed the road link between Kashgar to Lhasa.
- i) China threatens one part of India like Arunachal Pradesh and then Aksai chin area, to force India to spread its resources.
- j) By use of its superior infrastructure, they can rapidly bring troops anywhere on Indo –China border at the weakest point like Doklam in Bhutan.
- k) China wants to surround India with its bases in India's neighborhood, like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Nepal and Maldives.

- l) China is building bases near 'Choke points' in Indian Ocean by building bases in Gwadar , Djibouti, and Melaka Port in Malaysia.

China using Pakistan as proxy

- i) Military and economic aid.
- ii) Karakoram highway, which can be used to send military supplies.
- iii) Gwadar deep sea port.
- iv) China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
- v) Developing infrastructure in Pakistan like Nuclear power plants, Dams, Coal mines at Thar, Electrical power generation etc.
- vi) Assembly of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, and Karakoram K-8 jet trainer.
- vii) F-22 Zulfikar class frigate manufacturing in Karachi Shipyard. It is missile carrying frigate. The terrorists had almost taken possession of PNS Zulfikar in Karachi and wanted to fire missiles on a US navy aircraft carrier, the attempt failed.
- viii) To help Pakistan to assemble a Main Battle Tank Al Zarar and Al Khalid.
- ix) China has given large variety of missiles, which Pakistan has given names.
- x) 8 Air Independent Propulsion technologies (AIP) which will be delivered from 2022 at a cost of \$5 Billion.
- xi) China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will have an investment of \$62Billion.
- xii) Karakoram highway which joins Kashgar to Islamabad .It required supervision of Chinese engineers to complete it. Pakistan gave 15,000 Soldiers and China 20,000 workers. It was constructed at large cost of casualties of Pakistan and Chinese workers

Chinese bases /projects in nations near India.

Myanmar - China has developed a deep sea harbor near 'Kyank Pue' and a pipeline to take the oil to Kunming in China.

It has got a missile monitoring station at Cocos Island, primarily to keep track of Indian missile launches from Balasore (Orissa). Cocos Island was given to Myanmar during Pandit Jawaharlal's tenure.

Nepal - China had succeeded to install a Maoist government in Nepal, and they ruined the economy of Nepal. China also developed a red corridor of Naxalites, which has presence in more than 100 Indian districts.

China has made an excellent road from Lhasa to Kathmandu. It now wants to construct a Rail line from Lhasa to Kathmandu, by making tunnels under the

Mount Everest.

Maldives - In Maldives China succeeded to cancel a contract of an Indian company GMR, which had secured to build an International airport. GMR took the case to International court and won compensation, but the airport was made by a Chinese company.

China also took over a barren island in Maldives to make a naval base at an excellent Strategic position.

Sri Lanka - China built a port at a Strategic location Hambantota. All the ships coming from Cape of good Hope, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab -al -Mandab converge near this port as they go towards Malacca Strait. It has also made an International Airport at Hambantota ,which is making losses as there are hardly any airlines who have flights there.

China had also given substantial military help to defeat the liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam.

Bangladesh - China is giving two frigates to Bangladesh. It is doing utmost to woo Bangladesh from India by economic and military aid.

Caspian Sea nations

China has built a massive pipeline in Northern Caspian Sea region to take oil from 'Kashgan oil field' to increase energy security of China. This oil pipeline does not pass through any chokepoints. China has got a head start in the Caspian Sea nations.

Afghanistan - It has invested \$ 3.5 Billion in 'Aynak copper mines'.

Iran - China has increased trade with Iran from \$ 400 million in 1974 to \$ 50 Billion now.

Russian Federation - China has an agreement of \$400 Billion Dollars to buy 34Billion Cubic Meters gas per year for next 30 years.

CONCLUSION

To make sure that India is free to trade with Afghanistan, Iran, five central Asian Nations, Azerbaijan, Georgia ,Eastern Turkey and Russia , Chabahar will play a decisive role.

If India gets this back door entry to Afghanistan, it will result in economically strong Afghanistan. India can help it to develop its massive mineral reserves.

When the Road/railway line from Chabahar to Delaram to Hajigak is developed and a Steel plant is commissioned, Afghanistan can become a modern nation.

India must help Afghanistan to develop further by adding value added Industry.

Afghanistan's massive reserves of lithium will take care of India's requirements of Lithium-ion batteries those will power vehicles of future.

Afghanistan's Rare Earth Elements (REE) will help India greatly in Wind Power generation, as it is required to make Permanent magnets which do not require maintenance.

Iran is a resources rich country, giving them an offer in Joint ventures in Industry, Shipping etc will ensure that there is lesser risk and more funding available.

India should buy oil/gas from Caspian Sea nations and SWAP it with Iran to save transportation.

India needs bases to protect its merchant ships near Choke points at 'Strait of Hormuz' and 'Bab-al-Mandab'. India needs bases near 'Strait of Sunda' and 'Strait of Lombok' to ensure free navigation through South China Sea. Singapore has already given refueling facilities to Indian Navy ships. Vietnam or other South China Sea nations like Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, or Indonesia may offer bases for refueling or anti piracy role.

As compared to Gwadar port the port at Chabahar is far superior on all counts. It gives India access to 10 nations.

India can trade with Baltic nations and Russia at 50% of less time and costs by developing INSTC. India should not miss this golden opportunity to trade in cost effective manner to more than ten nations.

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PROF ASHOK SOMAN



Prof. Ashok Soman served as a lieutenant in Indian Navy and participated in Bangladesh War. After retirement, he turned a Management Guru and has over 47 years of experience in teaching and training.

He is associated with several national and international educational institutes in the capacity of a professor. He is one of the founder faculties at Symbiosis Institute of Management Studies (SIMS), Pune. He also teaches at Osaka Gakuin University, Japan; Khimji Training Institute - KTI, Oman and at Savitribai Phule Pune University's Ras al-Khaimah, UAE campus. He has also taught in Air Force Intelligence Academy and Defence Institute of Advanced Technologies.

He is associated with over 80 corporates as a Management Development Programme (MDP) trainer. He teaches senior officers in Yashwantraon Chavan Academy of Development Administration (YASHADA, Pune).

He has 3 books to his credit.

Future of Aerospace Power

Air Chief Marshal P V Naik (Veteran)

INTRODUCTION

Douhet, Mitchell & Trenchard were the first proponents of Air Power, as it was known then. They were ahead of their times & consequently, were hounded out by one & all for their heretical thoughts. Now, as you all know, Air Power is synonymous with Aerospace power. In fact both are interchangeable. This paper attempts to flag some important aspects of & share some thoughts on The Future of Aerospace Power, with special reference to India.

ENVIRONMENT

Today the South Asian Region ranks as one of the three flashpoints in the world along with the Middle East & North Korea. That the potential adversaries are Nuclear powers with missile capability is a cause for even greater discomfort. It is, on the other hand, also a region with enormous possibilities, some of them unfolding right before our eyes. Within this region lies a group of Nations in troubled transition to modernity, their external discourse damned by internal contradictions. In a world moving towards integration, many of these Nations remain torn by ethnic & religious strife, economic disparities & political instability. Undoubtedly, it is a new world order that is emerging because of complex relationships, strategic interests and influences. Asia is the happening place and for a variety of factors. For obvious reasons, it is full of turmoil and instabilities. Internal dynamics and external influences

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have led to increase in the degree of instability and uncertainty. Last but not the least; it is the playground terrorism .

As a member of this region, India remains vulnerable to the disturbances spilling over from her neighbours. India herself is at a crossroads. We witness this giant stirring into wakefulness – into an awareness of its power today. This rise in stature brings with it greater responsibilities & a larger role in regional as well as global affairs. This demands not only a change in policy, internal & external, but a fundamental change in our very thinking, ethos & value system.

THREAT SPECTRUM

India's strategic perspectives are shaped by her history, geography, geo-political realities & the demands of real-politik. Our native culture, our innate traditions of trust & tolerance, & our vision of world peace shape our national character, which, in turn, impacts on our international relations. These vital parameters are as relevant today as they have been earlier. India shares borders with 11 neighbours. Our relations with some are uneasy and with some, hostile. Any unrest within this somewhat hostile neighbourhood spills over into our borders in many forms; & with depressing regularity. Unless these geo-political cross currents affecting us are quietened, they would continue to thwart our desire to move forward.

India is faced with a full spectrum of threats, which emerge from all these issues. The spectrum itself is increasing in complexity and technological sophistication. So with the spectrum changing as well as being unpredictable, we have to look at full-spectrum dominance. This is equally applicable to all domains, land, sea air, space, as well as the Information domain. Since the focus of this article is on Aerospace Power, suffice it to say that Aerospace Power also will have to look in the same direction.

It is, therefore, prudent that we move away from a threat-based assessment to a capability-based approach. A capability can then be tailored or applied to meet the challenge. The capability will allow us to apply the right force in any form of conflict across the entire spectrum. This will ensure effectiveness as well as efficacy.

What is of concern to us is that the whole focus is on full-spectrum dominance. Yes, it will require new technology, modernisation and replacement of equipment. But just material-superiority and technology is not enough. Of

equal importance is the development of doctrine, organisation, training and education of leaders and people who can effectively take advantage of the technology.

AEROSPACE POWER

If we analyse the wars/skirmishes in the recent past, two 'Gospel Truths' have emerged. The first is 'Aerospace Power by itself cannot win a war'. The contradiction is that 'No major war has been won without the use of Aerospace Power'. This is likely to hold true for the foreseeable future also. It does not decry or belittle other forms of military power like Land or Sea; but is slowly & surely emerging to be a 'given' that aerospace power is the power of the future.

The corollary, therefore, that Aerospace Industry is the industry of the future is equally true. Hence any country aspiring for greatness must concentrate on & invest in aerospace power & aerospace industry.

Let us have a brief look, then, at 'What is Aerospace Power?' There is popular belief that aerospace power is about ac & satellites. This is not altogether wrong, but a little qualification would make the statement more accurate. Aerospace Power is the 'Total capacity of a nation to exploit the medium of air & space.' Besides ac & satellites it involves civil aviation, passenger & cargo; Comn systems for management & control; radars, data links; airfds, RANADS, support infrastructure. It involves a strong technological base capable of absorbing new hi tech; a pool of techno savvy & trained manpower; hi tech trg centres & labs. It involves a strong manufacturing sector- both Public & Pvt- with the will & enthusiasm to put the money where the mouth is; with sufficient depth & dexterity to adapt to hi tech; impeccable processes leading to high quality consciousness & control. Equally important is the user commitment which ensures viability. It involves investment & commitment to R&D. It demands a clear, comprehensive policy & an org to nurture this activity. Last but not the least, it requires National Will.

Colloquially speaking, Aerospace power is synonymous with its military aspect. The military aspect of aerospace power ensures that a nation has the freedom to exploit & exert the full spectrum of its aerospace power. This, as is well known, includes ac, satellites, launch platforms, wpns, radars, comn, Air

Defence, Space control, cyberspace mgt & many other aspects. In this paper this Military aspect is discussed further in three parts :-

- a. Capability Build up.
- b. Crystal Ball Gazing into the future of Aerospace Power, esp in India.
- c. What do we need to do.

Capability Buildup

Environment - First of all we need to analyse the geopolitical environment obtaining around us. We have already been through this earlier. The highlights are that we face the full spectrum of threats from nuclear to terrorism. So we need to go in for full spectrum dominance.

Policy Directives - The Raksha Mantri issues the RM's directive for war to all three Chiefs. This spells out details like threat assessment, type of war likely, single or multi front war, expected days of intense or less than intense conflict ; etc. But there is no policy on how to prepare for war or how to build up capability. For this each Service has to fall back on its own experience & brain power.

Mission - An important factor to consider is the Mission. The msn of the Air Force is 'To protect the country from threats arising through the medium of air & space.' Similarly, Army will have it for 'Land' & Navy for 'Sea'.

Aspirations - The IAF should be able to meet the aspirations of the country. The PM has already defined our Zone of Influence to be from the Gulf of Hormuz in the West to Malacca straits & beyond in the East.

Analysis - For a detailed analysis of all factors one follows the 'Appreciation' method where one considers all threats to the country, however small. A threat is anything that prevents the country from achieving her goals, objectives or from meeting the aspirations of her people. After our analysis we realized that if we went country specific it would result in a never ending arms race. So we decided to go capability specific. What capabilities would we require to meet the country's aspirations. Putting it simplistically,

there would be four supporting pillars for the buildup. SEE, REACH, HIT & PROTECT;-

- a) See. We should be able to see first & farthest. This pillar of capability includes satellites, AWACS, long range radars, Aerostats, etc.
- b) Reach. Having seen, we should be able to reach first & farthest. This

capability includes long range ac, escorts, aerial refueling, BVR wpns, Nav Systems,etc.

- c) Hit. Having reached, when required, we should have the capability to hit hard & accurately. This involves Air-surface wpns, PGMs,LGBs,etc.
- d) Protect. We must also have the capability to protect our force all the time both in peace as well as war so that we are capable of carrying out effective operations. This includes Air Defence, camouflage, concealment, electronic warfare,cyber warfare; etc. This pillar of capability is equally important.

HR - Capability is not only about machines or hardware. It is the people who convert this capability into actual power. Therefore, HR is a vital function. Manning, recruiting, trg, skill development, retention, etc.

Finance - Thereafter, depending on budget allocation, the various capabilities are prioritized over 3-4 Plan periods.

As our capabilities evolve, we expect our potential adversaries to also try and keep pace matching up with us. Today we may have superior conventional warfighting capabilities and effective nuclear deterrence against a potential adversary, but a favourable capability balance is not static. At each stage we should be able to conduct prompt, sustained and synchronised operations tailored to specific situations. In addition we should have access and freedom to operate in all domains – space, air, land and sea and most importantly, the information domain.

The problem is that this transformation is a long drawn process. It can't be achieved overnight. Long drawn because of our type of set-up. It is not a single condition to be achieved, nor is it like a normal evolution. Transformation for us will be a continued series of fundamental changes each leading to a better capability. Keeping all this in mind, we need to understand what we need for our capability build-up.

CRYSTAL GAZING; FUTURE AEROSPACE POWER.

In my opinion, aerospace power will proliferate & find utility with many more agencies. Because of its inherent flexibility & rapid response, it will become the preferred tool for many more contingencies. It will be able to offer up more options to the leadership in times of national crises. But the same pluses will raise fundamental questions of management, policy, org structures & ownership.

Aerospace technologies will continue to evolve creating exciting possibilities. Revolution in Engine design & Artificial Int has already commenced. Technologies for int gathering & Surveillance will leapfrog generations ahead. Instrumentation, metallurgy, comn & computing power will be revolutionized. Wpns capable of directed energy & controlled destruction are already being tested. Non-lethal air launched wpns are on the cards.

Aerospace Power will seek to enhance its fundamentals of reach, accuracy, lethality, survivability, comd & control. More complex situations will witness increased employment of Remotely Piloted Ac(RPAs). Peacetime employment of aerospace power will increase. It will be interwoven into the fabric of homeland security in many more roles for tackling asymmetric forces.

Increased use of Space by the 'Have's' will be a distinct advantage in conflicts. Even in a 'No Conflict' situation lack of 'Space' will reduce 'bargaining' or 'negotiating' power. Guarding or protecting Space assets will become a high priority area.

With rapid developments in IT, Nano Tech, Directed Energy, Electronic & Cyber warfare & ISR it is difficult to predict the nature of Aerospace Power in, say, 2050:-

- a) Will the whole accent shift to RPAs ?
- b) Will 'Space' ops become routine & user friendly ?
- c) Will supersonic or hypersonic transitions become routine ?
- d) What limits to miniaturization ?
- e) How to integrate Space with air, land & sea?

These are questions with tremendous consequences. Systems which were dreams only 10 years ago are already being operationalised. So if this be the future, what do we need to do to ensure we are there, up front ?

WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO

Policy - We need a comprehensive National Strategy on Aerospace spelling out where we go. We need to institutionalize the process so that there are minimum changes. We need a regulatory mechanism with teeth for implementation of the strategy like the Federal Aviation Authority. This must have representation of all stakeholders. A change in the mindset of policy makers needs to be brought about. They must feel they, too, are stakeholders & not disinterested observers.

Technological Base - Enhance Tech trg by having more IITs & Tech Institutes with access for deserving students. Enhance & retain our pool of expert manpower. Today they are in USA, UK, Singapore.

Industrial Base - Encourage the concept of 'Brand India' with quality consciousness & control. Empower Pvt Sector by encouraging JVs & ensuring suitable policy changes to make it financially viable. We need to institutionalize these changes to prevent reversals & ensure user commitment. In return, Pvt sector must commit to put money where the mouth is.

Acquisitions & Offsets - In the next 10 years we are likely to spend 235 bn USD on acquiring Defence systems. Even at 30% offsets it amounts to a whopping \$80 bn. First we need to understand offsets & then exploit their potential. Countries like Brazil & s Korea have used 100 to 120% offsets. We need to redefine offsets. Make the definition broader. One point to remember here is that offsets never fetch you cutting edge technology. It is always better to pay up front. Today our acquisitions process is slow. It needs to be streamlined. Involvement & accountability at ministry levels needs to increase to avoid delays.

R & D. - There is a crying need to invest more in R & D, not only by the Govt but by the Pvt & Public sectors too. The running of DRDO must be streamlined to minimize wastage & to get a better bang for the buck. The accountability of DRDO needs to increase. They must set timebound, achievable objectives. We should also lay emphasis on allocating broad based research to renowned educational institutions.

Organisational Changes. We need minor modifications in the org aspects. I have already discussed an autonomous FAA like structure. We need to simplify processes & procedures. On the military side we need to effect two changes. The first is the formation of a Space Comd. This will be tri-Service. However, manning must be as per Service requirements & skill levels instead of the standard 8:2:3 for army, navy & AF. The second is Air Defence Comd. This, again must be tri Service. It must be headed by the AF since AD is the prime responsibility of the IAF. With suitable representation from other Services & agencies.

National Will Last but not the least. The message must spread that this is not only a military or Govtal issue. The spinoffs will benefit the entire Nation. Hence the whole Nation must feel that it is a stakeholder.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that aerospace power is the power of the future. We must, therefore, invest in the Power & the Technology. We need to spread this awareness to the Nation. Policymakers need to appreciate that they are stakeholders too. We need to institutionalize policy guidelines to prevent reversals of decisions. We need to create an environment that facilitates Pvt & Public sector participation.

Today we are at the cusp of our capabilities. The ramping up will start in 2025. We do have 6-7 years to prepare. If we use them wisely, we will be there, right near the top, in a strong position to exploit this great medium of Aerospace.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PRADEEP NAIK (VETERAN)



Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Naik, PVSM VSM was born on 22 July 1949 and commissioned into the Indian Air Force on 21 June 1969. After initial schooling in the Sainik School, Satara, he graduated with the 33 course from the National Defence Academy.

In a distinguished career spanning forty years, the Chairman COSC and CAS has flown a wide variety of combat and trainer aircraft. After initial training on the HT-2, he has flown the Vampire and the Hunter, and has had extensive operational experience on all variants of the MiG-21. He is a Qualified Flying Instructor with vast instructional experience and a Fighter Combat Leader from the prestigious Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE). He was selected as one of the first eight pilots to convert to the MiG-23 BN in the erstwhile USSR, and was responsible for its induction into the IAF. Besides commanding a front line fighter squadron, he has commanded an important fighter base and air force station at Bidar. He has been the Directing Staff at TACDE and the Defence Services Staff College.

During his career, the Air Chief Marshal held numerous important staff appointments in different headquarters. He was the Senior Air Staff Officer at HQ Western Air Command, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Central Air Command and the Vice Chief of Air Staff, prior to his appointment as the Chief of the Air Staff. He also took over as the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee on 01 April 2010.

The Air Chief Marshal is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, and an alumnus of the National Defence College. He is a recipient of the Param Vishisht Seva Medal and Vishisht Seva Medal.

Role of Social Media and Its Impact on India's National Security

Professor Vijay Khare

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary societies are highly technology dependents, their economies are technology driven. Information itself has become a big asset. Many companies like Google yahoo, etc. through their social application collect huge amount of data. It is used to analyze behavior, thinking pattern, choices, decision making capabilities and predicting intuition of person. Social media also gives a quick connectivity to the people.

National security is essential for a country to plan its future course and chalk out its priorities, aspirations and security challenges. In the post-Cold-War era, global power politics has moved away from traditional military centric to non-military, non-traditional security issues such as economic security, regional, global trade agreement and rush for resources. This paradigm shift is due to the technological advances and globalization. Technology has shrunk time and space. It gives instant connectivity to people. Information generated by people has itself become one of the security challenges to national security. National security challenges are multi-dimensional and include maintenance of societal cohesion, political stability and economic development. National security is a very dynamic concept, it not only includes the current security challenges but also security of value and principle upheld by the county. Today the scope of security has further broadened into human security. The fast pace of evolution of technology further complicates the challenges posed to India's national security.

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India being a diverse country, has a huge task to face in order to maintain law and order. Hence, we, Indians, need to focus on social, economic and political equality. Historical injustice to people has created fault line between communities. This fault line is the biggest hurdle to maintain internal stability. There are several reasons for these internal security issues such as unfriendly neighbours, weak state structure like poor governance, poverty in large numbers, sustenance has decreased, political insecurity like secessionism, revolutionary movements, polarisation of society, hard class barriers, drugs and arms trafficking, smuggling, rise in intolerance and fundamentalism. It has been well documented that mass media poses internal security challenges through various means such as terrorism which makes the future of the nation uncertain. Social media sites are very convenient, affordable and people can reach a large number of people through sites such as you tube, twitter, Facebook etc. It has been observed that terrorists normally use social networking sites to transmit messages and accomplish their mission. Anti-government groups use internet technology such as email, chat room, e group, forums, and virtual message boards to live their communication. The destructive power of social media can be seen in the recent riots, in various parts of India. Social media has huge potential to create national security problems out of this fault line. The Indian government has shut down all internet service in Haryana, Punjab and some parts of Uttar Pradesh, due to agitation and mob lynching. It is been observed that social media may paralyze state machinery by creating chaos. Covertly, social media has become a weapon to destabilize the nation state by instigating disability, misinformation, fear and demoralising the whole nation. Social media is used as a tool to malign the future plan of nation state.

The revolution in communication and information technologies, the capability to broadcast almost every significant development in the world events to almost every place on the globe and creation and expansion of the internet have led to the globalization of social media, electronic journalism and worldwide growth in network stations and communications. Since the government's power/legitimacy stems from civil society, governments are bound to be held accountable for their action by their people. In this sense, the public has the capacity to influence the government's decision-making. This influence may take place either in the form of setting the agenda, thus deciding what the national interest will be, or in the form of imposing constraints on governmental decision-making.

SOCIAL MEDIA

Information and communication technology has changed rapidly over the past 20 years with a key development being the emergence of social media. The pace of change is accelerating. For example, the development of mobile technology has played an important role in shaping the impact of social media. Across the globe, mobile devices dominate in terms of total minutes spent online. This puts the means to connect anywhere, at any time on any device in everyone's hands. Social media are computer-mediated technologies that facilitate the creation and sharing of information, ideas, career interests and other forms of expression via virtual communities and networks. Social media includes popular networking websites, like Facebook and Twitter; as well as bookmarking sites like Reddit. It involves blogging and forums and any aspect of an interactive presence which allows individuals the ability to engage in conversations with one another, often as a discussion over a particular blog post, news article, or event. Social media is a two-way form of communication that allows users to interact with the information being transmitted. Social media encompasses a wide variety of online content, from social networking sites like Facebook to interactive encyclopedias like Wikipedia.

Conventional media, such as television or newspapers, essentially transmits information in one direction. Users can consume the information the media offers, but they have little or no ability to share their own views on the subject. Social media, however, gives users the ability to interact with the content that is being distributed. This communication may be as simple as allowing users to comment on articles or news stories. It can also be more complex, such as on Wikipedia, where users can dictate and revise the content contained in encyclopedia articles. Other social media sites may offer recommendations to users based on the interests of other users. For example, allows users to share their music tastes and then receive music recommendations based on the listening habits of similar users. Other examples of social media include social news sites such as Reddit, Propeller and Digg. These sites allow users to interact with one another by sharing content and voting on its quality, which determines the articles that rise to the top of the site. Social video sites like YouTube allow users to share video content and interact through video comments. Social media is a phrase that we throw around a lot these days, often to describe what we post on sites and apps like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat and others. But if we use the term to describe a site like Facebook, and also a site like Digg, plus a site like Wikipedia, and even a site like I Can Has Cheezburger. The term is used so vaguely that it can basically be used to describe almost any website on the internet today or maybe

not. Some people have more of a restricted view of social media, often equating it to mean the same as social networking (a.k.a. Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Other people don't consider blogs to fall under the social media category.

Definition

The “social” part refers to interacting with other people by sharing information with them and receiving information from them. The “media” part refers to an instrument of communication, like the internet (while TV, radio, and newspapers are examples of more traditional forms of media).

Social media are web-based communication tools that enable people to interact with each other by both sharing and consuming information. Social media as “media for social interaction, using highly accessible and scalable communication techniques. Social media is the use of web-based and mobile technologies to turn communication into interactive dialogue.”

The term Social Media refers to Internet based applications that enable people to communicate and share resources and information. Some examples of Social Media include blogs, discussion forums, chat rooms, wikis, YouTube channels, LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. Social Media can be accessed by computer, smart and cellular phones, and mobile phone text messaging (SMS).

What is Social Media ?

The “social” part refers to interacting with other people by sharing information with them and receiving information from them.


The “media” part refers to an instrument of communication, like the internet (while TV, radio, and newspapers are examples of more traditional forms of media).

Social media are web-based communication tools that enable people to interact with each other by both sharing and consuming information.

There are three main characteristics that define social media:


- A virtual space where the user can activate and set their own profile
- The opportunity to make such profile public, in part or totally, linking it with other profiles and in doing so, the user can communicate with the other profiles linked to his/her network
- The opportunity to handle one's own network, developing and updating it constantly
- Some important demographic facts about social media:
- More than 75% of internet users have at least one active social media profile
- About 40% of social media users access their profile via their mobile phone

- People older than 55 are particularly active using social media via their mobile phone
- Social media users are primarily women
- Most users are between 18 to 34 years old



Accessed on 8th August, 2017

<https://www.tes.com/lessons/OioCS800E23GLQ/is-society-becoming-addicted-to-social-media>



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ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Today Media is considered to be the most effective communication and influential channel. It supports right things on proper time. It gives exposure to the mass viewers about right or wrong process immediately. Whether the issue is local, regional or global, people rely and even trust the information provided to them by the media. Therefore, this dimension / value of media increases its significance as an influential and instrumental tool with regard to building confidence or promoting mistrust among people on issues related to national security. The importance of media can be observed at the times of disasters at national level. Even though, sometimes, media is related to spreading false news but it is a fact that it helps to inform people about the realities as well. Media, the means of communication that reaches or influences people broadly has a significant position in the statecraft mechanism especially in the period of information rebellion.

Social media - its reach, impact and potential in a globalised world is no longer contested. It is a fascinating phenomenon which presents both challenges and opportunities to governments and law enforcement agencies across the spectrum. An investigation into how India has grappled with the challenges posed by the medium as also whether social media can be harnessed to act as a force multiplier for our enforcement agencies is essential. Issues related to the inadequacy of the Indian legal regime in dealing with social media and fears relating to breach of privacy and censorship of the internet also need to be addressed.

Social media is not only confined to us but to politicians as well. Through different activities politics and politicians in India have brought social media into the limelight. It is expected that social media will play a crucial role and influence the coming general elections to a great extent.

All the recent lectures by Gujarat Chief Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi, received huge social media attention. He even hosted a political conference on Google+ hangouts and this makes him the third politician across the globe to do this after the Former President of the US, Mr. Obama and the former Australian PM, Julia Gillard. Shashi Tharoor is very active on Twitter and his tweets are quoted in mainstream media. Few months back, you must have seen a page on Facebook seeking Dr. Abdul Kalam, as the President of India. Then there is Anna Hazare's Social Media Campaign against corruption in India. Many researchers have indicated that social media would be stronger and more persuasive than television in influencing people.

Social Media is used by terrorist organizations as tools for ideological radicalization recruitment, communication and training. In addition to this, terrorist groups take

advantage of Social Media to communicate with cyber -crime organizations and to coordinate along with them for fund -raising activities (from illicit activities) carried out in part (drug smuggling, gunrunning) or completely (e.g. phishing) on the Internet. The link between organized crime and terrorist organizations is increasing considerably in the cyber-world, and this coalition will be able to produce new offensive technologies. The huge influence of media in creating popular image was used subsequently by states to counterbalance their enemies and foes, internally and externally. But irrespective of the degree of independence and fairness available to the media, it has been extensively observed that media follows the nationalistic principles when dealing with matters of national security and interests. Progressively, nation states and non-state political actors have well identified the great influence of media and its use for their objectives. However, the dynamics of media impact are quite different, varying and diversified in different countries. When discussing about the Indo Pakistan security relations, media has adopted a nationalistic approach forwarding and pushing the national interests such as in wars (1965, 1971), crisis (1990 nuclear alert), border skirmishes (Kargil) or the low-intensity war (LIW) in Kashmir.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

With the recent growth of social media in the past ten years as a new staple in our modern culture, social media has also emerged as a growing threat to national security. As the Internet and social media are constantly growing and changing, national security has lagged behind. National security experts and policy makers must now adapt quickly to emerging threats or face major national security breaches. In order to understand the role of the Social Media and its impact on India's National Security, many of India's National Security concerns have been attributed to a troubled neighbourhood surrounded by failed as well as ill governed states. India has been subjected to a range of security challenges from both state as well as state sponsored non-state actors. The country has been plagued by a multiplicity of internal and external security challenges in the form of terrorism and emergency movements, unsettled borders, disputed territories, and old treaties that have never been adhered to in spirit create enormous problems for bilateral relations. However, from the decision-making point of view, the challenges are linked to systemize conditions, capacities of institutions, legislations, personalities, policies, politics and economic strength. India's security policy decision-making towards Afghanistan and China are analyzed for

the external case studies and the effort towards erecting a national country terrorism architecture and policy towards the threat of left-wing extremism are included as the international security decision-making sphere. Analyses of the decisions pertaining to national security reveal three distinct trends. First, the decision-making process has become complex with an expansion of the list of influential actors. Second, successful decisions taken still remain personality oriented or are aided by favourable systemic or domestic conditions. In the absence of towering personalities and enabling conditions either no decisions could be taken or the compromised decisions barely fulfilled their stated objectives. And third, the overstretched bureaucracy plays a pivotal role in the process without necessary expertise and competence, and on most occasions, has prevented the emergence of structures that could aid the decision-making apparatus.

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National Security for National Development Internal Security is Fundamentally Central

Gp Captain A G Bewoor VM(G)

INTRODUCTION

Humans like animals live in groups. Sociologists, historians, anthropologists, estimate that like animals, humans seek security within their group and create rules, laws, restrictions, freedoms, limitations. All this is done for survival and continuation of the group as a single entity capable of resisting and repelling invasions as well as internal attacks. For how long this has been going on is irrelevant to us, what is germane and directly impacts our security as a nation is how powerful is our Internal Security (IS), and whether it can be breached. It can be argued that our IS may be permitted to be somewhat less potent than our External Security (ES), and such a situation would not impinge on National Security (NS). This is unsafe. Worse is that by concentrating on ES, which is easily definable, and neglecting IS in the belief that strong ES will automatically ensure IS, is as foolish as being certain that giving primacy to freedom over security guarantees freedoms. More on this later.

The forces that are put in place to ensure ES are well defined, large in numbers, their tasks, areas of responsibility, capabilities, fault lines, limitations are known. The defenders of ES have well defined threats and the directions from where these scourges can attack India. ES causes concern among citizens as they see a well outlined adversary whose intents, strengths and potencies are well advertised. On the canvas of NS, painting demands of ES is easily done, but not so about IS. When

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NS is juxtaposed with National Development (ND); everyone looks at the obvious impediments that waylay the potholed itinerary traversing a dusty uneven track, creating plenty of detritus and obscuring forward vision. In this obscurity, clarity suffers and decision making gets clouded on what should be done to heighten NS with the aim of helping ND. The single most critical and decisive constituent for enhancing the ambience for ND has to be recognition of Internal Threats (IT), to be countered by IS alone. Were we to clearly posit some vital ITs, with self evident solutions in the positing itself, the task of siring answers to fortify IS will emerge.

AIM

The aim of this article is to highlight some IT that need serious and immediate attention to heighten IS. The number of IT are too many to include in this paper, the writer acknowledges that his priorities may well differ from others views.

Being Branded a Regional Power and Its Pitfalls

False Security - In the late 80s when India intervened in Sri Lanka with the IPKF, followed by the successful defeat of the coup in Maldives, the Western Powers supported by their muscular media, branded India as a Regional Power (RP). We basked in that aureole, the Indian media parroted the West; our bureaucracy ably supported with political blessings placed a halo on themselves as the architects of a resurgent India which had 'arrived' on the global scene. The Soviet Union, our staunch ally, mired in Afghanistan, was yet to collapse. Rajiv Gandhi had not been tarred by Bofors, India was stuck in her command economy and our military capacity was certainly not adequate in size, mobility and gumption to tackle multiple contingencies that any RP must be able to do. In this ambience we were elevated onto the pedestal of a RP. This caused flighty self aggrandisement with in government and the military establishment too, creating a false sense of superiority, this overconfidence, became a major source of Internal Threat.

Policing the Region - One cannot be a RP without also being the Regional Policeman (RPM) which we are not. A RPM is invariably consulted before outside powers step into the region. Did USA tell us of their intentions in Pakistan and Afghanistan, do they tell us today? Did China talk to us before teaming up with Pakistan on the infamous road corridor? Who talks to India before intervening in Sri Lanka or Maldives? Does Myanmar apprise India about their tying up with China, USA, Australia, Indonesia or Bangladesh? Does Bangladesh advise us about their agreements with China, USA, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, USSR, UK or even

Pakistan? Does Nepal show acceptance of our position as RPM in the region? The list of unfulfilled expectations of a RP cum RPM are awkward and embarrassing, and if we keep asserting our status of being a RP, then the spin-off will fly in our faces with eroded IS. The laziness, neglect, certitude, cockiness that prevails in such an atmosphere is a grievous threat to NS. We wish away reality because others tell us we are powerful? We wish away debilitating facts to look great in international forums? We start believing what is false because of those laudatory accolades and indulge in self congratulations? Can there be a greater self inflicted injury. This is an IT in its finest form.

No One Asks Questions? Funnily no one in India questions this branding? Why is the branding being done, who benefits most, India or our adversaries? Has this branding, which we have lapped up as honourable, got us onto the High Table in the UN? Have we got a berth in the Nuclear Supplier Group? Has the branding made us neutralise the terror groups in Pakistan? Our political, military, bureaucratic, technocratic, judicial, academic, philosophical leadership has to make intellectual enquiries and reassessment on the short and long term deleterious impact of this branding. Our youth the mainstay for IS, who believe the media outpourings from the West as God's Own Truth, have been lulled into indolence with devastating effect on attitudes towards dedicated hard work to keep India safe from both Internal and External Threats. Does this sound alarmist? Many will say yes, which is exactly what the Western leadership want, a consistently overconfident India, which stumbles with regularity and has restricted diplomatic, military, economic capability that needs the West's support in perpetuity. How can we hope for development when our beliefs are tranquilising us into seeking what does not nourish India. Forces inimical to India both within and without, surreptitiously encouraged us to enter Sri Lanka with the IPKF, ensuring that the mission must fail, and simultaneously feeding our collective egos with Great Power nutrition. And how we fell for this hook, line and sinker. Let us accept that no nation on Earth is willing to acquiesce to having India rise to RP status. Many ignore the facts of partition that irrefutably point to the absolute fear that the Post World War II Western conglomerate had of an independent strong undivided India. To be told you are mighty when you are not, is a major internal threat because it gives you a false of well being and power that you just do not have and cannot acquire.

Educating the Population to Generate Security

That Inner Strength. India has shamelessly and negligently fiddled around with our education system since 1947. This meddling and tampering was done for votes

and to churn out like sausage, hordes of graduates, post-graduates, and doctoral dissertation writers, with limited employability. What was worse, the value system of our ancient educational patterns was dismissed as irrelevant in the 20th century of the bi-polar world. Leftist thinkers who carried much weight in the Nehru years dictated the contents and methodology of teaching the burgeoning youth who grew up with strong aspirations to work in Free India. These Leftists threw out of the classroom windows anything remotely associated with Vedic or Puranic processes, schemes and practices, because these two ancient systems were branded as religious extracts, and religion as per their 'Master' Karl Marx was the opium of the masses. In addition a 'secular' people could not be fed with thoughts that emanate from religious texts. It is a different matter that these leftists knowingly concealed the bitter truth, that spirituality and religion are two different ideas, and that spirituality makes for inner strength. Whether it be from Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Zoroastrian, Hindu, Jain, Sikh context, spirituality is in essence the same. So our schools and colleges worked towards teaching by rote to regurgitate book knowledge, giving High School certificates, Bachelors & Masters Degrees, Doctorates; all very pretty on paper. Unfortunately these parchments were useless for creating a dedicated, loyal, persevering, unwavering work force because their teachers could not give them the stability and courage to hang-in, hold-on and persist in adversities that a young, fragile, confused, ambitious India was passing through.

Lucre Subsumed Our Values - Political and bureaucratic interventions at every level from parliament to panchayat, frequently altered, modified, added, deleted, subjects and curriculum at whim for political advantage, and we watched. Genuine academics failed India by their silence, the overwhelming weight of secular philosophy was so potent and muscular, that even our greatest of educationist, Dr S. Radhakrishnan could not intervene. When three generations of Indians go through such traumatic scholastic years, the erosion in self confidence and level of self doubting reaches an apex. Internal security dives to the bottom of the barrel, lost in the darkness of uncertainty and emptiness. When millions joined the Indian workforce after so painful and oft changing learning process what security could they provide to themselves, their families, and their progeny who would take over India 30 years later? When lakhs of middle aged Indians have been given tilted and biased values that benefit political organisations to control Assemblies and Parliament, a truly disoriented generation will emerge into the mainstream. Embarrassing as it is, this generally confused and partially lost generation is made up of us who are now in our late 60s and early 70s. That we survived this academic onslaught and created the India of today, is directly attributable to our predecessors and mentors,

who ensured that basic values from all philosophies were imbibed by us, we must be eternally grateful to them. On the other hand witness today our streets, colleges, universities, workplaces, entertainment centres, legislatures, bureaucracies, military, judiciary, academia, scientists, and we see that lucre has subsumed loyalty, generosity, unselfishness, humility, camaraderie, standing up to be counted and such attributes that were considered intrinsic for all. Is this not corrosion of IS? A population that measures itself only in its accumulated liquidity cannot provide any security to themselves and to their nation. Without that security how can we expect even an iota of development?

Politicisation of the Student Community - To have student unions to enter into a dialogue with their teachers and administrators is indispensable and desirable. Having Student Unions also gives abundant opportunity for learning how to accept disparate views, contradictions of life, failures and successes and the art of give and take. These exposures prepares the youth to face up to the challenges that will confront them during their careers, while organising their families, in retirement, thus making each one of them an important fulcrum in strengthening the community from within and as a group thus enhancing IS. This automatically leads to security of individuals, families, and communities, translating into safe developmental actions for all. It is this IS that can trace its roots to the students union activity. Regrettably our polity has crippled this honest and noble design by criminalising student unions in an effort to get their claws into the vitals of educational institutes. The criminalisation is so complete; that student leadership cannot function without active and open support from political parties. What a disgrace it is that our youth have more faith in politicians than their teachers, guides, mentors and colleagues. How have we permitted this to happen? Who is to blame for this unpalatable state of affairs that is eating away the inherent security that an educational unit engenders? We keep demanding IS from our law enforcement forces, and they in turn plead for cooperation from the public. At how many places can a policeman be standing to ensure security? That an incident like Nirbhay can happen and we remain mute spectators, then that is degeneration of values, which is born from a corrupted youth over decades of criminalisation of our students for short term political triumphs. The day all Student Unions sever their ties with politicians, the danger to IS will start to diminish, will the 'netas' allow it? So which MP/MLA is working towards IS?

Get Hold of Teachers - In all the foregoing the focus has been on the taught and have forgotten the 'guru'. Like a mother whose constant attention and training of children makes for a good individual, so also is the skill, capability, dignity, self

respect, esteem, of the teachers in India the strongest root for making responsible and reliable youth. Institutes of higher learning, public and private schools, Municipal and Central Schools, boarding schools, expensive schools, village schools, fancy schools, are in abundance yet inadequate for our burgeoning population. In all debates and discussions centre of attention and stress is constantly on the taught, while the teacher is sidelined and out of focus. This lack of attention to our teachers is where IS in India takes a beating. The poor investment of funds and infrastructure in teachers training and their maintenance is where, to put it in vernacular, '*Hindustan maar kha gaya*'. We have been so unconcerned and disinterested in the quality, integrity and respectability of the 'gurus' that IS suffers.. Certainly the very base of a well trained young citizenry is the teacher who nurtured them with values and did not just pass on data for reproduction in examinations. When the class 1 child gets truthful knowledge from a solidly dedicated, respected and trained guru, and continues to get nurturing for 12 years at the end of high school, the IS of a nation become powerful. We are looking only at the taught because there is money and political benefit in this attitude. The more efforts we put into creating top quality teachers for all levels of education, the more satisfactory will be the calibre and character of the output from our education machines. The more robust and enduring the character of students joining India's workforce, the stronger our IS, because such a population will not permit unhealthy activities that cause dissonance. Thousands upon thousands of young men and women will bring cohesiveness and value based glue to keep us away from fragmenting. Brilliant managers, accountants, scientists, engineers, doctors, cannot work towards IS when their attention during 18 years of routine education, has never touched on values to make a secure environment which must finally benefit them and their descendents. Get the focus onto generating the best of gurus, give them the izzat they deserve, give them remunerations and facilities commensurate with their burden of creating generations of valuable Indians, and finally keep their role on the front pages and in prime time of national and regional media. We have ignored, overlooked, disregarded the critical role of teachers in nation building and its close link to IS. The annual salary of an IIM postgraduate gets primacy over the teacher's salary who got him there, we are paying the price in many areas including IS. It has to change.

The Freedoms, Obligations, Duties, Information and Security Through Media

A One Sided Relationship - In the last 67 years that India's constitution has been in force, we have legislated 101 amendments till Sep 2017. In the USA, since 1789, a period of 228 years, there have been only 33 amendments. So much for the architects of our constitution who we lionise as near perfect thinkers. The only need to mention this truth is to be able to state without hesitation that there are many imperfections in our constitution which was so painstakingly made by stalwarts of those days. Some of them had the vision to look well beyond their times, others were stuck in a time warp, yet others focussed on just a few matters, and therefore to say that each and every article of our constitution is total and complete is wrong, and this also includes the Articles on Freedoms. Freedom to speak, express ideas, disseminate contrary views, challenge existing systems, demand redressal, practice ones faith, are inviolate and cannot be impinged upon; for they make the bedrock of democratic values which we cherish and must protect. What is conveniently ignored by those who champion freedoms are the Articles that define duties, obligations, responsibilities, limitations on the freedoms. This one sided relationship between the citizen and the state is bad for IS. It has been often reported that delay in completion of Sardar Sarovar dam was a direct result of rights being demanded without attendant obligations being attached to those demands. In these last three decades when India opened up its economy and also ushered in the information revolution there has been a surfeit of events wherein basic freedoms subsumed canonical duties along with elementary constitutional limitations.

Freedoms and Privacy - Everyone is so elated by the Supreme Court order about Privacy that most have ignored the other aspect of seeking, nay snatching ones privacy and hiding it before any security walla can even look at it. While privacy is desirable and indeed necessary it cannot and must not swallow security of the 'private person' and her fellow citizens and thus endanger the safety of not just her but all those who exist around her. The 'seeker' is guided not by her own analysis but by what the media presents as detailed introspection by knowledgeable stalwarts, who by the sheer frequency of their writings have arrogated to themselves the status of experts. This is false and rampant among media to dilute the duties and obligations of citizens towards their country, because such dilution gives huge space for manoeuvre by media to control opinions of the masses. If Karl Marx considered religion as the opiate of the masses way back in the 1840s, then today nearly 200 years later, media control over opinion of the masses is the true intoxicant, it must be definitely toned down to ensure IS. The media giants will instantly cry foul and say you are 'shooting the

messenger' and muzzling freedom of speech, and preventing the world to exercise their right to know. Nauseating as these false tears are, we are familiar with them and permit the media wallas to say it. However, the fact is that the messengers have not remained pure messengers, but have become the message. They have laid claim and usurped from the public, the right to think, analyse, reject, accept, kick out, or embrace the information being spewed out by the media. They present it twisted and convoluted with large doses of strong prompting and proposals and repeatedly attack our eyes and ears with the same visuals and commentaries, without any concern to our freedoms. If we object they do not listen to us, and continue as it is guaranteed by the constitution. Worse, the complete spectrum of media are in it together, thick as thieves, displaying no remorse at their vituperative language. The ordinary guy is not permitted to think and make up his mind on any subject. This is a direct attack on IS because without suggestion by media, we are unable to decide and act, the media has made robots out of us, that is their grip, thus the men and women of India who are the mainstay of IS have no opinion nor any contribution towards IS unless actuated and incited by the all pervasive media. So where is our freedom and our privacy? Who actually is controlling it?

How Many Onslaughts Can We Count? The vice like grip that social media as well as TV has established on our population is frightening and seemingly undefeatable. No less than Barak Obama was constrained to mention this. Instant transmission of stories and pictures of people, events, places, with no care for privacy or security has overwhelmed our nation. Its misuse is well documented and witnessed by lakhs of Indians. Some sensational ones that trigger extreme dismay are the live pictures of special forces slithering down from helicopters during the 26/11 attack on Hotel Taj Mahal in Mumbai. It should never have happened. The harm and hurt that resulted cannot be measured or weighed in a '*tarazoo*'. Yet I do not recall anyone from the channel accepting it as a colossal blunder, catch any media mogul ever saying they are wrong or blameworthy. Take the infamous Tehelka sting operation that toppled Mr Bangaru Laxman and forced the resignation of some senior Army officers. The leader of this sting today stands accused of rape and molestation and is in custody. This is the integrity and morality of the man who says there is utter corruption in defence procurement procedures? One can ask, how much of the sting was prompted by sleaze and sexual favours, given the tilt of the leader for such activity. Observe how the media destabilised the system but kept its own unpalatable actions away from public eyes and ears. This terribly dangerous weakness of media gets ignored because they collectively suppresses it, a regular recurring onslaught on the intelligence and security of each citizen, with a trickle-down effect on IS. Sadly no one looks at these

abnormalities through the lens of India's safety. Social sites and TV showing carnage of terrorist attacks with the panic and confusion is exactly what the attackers want the viewers to see. The media is directly assisting terror groups by highlighting their butchery, and media pleas about right to know, right to tell, right to expression are false flags, in actuality the media has more blood on their hands than the murderers. Does anyone keep this view as the focus of their deliberations? The media has mesmerised us into viewing and reading what they want us to. Observe the live coverage of Dera Sacha Sauda. The media could have ignored it completely as frivolous which it was and spared Indian privacy from utterly debased stories that bordered on pornography when they interviewed people from the Dera. And not one voice of protest from anyone who matters, and media gave themselves a huge pat on the back for corrupting our thoughts and impinging on security of thought and privacy. Regrettably we do not link such deluging and overpowering media behaviour as a threat to our well being, privacy and security. In Orwellian terms the media is the Big Brother who has captured our attention, our thinking, our decision making, our preferences, our political and social predispositions. We are becoming a nation that needs someone else to tell us what is good, bad, acceptable, unsavoury, dangerous, sleazy and squalid. These onslaughts are camouflaged with confusing messages that are obliquely disseminated keeping the media's credibility by artificial means. It is there for all to see, yet we remain inert, indifferent and neutral to this grievous life-threatening subterfuge.

The Few Who Overwhelm the Many - An unsuspecting threat that simmers just under the surface is the ability of the very few to overpower all others. Group and individual views, opinions, decisions, beliefs, feelings, impressions, judgments, sentiments, thoughts, notions, in fact just about anything that people wish to do and think is controlled by these very few. Their reach far outweighs their actual numbers with disastrous consequences; that force decisions upon nations and citizens that should never have been options in the first place. This is one of the greatest threats to IS, because a very small, but highly influential group of self serving persons coerce and impel decisions that are detrimental to the vast majority, but extremely salutary and beneficial to this small group immediately. Take the Brexit imbroglio. First it was not necessary to have the referendum, but it was forced upon Great Britain because of specious parallels from history. Strange examples were projected by Brexiters to sway the voting in favour of leaving the EU. Like the neoconservatives in USA who sold the idea of regime change in Iraq, (more on this later), the pro-Brexiters outmanoeuvred all sanity and logic to win the referendum. All managed brilliantly by media that was complicit in this dastardly act. The stupidity of Brexit could not be defeated by false news, disinformation, alarmist deductions that were pure lies. Observe the false claims

that Brexit would put Pounds 350 million into the National Health Scheme that otherwise goes to the EU every week, and the media with the 'few', succeeded, which also speaks poorly of Britisher's intelligence. How Britain ruled India with such poor intellectual calibre is a mystery, maybe it is our even poorer ability to outfox them. It is worth asking how many media barons are now squirming in their chairs realising too late the colossal damage they have done to their great country. How Brexit will damage internal and overall security of Great Britain is to be seen, but all pointers are looking at massive troubles. Similarly witness the media campaign charted out against Modi even before he won in 2014. No self respecting opinion maker in India could hold forth unless she lambasted Modi for all acts of commission and omission, and all this was fortified by a willing and pliant media. Recall that these alarmists were miniscule in numbers yet had a pan-India reach not seen before which told all Indians that a govt led by Modi will sink India into the ocean or get smothered under mountains of bigotry with anti-Muslim and anti-Christian rhetoric. This story has nothing to do with the correctness or otherwise of these opinions; the article is to highlight the all pervasive out of proportion influence that a small group of supposedly prestigious individuals can apply with a sly media which itself has much to gain by the 'group' winning their game. It is fortuitous that Indians saw through the perfidy and voted from their hearts but the goo and mire that the media threw at Modi at the behest of this small influential group, has remained. Yet another example of media in cahoots with American neoconservatives targeted Iraq and Saddam Hussain for completely false causes and turned educated and reasonably well informed Americans into robots who supported the 'weapons of mass destruction' theory. Many say it was to control oil, others say it was because Saddam wanted to link oil prices to the Euro and not the US dollar which would have made the dollar as cheap as toilet paper, be that as it may, the media played into the hands of these tiny neoconservatives and the chaos in the Middle East today is the sad result of that greater than acceptable influence small groups have with complicit support from the media. Illustrations of this phenomena flourishing in India are numerous and still happening, causing dangerous threats to IS because fiction becomes fact, untruth becomes verity, the distasteful becomes normal, routine becomes heinous, majority become directionless and then get guided by the narrative doled out by the media at the behest and directions of the group, and we all live happily thereafter. Such a people are susceptible to IT very easily.

Branding and Image Make Over by Media - Communists won many seats in the 2004 elections and could have been an active part of UPA 1 but they gave support from the 'outside', shying from responsibility under public gaze.. There are many such political stalwarts who talk more than they act, and the media gives them huge

credibility. They will make pronouncements on matters and issues which they know nothing about, yet will pontificate as though they are experts, like Brinda Karat calling the appointment of General Bipin Rawat as Chief of Army Staff in January 2016 as incorrect. What Karat knows about higher military appointments is not worth knowing, but the media gave her undeserved prominence. Recall that Rajiv Gandhi's Congress won 414 seats out of 533 in 1984, and the BJP won 282 out of 543 in 2014, but no one accused the Congress with 77% majority of having a majoritarian impact, but the BJP with just 52% seats is positively majoritarian. See the false branding and misleading epithets that the 'few' with media support can unleash on the public. A direct destabilising impact on IS because it creates a fear psychosis among the undiscerning. Yet another smear campaign is the denial of women their justified place within the Armed Forces. Statistics will prove that all those who champion the cause of women getting into all parts of the Armed Forces including direct combat units, will never ever send their daughters, nieces, sisters, daughters-in-law, into the Armed Forces. That is for other women. Yet the cause gets enormous media exposure with branding of the Armed Forces as male dominated chauvinist citadels where equality is denied to 50% of India. The inherent problems of putting girls into battle along with men has never been asked, thus never answered in the media, and the champions of women's liberation are never answer them. But look at the disinformation spread by a few with unfettered support from media that ends in distrust of those who defend India, causing erosion of IS.

The Civil - Military Equation

The Fictitious and Delusive Threat of a Military Coup - In all democratic systems, the military is given a position of prominence in the deliberations of government where security, external threats, internal security, equations with neighbouring countries, international relations that impact defence and so on are considered. And readers will be appalled to learn that India is the only nation on Earth and possibly the solar system if not the 'brahmaand', where the Armed Forces are purposely kept away from such deliberations. In the Govt of India's matters of business, the civilian IAS official called the Defence Secretary (DS), is solely responsible for the Defence of India, the Chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force have no mention. This DS is ably supported by an army of other IAS boffins who run the Ministry of Defence (MOD) for the Raksha Mantri who is responsible to the Cabinet. This system is ingrained into the MOD and not one uniformed officer is ever a part of the functioning of MOD. This according to the IAS cadres is the definitive aspect of democratic governance where the civilians establish constant and permanent control of the military. This brings

undesirable condescension by the civilian in the engagements with the military, and a constant frustration within the military. The lay citizen will balk at this state of affairs, and demand change, but he is kept in the dark by a manipulative civil service, that constantly reminds the political leadership that unless the military is kept under tight civilian control, the possibility of a coup is very high. The Indian bureaucrat and his intelligence community colleagues have spread this canard ever since totalitarian regimes spread in our neighbourhood. They frightened politicians by pointing at Ayub Khans coup in Pakistan, and said that Indian Armed Forces' officers were at one time blood brothers in arms of those who now rule Pakistan, why should they not do the same here in India? Blatant misinformation causing damage to IS.

Decibels of Disharmony Cannot Be Sustained - After Nehru's death this fictional fabrication was further fortified by civilian bureaucrats, police cadre intelligence people, and armed para-military police forces were raised as a counterpoise to the supposed Armed Forces coup, and as usual the media played ball and shamelessly promoted this fear psychosis. The glaring front page misleading story by Indian Express on 16 Jan 2016 not even two years back, is evidence of media and civilian bureaucratic unsavoury concoction to put the political leadership into disarray and make it unsure of what the military might do. It is worth noting that when the conditions in India for staging a coup were the most attractive, India's Armed Forces have remained unswervingly loyal to the government of the day whatever its shape, size, leaning, frailties, misdemeanours. Recall the conduct of the Indian Armed Forces during the Emergency, during the Fits and Starts governments of the unholy alliances that fell like nine pins with prime ministers coming and going. Indian military leadership abhors and prohibits discussions on politics among its officers and men. Fiercely truehearted, unflappable in crisis, firmly loyal to the elected government, and steadfast in defending the integrity of India even under grave provocation from its own civilian masters, that is the bharatiya faujis way of life. The disruptive methods used against the Armed Forces to supposedly keep them away from mischief, creates avoidable fear among the population which leads to erosion of IS because the decibels of internal disharmony rises to a crescendo. People look for security elsewhere when it is already in place and flourishing. Remedy is required immediately to this environment of insincerity, if not addressed with imagination and courage, IS will crumble from within.

CONCLUSION

The greatest danger in to system is always from within, whereas, the controllers of public opinion will point towards outside elements as the visible threat. If we want solid unassailable IS to fortify NS then let us be intrepid in seeing the danger from all aspects. Look at IS as a societal matter and not the domain of government responsibility. Domestic violence talk was taboo, yet we knew it was there. Sexual victimisation among people of all faiths is common knowledge yet swept under rugs with missionary zeal. Violent mistreatment and exploitation of minor girls and boys is rampant yet we close our eyes to it. Female Genital Mutilation is common in many countries, and banned by law, regrettably it continues but prosecution is rare. The most unsafe place for women and children on Earth; appears to be the Home. Internal Security is failing where it should be taking birth. If the 'home' itself is unsafe, how can security get generated? Masses are discombobulated and unable to decide where to seek that protection. To counter sexual or physical harassment inside homes and workplaces, internal security has to flourish in homes and workplaces, only then can men, women, children go to work or play, and happily return home. Ordinary people in large numbers are essential for ensuring security and laws to function. To expect legislatures, judiciary, police, military, vigilantes, to do this is misplaced and dangerous. Thus security of our nation has to be taught and imbibed into our culture as a collective and singular responsibility to preserve and protect our very being and existence.

The media and the ordinary citizen have to hold hands for generating IS which is critical for keeping us safe today and maintain that safety for generations that will follow. The teachers who will educate our youth are bewildered, neglected and never given the elevated posit of the ancient guru.

Their contribution towards IS will be monumental if their energies are harnessed. Beware of the uncontrolled influence that few can impose upon the many with a complicit media. False news through social media is a scourge that has to be tackled to have a robust IS. Do not get swayed by being falsely elevated to a position higher than we are capable of, it lulls us into laziness and puts blinkers on our eyes and plugs in our ears, surely but gradually destroying IS from the inside like termite. The discordant equation between the military and civil bureaucracy has to be bridged with faith and adjustments, keeping the military-civilian link disharmonious damages IS, and the population does not know where to seek it.

The tragic fire in a Mumbai eatery is a glaring example of failed Internal Security. Patrons to hotels, restaurants, pubs, cinema halls, theatres, circuses, can clearly observe the safety measures available in case of natural disasters. But self preservation which is

intrinsic to IS, is handed over to the administration, police, municipality, fire-fighters, and local government. The media convinces us that our personal safety is not our business, but that of the government, irrespective whether we have been abundantly negligent in our assessments of visiting any place for leisure and pleasure. This is why public education and awareness of IS cannot be overemphasised. The constitution has been made by mortals who have laid down our dharma. What is the 'Dharma' of citizens of India in ensuring IS for us today and for our children tomorrow? Draupadi's humiliation is witnessed by all, but no one steps forward to help her. There are arguments on whether it is within the purview of Dharma to intervene. Which means no one, including kings, find anything terrible in a woman being dragged and disrobed in public. This dramatic episode draws attention to the tragedy of laws that in their dispassionate execution forget that Dharma exists in the first place; to enable the ordinary citizens to survive with dignity. There cannot be a law that permits netas and administrators to gamble away their kingdoms and for men to gamble away their wives. *When the letter of the law becomes more important than the spirit of the law, when rules matter more than people, when order is established without compassion, it is time to re-examine the dharma being followed by those who are custodians of that Dharma.* IS emerges from true spirit of Dharma.

GROUP CAPTAIN A G BEWOOR, VM (G)



Gp Capt A G Bewoor 9718 F(P) was commissioned in the Indian Air Force in October 1965 into the Transport Stream. He was one of the pioneer members to induct the Il-76 into the IAF.

He flew the first Il-76 into Male during the abortive coup in the Maldives in 1988. This, along with the other acts earned him the Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry) in 1990. Over his career spanning 26 years, he had flown various types like the C-119, C-47, An-12, An-24, Il-76 and even the C-46

Commando during his tenure with ARC.

He took premature retirement on 30 November 1993 while serving as the COO of 3 Wing at AFS Palam.

Psychological Pressure of Military Operations Against Terrorists on Army Persons and Their Families

Maj Gen S H Mahajan (Retd)

INTRODUCTION

The study of combat stress on soldiers of the Indian Army must necessarily go beyond purely theoretical and often illogical speculation. Why this needs a mention is because focused data collection is more or less absent. As a proud and often stoic Army, combat stress is not recognized as a war stopper. So there should be no surprise that studies on the subject are not only nearly absent in India, they do not form part of the Army's training curriculum. Recently a field manual titled "Psychological strengths of Indian soldiers"¹ was published by DIPR, New Delhi. A study of the manual reveals near total absence of data collection and analysis. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is hardly any focus on the Indian soldier. The manual goes on to establish its premises entirely based on and more or less completely extracted from studies by the US Armed Forces. Consequently the recommended models to address combat stress related behavioral issues are also derived and completely juxtaposed from Comprehensive Soldier Fitness programme for the US Army. To put it mildly, this approach gloriously ignores the anthropology of the Indian soldier, its organizational ethos, social milieu and the far more complex issues obtaining in the operating environment.

1 Singh J K and Singh N P and Kumar Suresh(2014), "Psychological Strengths of Indian Soldiers", by DIPR, Timarpur, Delhi

The problems of Army personnel are unique. Most of the Army personnel retire at 40 when their social responsibilities are the highest. In addition, since 80 per cent of the soldiers are from villages they are cut off from their kin during their service. Overall, the problems of Army personnel require a different understanding and different solutions. For example, research on problems confronted especially by Kargil war widows pointed out that we need to have an appropriate way of disbursing compensation to the affected families. Historical research also shows that we should continue the present regimental system which is an important ingredient of the Unit's responsibility towards a soldier.

STRESS IN ARMY ENVIRONMENT

Stress has become a by-word of modern life. Constrained by the demands imposed at the professional and personal realms; overwhelmed by personal aspirations and expectations of peers, subordinates and superiors; restricted by either the limitations of one's capabilities or resources, every man and woman in every walk of life undergoes the phenomenon of stress in varying degrees. While stress affects the emotional and physical health of any individual for a finite time period in any job or profession, the impact of stress on the continued well being of an individual is nowhere as pronounced as it is when the individual is an Armed Forces personnel and the environment is the Armed Forces. The prolonged periods of separation from family, the very threat to life and limb, the imminence of physical danger, the likelihood of the loss of a close colleague, make the Armed Forces environment – especially in combat – inherently stressful². The lethality of the modern conflicts is potentially greater and the

way that conflicts are waged is more asymmetrical, when compared with the wars of an earlier era. Consequently, there have been high rates of combat stress related casualties in all wars over the past 100 years. Historically, within US military operations, Combat Operational Stress Reactions (COSR) have accounted for up to half of all battlefield casualties, depending upon the difficulty of the conditions³. Our

2 Pravin Singh, "Suicides graver than enemies for Armed Forces", 22 Jul 2014, available [Online]: www.Oneindia.com accessed on 14 Dec 2017

3 Jennifer Lee Gibson, Trueman R. Tremble "Influences of Work Life Support of Officers' Organisational Commitment and Negative Work-Family Spillover", U.S. Army Research Institute for The Behavioral and Social Sciences Army Project

own Armed Forces have been grappling with instances of stress related incidents every year⁴. The toll has been alarmingly crossing the 100 mark year after year. The year wise details of suicide case from 2003 to 2012 is shown at Table 1⁵. In 2008, for instance, there were 151 suicide cases and four cases of fratricide in the three Services. The figures for suicides in the army in 2006 rose by 56% over 2005. The number of cases for fratricide in the army rose by 117% in 2006 over 2005. Recent media reports indicate over four times more soldiers die battling their internal demons rather than fighting militants in Kashmir or North-East. Just 24 soldiers, for instance, were killed in action while fighting terrorists in J&K in 2011 as against 102 who took their own lives⁶. The situation is not much better in Indian Air Force, with over 20 Airmen committing suicide every year. The situation of stress related causality turning into fatal casualties has remained grimmer over the years⁷.

COMBAT AND NON COMBAT STRESS

The Army personnel are exposed to combat as well as non-combat stress due to their professional obligations and nature of deployment. The details are given in succeeding paragraphs.

- Combat Stress Combat Stress is the mental, emotional or physical tension, strain, or distress resulting from exposure to combat and combat-related conditions. Combat Stress is obtained as a result of prolonged exposure to traumatic conditions of service or due to one or more potentially traumatic experience(s).
- Non – Combat Stress Non – Combat Stress in army is obtained due to stressors that are non-operational in nature. Domestic instability, financial issues, inability to influence events and decisions on the domestic front, diminishing prospects of advancement in Service etc. are some of the examples of Non-Combat stressors. However, it is essential to understand that Non-Combat stressors may affect an individual even in combat environment.

Number 622785A790 Personnel Performance and Training Technology.

4 Lt Gen Harwant Singh, "Suicides in the military". IDR. 10 Oct 2012.

5 Dr Sakshi Sharma, "Stress Management in Indian Army", available online at www.dailyexcelsior.com/stress-management-in-indian-army/, accessed on 14 Dec 2017.

6 Nitin Gokhale, "Suicides in Army: A comprehensive review needed", 11 Aug 2012, available [Online]: www.ndtv.com, accessed on 14 Dec 2017.

7 Rajat Pandit, Times of India Ed. "597 Military personnel have committed suicide in last 5 years, Government says", 22 Jul 2014.

COMBAT STRESS REACTION

Soldiers exposed to danger experience physical and emotional reactions that are not present under more tranquil circumstances⁸. Some reactions sharpen abilities to survive and win; other reactions may produce disruptive behaviors and threaten individual and unit safety. These adverse behaviors are collectively called combat stress reaction. Combat stress reaction is an acute reaction including a range of behaviors resulting from the stress of battle which decrease the combatant's fighting efficiency. The most common symptoms are fatigue, slower reaction times, indecision, disconnection from one's surroundings, and inability to prioritize. Combat stress reaction is generally short-term and may or may not lead to long term disorders such as acute stress disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder.

STRESSORS IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT

Military operations encompass a range of different types of missions, including war like operations (conventional operations), counter insurgency operations, encountering hostile fire, maintaining law and order in aid to civil authority, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, executing of civic action programmes etc., each with its own distinct challenges and stressors. It is difficult to draw a dividing line between what constitutes an unconventional warfare stressor and what constitutes a conventional warfare stressor, because both kinds of operations may include elements and stressors of both, like lack of sleep, difficult living conditions, risk of diseases, long hours and boredom apart from risk of death or injury to oneself and colleagues. The demands of deployments often require tighter deadlines and heavier workloads for maintenance, training and logistics operations. However, certain characteristics of conventional and sub conventional operations are elaborated upon in succeeding paragraphs.

CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

War is the most dramatic concentration of deliberate physical and psychological trauma that societies can inflict upon each other. Under particularly intense combat

8 Tribune News, Editorial (05-072007). Soldier in Stress, Ignore symptoms to court disaster. <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/2007/0705/edit.htm#1>. accessed 14 December 2017.

conditions, extreme manifestation of stress response and breakdown in performance have been found to be prevalent. In a study of 2630 soldiers who had broken down during combat in Normandy campaign in World War II, it was estimated that the onset of combat exhaustion occurred even in previously normal soldiers when about 65% of their companions had been killed, wounded or had otherwise become casualties. Following aspects characterize conventional operations and contribute directly and indirectly to causing stress to the soldier concerned :-

- **Threat to Life and Limb** The prosecution of war is violent to the extreme. The battlefield is characterized by intense artillery shelling, aimed small arms fire, grenades, mines etc, all of which have the capacity to kill or maim for life. Thus the combatant is well justified in fearing the worst that might happen to him. Prolonged exposure to an intense battlefield environment where the threat to life and limb is high often leads to stress reactions such as shell shock and battle fatigue which may subsequently morph into PTSD or other such anxiety disorder.
- **Isolation** Although peacetime army routine is characterized by fall-ins, assemblies of troops, large scale parades etc. where a soldier gets used to seeing almost his entire team together, combat operations are characterized by a sense of isolation and an overwhelming sense of loneliness. As brought out by SLA Marshall in his masterful study on World War II veterans, 'Men Against Fire', even the enemy is 'invisible'. The soldier in defence is required to spend long durations of time at his post or piquet. When the time to wage battle comes, the soldier finds himself alone with only his fellow soldiers in his bunker for company. Although the rest of the unit or sub unit is fighting the same battle from their respective battle positions, it is very difficult for a soldier under fire to visualise the same. In an attack operation of war, each sub unit is assigned respective specific objectives down to the last bunker to be captured. However, in the chaos that is another characteristic of the battle field, an individual soldier is quite likely to lose sight of the mental picture and imagine that he and his buddy are alone in the execution of the assigned mission. Thus isolation and loneliness are major contributors to stress.
- **Lack of Communication with Family** War like situations demand frequent movement of units, censorship of mail etc. Even in today's age of multiple modes of communication, there are many areas in our country where the benefits of instant communication have not yet reached. Thus a mix of circumstance, organizational requirement and lack of communication infrastructure result in a soldier not being able to remain in touch with his family which ,for many, may be a source of strength and inspiration.

- **Chaos** The chaos of the battlefield militates against the orderliness of a peacetime orientation. The disorderliness of war can never be constructed during organized field exercises. Thus no amount of peacetime training and preparation can ever prepare a soldier to even visualise or appreciate the chaos of the battlefield. Therefore it calls for mental flexibility, mobility and resilience of a very high order to overcome the overwhelming influence of battlefield chaos.
- **Death and Destruction** As much as the likelihood of bodily harm to one's own self, the death or injury to one's peers, subordinates and colleagues are likely to cause extreme levels of stress to an individual. The material destruction caused due to fire is apt to cause physical hardships and resultant mental trauma.
- **Fear of Capture and Torture** Fear of capture as prisoners of war (PW) and subsequent torture is a major stressor.
- **Reduced Access to Amenities** Battle field conditions preclude the access to many basic amenities such as hygienic habitat, water, electricity, food etc.
- **Abrogation of Basic Rights** Warlike conditions often necessitate the leader to impose his will on his unit in the interest of the success of the mission. This may result in a temporary abrogation of basic rights, including the right to live.

STRESSORS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) OPERATIONS

Before delving into the stressors prevalent in a LIC environment, it is essential to understand the dynamics of an LIC environment and how it fundamentally differs from a conventional combat environment. In conventional operations of war the battle lines are clearly drawn. The enemy is clearly identifiable and aggression can be unequivocally channeled in his direction. Organizational as well as national goals are clear and unambiguous, public support is assured and the soldier comes to regard himself as a living symbol of patriotic pride. Periods of intense stress followed by adequate recovery phases may aid the commanders in maintaining the morale and psychological resources of the soldier unless the operations are unduly prolonged or are attended by repeated reverses. Low intensity conflicts (LIC) are territorially limited politico-military struggles to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives. LIC is often characterized by limitations of armaments, tactics and levels of force. They are often protracted and involve military, diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure through terrorism and insurgency. Troops trained in conventional warfare experience significant stress in such LIC operations. Conventional military training makes the soldier think in clear-cut extremes like black and white, friend and foe. This tendency often leads to problems in LIC where

the concept of 'enemy' cannot be applied to one's own people. The contributory factors, which increase the stress level on soldiers participating in LIC, are the product of a complex interplay of three elements involved—the militant, the local population and the soldier. The development of militancy often has its roots in the regional aspirations of a people governed by an insensitive, unresponsive and corrupt administration. The local population tends to think that they have been wronged by the administration. They tend to look at the militant as one of their own fighting for a just cause, and the security forces as the long and cruel hand of the administration, particularly when there are human rights violations. Propaganda by vested interests including hostile neighbors, national and inter-national media may further exacerbate the situation for the Army. In this background the soldier, often from a different cultural milieu, is looked upon as an outsider. The army thus end up fighting an elusive enemy, in the absence of any reliable intelligence, and lack of cooperation or even active resentment of the local population. Prolonged spells of stress punctuated by quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate opportunities for rest and relaxation impose immense and often unbearable demands on even otherwise robust soldiers. In this milieu some of the stressors peculiar to the Indian context worth mentioning are as follows :-

- Ambiguity of aim.
- Lack of visible success.
- High casualty rates.
- Unpredictability of threat.
- Extended Tenures of Deployment The present tour of duty of the soldier in LIC lasts about two years. When compared to one-year service for soldiers in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this prolonged tenure is unfair by all accounts. Compounding the problem is the fact that in some cases the long tenure in LIC is either preceded or followed by another 'difficult' tenure. It is well established that long tenures produce combat fatigue and an early 'burn-out'.
- Fatigue With 365 days of hands-on service in a calendar year, troops are known to average about 16 hours a day in active operations with five hours of sleep and one off-day in eleven days. By any calculation this is mentally and physically stressful.
- Absence of recreational avenues.
- Domestic concerns.
- Irregular and unreliable communication.
- Problems related to leave and railway travel.

NON - COMBAT STRESSORS

Domestic instability, financial issues, inability to influence events and decisions on the domestic front, diminishing prospects of advancement in service etc are some of the examples of Non-Combat stressors. It is essential to appreciate that non-combat stressors affect a soldier even when he is deployed in a combat environment. Following points are pertinent :-

- Domestic Stresses More often it is the problem back at home that makes a soldier feel helpless and drives him/ her to suicide than work related stress. In its report of 04 April 2010, Parliament's Standing Committee on Defence pointed out that the inability of the soldiers to solve their family problems due to operational requirements and other constraints within which they have to work resulted in enhanced levels of negative stress which leads to behavioral problems including suicides and fratricides.
- Social Apathy Social apathy has been identified as another reason for troop frustration. A soldier believes that he is facing all sorts of difficulties to serve his nation and countrymen. The soldier has this sense of honor and duty that motivates him to face any challenges. But when people do not bother to acknowledge his contributions, he starts questioning his commitment towards his profession and the nation. Certain studies have established a direct link to apathy in some of the cases of suicides.
- The steep pyramidal structure and the process of elimination is a major cause for stress for commanders.
- The pressure of performance and competition with peers and sister units.
- Self comparison (often arriving at adverse conclusion) with civilian counterparts employed in the other sectors.
- Dissatisfaction with the assessment of the superior officer of one's own performance.
- Inadequacy of grievance disposal mechanism.
- Human Rights Groups activism.
- Disinformation through social media.

STRESS RESPONSE IN INDIAN ARMY

Soldiering is stressful and evidence exists regarding the stress consequences on Indian soldiers. However there is no evidence to suggest a stress epidemic in the

Indian Army nor is there any evidence of increasing stress related illnesses over the last decade. Some of the common manifestations of stress response in the Indian army are as given below :-

- Apathy and a lack of interest in the assigned task.
- Seclusion and withdrawal.
- Absent Without Leave (AWL) or Overstayal of Leave (OSL).
- Disobedience of orders/ Insubordination.
- Alcohol and/or substance abuse.
- Malingering/ feigning sickness.
- Self inflicted injury.
- Inter-personal violence.
- Fratricide.
- Suicide.

MANIFESTATION OF STRESS IN NON-COMBAT ENVIRONMENT

It is indeed paradoxical that the suicide cases in peace stations should outnumber that in LIC environment. When a unit or an individual moves from a field area (combat environment) to a peace station, there are expectations of a stable family life, availability of quality time to spend with family etc. However, not only have the commitments in peace stations increased manifold, mainly as a result of generation of infructuous work, but pressure at the work place too has increased exponentially leading to increased stress. Another factor to consider is the impact of non-combat stress. While combat stress (that arises as a result of service in a combat environment) no longer is applicable on a person when he moves out from a field area, there is no let up in the pressure exerted by non - combat factors such as domestic issues, financial problems, family quarrels etc. Thus, one aspect of stress continues to exact a toll on the individual. Certain other peculiarities of service in a peace station that contribute directly to the increasing levels of stress are as follows :-

- Ambiguity on objectives and standards to be achieved. There is a conflict between the subordinate and higher commanders in perception of mission essentials; excellence in performance etc.
- An unrealistic sense of accountability especially in peace stations make command a stressful experience.
- Zero Error syndrome is more common in a peace environment.
- There is a greater interference by the superior officers in a peace environment.

- Stress generated in a peace station is mostly due to non-professional factors.
- While combat stress is caused by work environment, stress in a peace environment is caused by the hierarchy.
- Unreasonable demands on manpower.
- Lack of personal time & inability to meet personal aspirations.
- The pressure to perform is greater in a peace station than in a field area due to uncertain variables and parameters.
- In the absence of quantifiable parameters of excellence in a peace station, commanders at every level resort to additional activities which generate additional work and stress in the lower hierarchy.
- Lack of professional content in one's charter of duties in a peace station is a big de-motivator and a major stress causing factor.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR COMBAT STRESS MANAGEMENT

Selection of personnel Other Ranks selection battery consisting of a cognitive test and a personality test has been developed and standardized by DIPR that would ensure efficient and effective selection. This needs to be introduced in the selection process of Other Ranks .

- Religion. a source of strength. Religious fellowship, spiritual principles and faith in something greater than man can be major source of strength during times of crisis. Regular Mandir and Gurudwara parade in army units acts as a great catharsis for reliving soldiers of their fears and stresses.
- Professional Counselling. Professional Counselling by army religious teachers and junior commissioned officers of the Army medical Corps is being done for the needy personnel. This needs to be further strengthened and formalized.
- Mental Conditioning. Commanders and troops must be conditioned to understand that they are operating in a 'No win' situation and there is no such thing as quick military victory. None should attempt to achieve 'quick end' results by resorting to excessive use of force.
- Leadership. Majority of the operations are fought at platoon and company levels; hence platoon and company commanders must plan and execute missions by leading from the front and setting personal example. Higher level commanders must manage the overall environment .
- Training To kill is not the natural behavior of a human being. If men are trained for all possible tasks and situations, the stress of counter terrorist operations would

reduce to a negligible level.

- Use of Minimum force. The commander on the spot is the best judge to decide the quantum of force and firepower to be used and the higher commanders must honor the wisdom of his judgement.
- Post combat Stress management Just as pre-deployment and combat are stressful, the period after combat is also difficult. Today's rapid transportation enables service members to travel from the operational area to their peace stations in 72 to 96 hours. This short time often does not give them reflection with their comrades. Units should therefore have "end of tenure" debriefing, memorial ceremonies and rituals that formally end the operations. Awards, decorations and other recognition must be allotted fairly by the commanders. A spouse too may feel that her sacrifices during the service members absence have gone unrecognized. This becomes an additional source of tension. Families need to be reassured of their contribution.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) The aspect of PTSD is an area that remains in utter neglect. It is as if the state as well as the organization is in great hurry to close the chapter once the CT operations tenure is over. PTSD symptoms like disturbed family life, divorce, sub par professional performance, alcoholism and in certain cases violent behavior or worse, clinical depression can be temptingly dismissed as personal deviations or family reasons. Many veterans feel guilty because they lived while others died. Some commanding officers feel ashamed because they did not bring all their men home and wonder what they could have done differently to save them. Affirmative and visible support of the government and civil society are of paramount importance. Any critical references to firefighters can upset the troops facing the brunt in the combat zone.

CONCLUSION

Stress which was usually considered as menace of modern society has gradually crept into Army too. The soldier is no more immune from changed socio-economic set up and their aspirations have also increased manifold. The soldiers increased aspiration level and long separation from their families due to organizational obligation is contributing to stress related problems. The stress related casualties are conspicuous in combat as well as non-combat environment; however the statistics of suicides/ attempted suicides indicates that these incidents are higher in a peace environment. It's not only the organizational measures which would control and reduce the menace of stress but individual's self control, capacity to put up with

hard situations will facilitate in coping with stress. The Martin Luther King Jr, saying is quite apt in present day's soldiers' paradigm of stress control.

*"The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort,
but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy"*

-Martin Luther King Jr

Year	Suicides in Army
2003	96
2004	100
2005	92
2006	131
2007	142
2008	150
2009	111
2010	130
2011	102
2012	93

Table 1: Suicides in the Army (2003-2012)

MAJOR GENERAL S H MAHAJAN SM (RETD)



Major General S H Mahajan during his 38 years of Army service, has served in all the border areas of our country. The General Officer is an alumni of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Armywar College, Mhow and the National Defence College (NDC), New Delhi. Maj Gen Mahajan has seen active service having commanded 4 MARATHA LI in Jammu & Kashmir and 11 Mountain Brigade in Assam. For his distinguished service in Counter Insurgency Operations in Assam, he was awarded Vishisht Seva Medal. The General Officer has commanded 23 Infantry Division as part of strike corps on the Western Front. For his distinguished service as Major General Administration of Northern Command he was awarded Sena Medal.

He has served with United Nations as a Military Observer in Iran after the ceasefire in the Iran Iraq war in 1989. As Deputy Director General Military Intelligence (Foreign Division) he was responsible to plan and implement International Defence Cooperation for the Indian Army. He has served as Director Military Affairs at Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division, under the Ministry of External Affairs, Delhi where he was dealing with Arms control of conventional weapons. During this tenure he attended several meetings at UN Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (Switzerland). He has travelled widely and has visited 18 countries. After superannuation in Jan 2013, presently he is Deputy Director of CASS. He has been nominated by MoD as a member, Committee of Experts to recommend measures to enhance combat capability and rebalance defence expenditure of the Armed Forces.

Global Security Environment and Focus on India's Regional and Strategic Role^A

Prof. Gautam Sen

*“.....only freedom can make security secure”
Karl Popper (Popper 1966:130)*

INTRODUCTION

The study of security¹ in the global context is a sub-discipline of the wider subject called International relations which studies all political interactions between international actors, represented by the governments, international organizations and interestingly some wealthy private individuals. The Global Security Environment have been heavily influenced first by the Realists, then by the Neo-Realists and presently by Social Constructivists. It has not been a seamless transition from one theoretical mooring to the other but a transformation based on situation, perceptions and circumstances through which international relations amongst nation states have traversed after the end of the “Cold War”. While nation states in the post-World War II and the

[^A] In preparing this paper, I have extensively quoted and used the typology, methodology and the philosophy contained in the various US Congressional Research Services Reports prepared for the Members of the Committees of Congress on Pakistan, China, Terrorism, etc. including the report entitled “Shift in the International Security Environment” Report No. R 43838. All are acknowledged.

remaining part of the 20th Century lived tactically, tactisized strategic thinking, strategic analysis with a view to the possible use of the nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction, the 21st Century ushered in information age, the cyber space, an interdependent international political economy and a very heightened sense to further the cause of implementing policies to securitize human security. Hence in the 21st century, emphasis is well on the way to live strategically by strategizing the tactical aspects to achieve the non-use of all Weapons of Mass Destruction. This consensus has seemly infiltrated unknowingly across the thinking process in amongst all the countries of the world – rich or poor, developed or less developed.

GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Overview

World events since late 2013, have led observers to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the past 20 to 25 years, (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II².

A previous change in the international security environment—the shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era had resulted in the reassessment by the US Department of Defense (DOD) in its defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs.

The recent shift in the international security environment has become a factor of debate and discussion on defense strategy, plans, and programs related to the following:

- Grand strategy and geopolitics
- U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
- Capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and grey-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China;
- Capabilities for conducting so-called high-end warfare (i.e., large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia;
- U.S. attempt to maintain technological superiority in conventional weapons;

- Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;
- Speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy; and
- Minimizing reliance in U.S. military systems on components and materials from Russia and China.

The issue before nation states now is to figure out as to how their individual defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs should respond to changes in the international security environment.

EARLIER GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

Cold War Era

The Cold War era, which is generally viewed as lasting from the late 1940s until the late 1980s/early 1990s, was generally viewed as a strongly bipolar situation featuring two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—engaged in a political, ideological, and military competition for influence across multiple regions. The military component of that competition was often most acutely visible in Europe, where the U.S.-led NATO alliance and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance faced off against one another with large numbers of conventional forces and theatre nuclear weapons, backed by longer-ranged strategic nuclear weapons.

Post-Cold War Era

The post-Cold War era began in the early 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the end of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact military alliance in March 1991, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into Russia and the former Soviet republics in December 1991. These were key events marking the ending of the Cold War. The post-Cold War era is generally viewed as having tended toward a unipolar situation, with the United States as the world's sole superpower. Neither Russia, China, nor any other country was viewed as posing a significant challenge to either the United States' status as the world's sole superpower or the U.S.-led international order. Compared to the Cold War, the post-Cold War era has generally featured reduced levels of overt political, ideological, and military competition among major states. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, the post-Cold War era has been characterized by a strong focus on countering transnational terrorist organizations that had emerged as significant nonstate actors, particularly Al Qaeda.

New International Security Environment

Observers Conclude that a “Shift Has Occurred”. World events in recent years—including Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas and Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014³ have led observers, since 2013, to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era with the United States as the unipolar power, to a new and different situation that features, great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War-II⁴. Hence the United states has to rebuild her strategic muscles and to rethink in terms of global competition and in the next thirty years or so there will be a lot of give and take between the great powers.⁵

Specific Features of the New Environment

Observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new situation generally view the new period not as a bipolar situation (like the Cold War) or a unipolar situation (like the post-Cold War era), but as a situation characterized in part by renewed competition among three major world powers—the United States, China, and Russia. Other emerging characteristics as observed by the new international security situation are the following:

- Renewed ideological competition, this time against 21st-century forms of authoritarianism in Russia, China, and other countries⁶
- The promotion in China and Russia through their state-controlled media of nationalistic historical narratives emphasizing assertions of prior humiliation or victimization by Western powers, and the use of those narratives to support revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims;
- The use by Russia and China of new forms of aggressive or assertive military, paramilitary, and information operations—called hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare, among other terms, in the case of Russia’s actions, and called salami-slicing tactics or grey-zone warfare, among other terms, in the case of China’s actions—to gain greater degrees of control of areas on their peripheries;
- Challenges by Russia and China to key elements of the U.S.-led international order, including the principle that force or threat of force should not be used as a routine or first-resort measure for settling disputes between countries, and the principle of freedom of the seas (i.e., that the world’s oceans are to be treated as an international commons); and

- Additional features alongside those listed above, including
- Continued regional security challenges from countries such as Iran and North Korea;
- A continuation of the post-Cold War era's focus (at least from a U.S. perspective) on countering transnational terrorist organizations that have emerged as significant nonstate actors (now including the Islamic State organization, among other groups); and weak or failed states, and resulting weakly governed or ungoverned areas that can contribute to the emergence of (or serve as base areas or sanctuaries for) nonstate actors, and become potential locations of intervention by stronger states, including major powers.

Indicators of the Shift to the New Environment

For those who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new situation, the sharpest single marker of the shift was Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014. This represented the first since World War II, the seizure and annexation of one country's territory forcibly by another country in Europe since World War II. Other markers of the shift—such as Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe since March 2014. However, China's military modernization and economic growth, as well as China's actions in the East and South China Seas during the last several years—have been more gradual and cumulative.

Some observers trace the beginnings of the shift in the international security environment back to 2008. In that year, Russia invaded and occupied part of the former Soviet republic of Georgia without provoking a strong response from the United States and its allies. Also in that year, the financial crisis and resulting deep recessions in the United States and Europe, combined with China's ability to weather that crisis and its successful staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics, are seen as having contributed to a perception in China of the United States as a declining power, and to a Chinese sense of self-confidence or triumphalism⁷. China's assertive actions in the East and South China Seas can be viewed as having begun soon thereafter. Other observers trace the roots of the end of the post-Cold War era further, to years prior to 2008.⁸

Comparing the New Environment to Earlier Periods

Each international security environment features a unique combination of major actors, dimensions of competition and cooperation among those actors, and military and other technologies available to them. A new international

security environment can have some similarities to previous ones, but it will also have differences, including, potentially, one or more features not present in any previous international security environment. In the early years of a new international security environment, some of its features may be unclear, in dispute, not yet apparent, or subject to evolution. In attempting to understand a new international security environment, comparisons to earlier ones are potentially helpful in identifying avenues of investigation. If applied too rigidly, however, such comparisons can act as intellectual straightjackets, making it more difficult to achieve a full understanding of a new international security environment's characteristic features, particularly those that differentiate it from previous ones.

Some observers have stated that the world is entering a new Cold War (or Cold War II or 2.0). That term may have utility in referring specifically to U.S.-Russian relations, because the new international security environment that observers have identified features competition and tension with Russia. Considered more broadly, however, the Cold War was a bipolar situation, while the new environment is a situation that also includes China as a major competing power. The bipolarity of the Cold War, moreover, was reinforced by the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, whereas in contrast, Russia today does not lead an equivalent of the Warsaw Pact. And while terrorists were a concern during the Cold War, the U.S. focus on countering transnational terrorist groups was not nearly as significant during the Cold War as it has been since 9/11.

Other observers, viewing the emerging situation, have drawn comparisons to the multipolar situation that existed in the 19th century and the years prior to World War I. Still others, observing the promotion in China and Russia of nationalistic historical narratives supporting revanchist or irredentist foreign policy aims, have drawn comparisons to the 1930s. Those two earlier situations, however, did not feature a strong focus on countering globally significant transnational terrorist groups, and the military and other technologies available then differ vastly from those available today. The new situation that observers have identified may be similar in some respects to previous situations, but it also differs from previous situations in certain respects, and might be best understood by direct observation and identification of its key features.

Naming the New Environment

Observers who conclude that the international security environment has shifted to a new situation do not yet appear to have reached a consensus on what term to use to refer to the new situation. As noted above, some observers have used terms such as a new Cold War (or Cold War II or 2.0). Other observers have referred to the new situation as an era of renewed great power competition, a competitive world order, a multipolar era, and a disorderly world (or era)

SOME EMERGING IMPLICATIONS

Renewed Emphasis on Grand Strategy and Geopolitics

Discussion of the shift in the international security environment that observers have identified has led to a renewed emphasis on grand strategy⁹ and geopolitics¹⁰ as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs.¹¹ A 2 November 2015, press report, stated:

The resurgence of Russia and the continued rise of China have created a new period of great-power rivalry—and a corresponding need for a solid grand strategy, [then-]U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work Deputy Defence Secretary said that “The era of everything is the era of grand strategy,” Work hence indicated that it was time that the United States “must carefully marshal and deploy its great yet limited resources”.¹² From a U.S. perspective on grand strategy and geopolitics, it can be noted that most of the world’s people, resources, and economic activity are located not in the Western Hemisphere, but in the other hemisphere, particularly Eurasia. In response to this basic feature of world geography, U.S. policymakers for the last several decades have chosen to pursue, as a key element of U.S. national strategy, a goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon could represent a concentration of power strong enough to threaten core U.S. interests.

The U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another has been a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with force elements that enable it to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival. Force elements associated with this goal include, among other things, an Air Force with significant numbers of long-range bombers, long-range surveillance aircraft, long-range airlift aircraft, and aerial refuelling tankers, and a Navy with significant numbers of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered attack submarines, large surface combatants, large amphibious ships, and underway replenishment ships.¹³

U.S. and NATO Military Capabilities in Europe

Russia's seizure and annexation of Ukraine and Russia's subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe have led to a renewed focus among policymakers on the adequacy of U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe. Some observers have expressed particular concern about the ability of the United States and its NATO allies to defend the Baltic members of NATO in the event of a fast-paced Russian military move into those countries.

DOD in recent years has announced a series of specific actions to bolster military deterrence in Europe, including an annually funded package of measures originally called the European Reassurance Initiative and now called the European Deterrence Initiative. As part of its proposed FY2018 defense budget, the Trump Administration is requesting \$4.8 billion for this initiative for FY2018. NATO leaders since 2014 have announced a series of initiatives for refocusing NATO away from "out of area" (i.e., beyond-Europe) operations, and back toward a focus on territorial defense and deterrence in Europe itself.¹⁴

The increased attention that U.S. policymakers are paying to the security situation in Europe, combined with U.S. military operations in the Middle East against the Islamic State organization and similar groups, has intensified questions among some observers about whether the United States will simultaneously be able to devote sufficient attention and resources to countering security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region posed by China and North Korea.

Countering Hybrid Warfare

Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Russia's information operations, have led to a focus among policymakers on how to counter Russia's so-called hybrid warfare or ambiguous warfare tactics.¹⁵ China's actions in the East and South China Seas have similarly prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China's so-called salami-slicing or grey-zone tactics in those areas.¹⁶

Capabilities for High-End Warfare

China's continuing military modernization effort¹⁷ and Russia's actions to modernize its own military and deploy it to places such as the Middle East have led to a renewed emphasis in U.S. defense plans and programs on capabilities for conducting so-called high-end warfare, meaning large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare against adversaries with similarly sophisticated military capabilities. Defense acquisition programs included in the renewed U.S.

emphasis on high-end warfare include (to mention only a few examples) programs for procuring advanced aircraft such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)¹⁸ and the next-generation long-range bomber,¹⁹ highly capable warships such as the Virginia-class attack submarine²⁰ and DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer,²¹ ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities,²² longer-ranged land-attack and anti-ship weapons, new types of weapons such as lasers, railguns, and hypervelocity projectiles,²³ new ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities, military space capabilities,²⁴ electronic warfare capabilities, and military cyber capabilities.²⁵

Maintaining Technological Superiority

The United States is concerned that the technological and qualitative edge that U.S. military forces have had relative to the military forces of other countries is being narrowed by improving military capabilities in other countries, particularly China and Russia. To arrest and reverse the decline in the U.S. technological and qualitative edge, DOD in November 2014 announced a new Defense Innovation Initiative.²⁶ In related efforts, DOD also announced that it was implementing a Long-Range Research and Development Plan (LRRDP),²⁷ and that it was seeking a new general U.S. approach—a so-called “third offset strategy”—for maintaining U.S. superiority over opposing military forces that are both numerically large and armed with precision-guided weapons.²⁸

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence

Russia's reassertion of its status as a major world power has included, among other things, especially to nuclear weapons and Russia's status as a major nuclear weapon power. This has led to an increased emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense and security on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence at a time when the US is in the early stages of a multi-year plan to spend billions of dollars to modernize her strategic nuclear deterrent forces.²⁹ The US currently has plans to acquire a new class of ballistic missile submarines³⁰ and a next-generation long-range bomber.³¹

Development and Deployment of Weapon System

Staying ahead of improving military capabilities in countries such as China in coming years will require defense acquisition policy of all nation states to place a greater emphasis on speed of development and deployment in defense acquisition policy. As a consequence, the US have already stated, that defense acquisition should feature more experimentation, risk-taking, and tolerance of failure during development. Efforts can be seen within individual military services of all nation states to move toward more-

rapid acquisition of new capabilities in order to achieve greater flexibility in how they are permitted to use funds for prototyping and experimentation.³²

Potential policy issues needs to include assessing the following:

- There should be a broad reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs and what role should each nation state developed or less developed play internationally.
- There should be a broad reassessment in response to changes in the international security environment, whether defense funding levels in coming years in case of all nations will increase, reduce, or be maintained at about the current level?
- How to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another?
- Reassessing what potential impacts would a strengthened U.S. military presence in Europe have globally and especially towards the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region?
- Hybrid warfare and grey-zone tactics. Do the United States and its allies and partners have adequate strategies for countering Russia's so-called hybrid warfare
- Capabilities for high-end warfare.
- Maintaining technological superiority in conventional weapons.
- How Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence be aligned with the needs of the new international security environment?
- How nation states are poised individually for accommodating Speed in defense acquisition policy.
- What would be the level of reliance on Russian and Chinese components and materials vis-à-vis US and European components and materials globally.

INDIA'S GLOBAL AND STRATEGIC ROLE

Legacy of the Past

The purpose of this section is to give a bird's eye view of the evolving India's security strategy by placing it within the ambit of global involvement and India position in the world affairs in the 21st century. India is still a young nation state with a rich cultural and civilizational consciousness of the past. The founding fathers of this young nation state not only gave an enviable constitution to be followed within its parliamentary democracy but also had stipulated an educational policy enshrined in the first Education Commission chaired by Dr. S Radhakrishnan, then then Vice President of India. Had the Commission's report been followed in letter

and spirit, India and her educated citizen would have contributed enormously to the development of strategic culture and a realistic attitude to develop a National Security Strategy within a short period of time and perhaps India would not have suffered the humiliation of the 1962 war with China. This voluminous report spanning some 776 pages at the very first few pages of its presentation records as follows:

“The Commission made a specific observation on war and peace, violence and conflict by stating that there is a role of the University to usher “Positive Peace” and elaborated that “Peace is not the absence of armed conflict. It is the positive establishment of just and humane relationships among the peoples of the world, the development of mutual confidence among nations. Universities can make a significant contribution to world peace.”

It is a pity that none of the Indian political leaders who headed the government or even the Parliament ever debated about this vital recommendation of the Commission in the past seventy years.

Status of India's Defence Policy

In 1990-91, Jaswant Singh noted the stark reality of Indian thinking and assessment on matters military. That India till 1995, did not have a declared Defence policy but only guide lines is evident from Jaswant Singh's address entitled “What Constitutes National Security in a Changing World Order? India's Strategic Thought”, published as CASI Occasional Paper Number 6 June 1998. The relevant part of the publication is appended below for record:

In 1990, the then Defence Secretary stated during evidence:

“I would submit that perhaps we have not been able to convince the honourable committee through our various notes that there is a policy. It is perhaps not defined in the manner that the committee was looking for.

He further added:

There is a document called the Operational Directives. It is a fairly comprehensive paper, which is issued from the Defence Secretary to the three Chiefs of Staff. It seeks to bring about as clearly as possible, under given circumstances, the threat situation which has been visualised in consultation not only with the three Services but the various agencies, the Ministry of External Affairs, as necessary with the Home Ministry in consultation with the Prime Minister's Office and finally it is approved by the Defence Minister. We have such a document, which has been in existence for a considerable period.

**On 16 May 1995, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence,
Shri P. V. Narasimha Rao, stated:**

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I would only confine myself to a few matters, a very few matters impinging on the defence policy of the Government and I would like to take the House into confidence and explain these things to the best possible extent, to the extent I can.

Sir, the first criticism has been rather an extraordinary kind of criticism to say that we have no National Defence Policy. I would like to submit very respectfully that this is not true.

We do not have a document called India's National Defence Policy but we have got several guidelines, which are followed, strictly followed and observed, and those can be summed up as follows:

1. To defend our National Territory over land, sea and air, encompassing among others the inviolability of our land borders, island territories, offshore assets and our maritime trade routes.
2. To secure an internal environment whereby our Nation State is insured against any threats to its unity or progress on the basis of religion, language, ethnicity or socio- economic dissonance.
3. To be able to exercise a degree of influence over the nations in our immediate neighborhood to promote harmonious relationships in tune with our national interests.
4. To be able to effectively contribute towards regional and international stability and to possess an effective out-of-the-country contingency capability to prevent destabilization of the small nations in our immediate neighborhood that could have adverse security implications for us.

From the above exposition it can be clearly inferred that for the first fifty years after India's independence, the political leadership have made the utterances on defence policy not through a policy document but as guidelines produced by the bureaucracy without any inputs from the Indian intellectual community at large or various stake holders in a transparent way. There has only been talks but without any will to implement a robust defence policy in place or recording of any strategy for national security nor any attempt to define India's national interest. Even today, there is no official enunciation of a Defence Policy of India by the Government, no official document enumerating National Security Strategy and no White Paper on Defence Strategy.

Indian Dilemma

India since the beginning of the cold war suffered from three shortcomings. First Nehru's relegating economics of market to a minor position in diplomacy, second, his inability of understanding of the inevitable onslaught of the potential power of an information age in the making and third, the long period of Nehru's leadership as prime minister. Devoid of the realist approach to world order the Nehruvian vision resulted in the incorporation of the worldview that were based on the premise that there were only moral solutions to political problems. Translated into actual implementation, India incorporated central planning and state ownerships in all strategic sectors of defense production and social welfare including education under the garb of mixed capitalistic economy. Private sector thus remained confined to consumer oriented consumable products production, which accounted to less than thirty percent of total outlay for national development.

The private sector in this process lost the ability to have any stake related to national security or partnership in any form of decision making on national security. There were no experts who could agree to disagree with Nehru publicly either within the ruling part or its political adversaries and survive. While Y B Chavan is a classic example of neutralization by the then political architects, J R D Tata became the symbol of insensitivity of the government towards the private sector. National interest in the post Nehru era was more or less ill defined by politicians and perused by an unwieldy bureaucracy which perpetuated the "license raj". The entire period of cold war thus saw the primacy of strategic policy making based on privilege information on a need to know basis. India fell into the trap of relying on bureaucratic outlooks and perceptions and being ever suspicious of any freethinking by any non-governmental individual or organization. So much so that even the Service Chiefs of the Armed forces were seldom consulted. The sharing of information mundane or otherwise was a taboo and the private entrepreneurs were viewed as animals who were only interested in profit making and hence could not be patriotic to safeguard national interests. Coupled with lack of information related to strategic matters, the bureaucracy and the political leadership ensured that they remained in power by denying information to others which could be a basis of national debate on strategic perspectives.

However, there is a definite impact of neo-realism on India's approach to galvanize National Security policy making strategy supported by strategic thinking where in the culture of strategic thinking has perceptively changed to become more realistic due to the participation of a variety of individuals, organizations and the

private sector. The corporate sector giants have found stake in national security affairs indirectly to safeguard their business interests in major areas like energy, environment and intellectual property rights.

India's Strategic Perspective Towards China Under Modi Government

The sweeping victory by Narendra Modi in the national election in 2014, has had a significant impact regionally and globally. The election victory has brought to the forefront about the possible role that India will play in Asia. Some scholars have already started writing that Modi may follow the PRC model for economic development and growth and the Chinese analysts who have been keenly following the transition of power, governance and administration in India have started attributing historical analogies to explain the behavior of the new leader and the leadership style of Modi. Modi's intense display of nationalism, strategy to attract Indian diaspora during every visit of his abroad, his near iconic rock star status amongst them by attracting thousands of Indians settled abroad in every of his meeting, his techno suaveness to use the tools of information technology to connect up with Indian and non-Indian masses around the globe (Modi has today 12 million followers on twitter) and not to forget his oratory skills has surpassed the public reputation as a leader who constantly harps on the spirit of nationalism, patriotism to the hilt.

In the past thirty-six months that Modi has been leading the government, there has occurred no corruption scams as was prevalent in the past government lead by Man Mohan Singh government. Fears have been expressed at some quarters that Modi may become the "Indian Shinzo Abe" resulting in overplaying the nationalism card and sensitize the border dispute with China to a totally different level. His careful choice of principle advisors on security, relegating the role of diplomacy by diplomats of the Ministry of External Affairs and its bureaucrats at the highest levels totally subservient to the National Security Advisor, his personal commitment to the members of the Armed Forces howsoever difficult it may be proving at this time to fulfil his pre-poll promises has been a complete game changer in critical decision making for national level while dealing with internal security and with Pakistan in particular when dealing with the Pakistan on the border issue, Afghanistan on international aid for development and reconstruction, with Myanmar and Bangladesh on border demarcation and an impressive response to evacuate Indians stranded in crisis area on one hand and extending humanitarian aid for disaster management both nationally and internationally.

Modi's strategic vision and perspectives has ushered in a degree of strategic competition and a situation to maintain a status quo on India China relations. Modi is the first Indian Prime Minister in whose time when the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was visiting India that the Indian Government announced the establishing a "Mountain Strike Corp" with a view to move troops of the Indian Army in the Chinese territory. It was during Man Mohan Singh regime that India tested and operationalized the Agni-5 ICBM to bring the whole of China in range for the first time in 2012. Palash Ghosh wrote in *International Business* time that "India's border patrol policy is only one small part of its military readiness against China"

Kapil Patil writing in the *DIPLOMAT* in 2012 in an article, stated that "India's overall land warfare strategy vis-à-vis China is determined by its deterrence posture, layered at both conventional and nuclear levels. Maintaining credible nuclear and conventional capabilities is therefore essential, not only for deterring the Chinese military threat but also for improving India's overall bargaining position in border settlement talks with China . Post landing of a C-130 Hercules heavy lift aircraft at Daulat Beg Oldi landing strip in Ladakh will further raise Modi's strategic vision and attitude to create a situational strategic parity of credibility making with China in times to come.

While much literature has been generated on the China's Silk Routes/Roads/Belt, what is yet to be proven is on its question of sustainability and more so on a whole range of cooperative economic interdependence that must occur to make the grand strategy of one belt one road a reality. As of now China having sunk \$46 bn on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is faced with the question of India's objection of the route passing through disputed territory. India will hardly agree geo-strategically and will be remiss if she agrees to the overtures done by China to Pakistan on this economic agglomeration by China on India through Pakistan.

Thus the status of a formally enunciated Defence Policy of India has always remained ambiguous since 1947. However, writings on the subject has been quite voluminous from 1991 onwards including those of international vintage. As India's economy and population have been growing steadily since 1947, to a level of 1.3 billion people India's first priority had to be in the priority area of socio-economic development while believing at the same time that an assured level of regional stability is essential for this development. To this end, India has traditionally pursued a broad policy of defensive defense. However military developments, and growing hostilities with Pakistan, have caused her to shift to a strategy of war prevention. This has led to a great degree of the use of security forces to guard the territorial integrity, accepting no Defence Policy based on Assumptions, no effort to create strategic autonomy except

in one case when India signed with the former Soviet Union a Treaty of Friendship and continued to follow the policy of Non Alignment signifying further the absence of a robust defence policy. Further if one analyses the military decision to go to war with Pakistan to aid the MuktiBahani which ultimately created Bangladesh, it was again a reactive response rather than a pre-emptive strategy as a part of any grand strategy that Indian political leadership may have thought of.

The result was that despite a classic victory in which 93,000 Pakistani POWs were captured, India failed to capitalise either in negotiating a permanent international border with Pakistan in J&K nor take advantage of the situation to undertake an offensive in the Western Sector during the Bangladesh war. It was no more than defensive action in the Western Sector. The trend of such a reactive defence policy did continue even after Indian army operations of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and the Kargil war with Pakistan. In all fairness it must be noted that Indian Army's proactive operational doctrine in the form of "Cold Start Doctrine" was conceived against India's Western Adversary in 2004. However, in the post 2014 period the Indian Defence Policy and National Security Strategy has been a bit more dynamic, a bit pre-emptive towards containing terrorism or dealing with LOC violation not only against Pakistan but also with China or disruptive forces operating against India from across the India Myanmar Border. Similarly, "The Joint Indian Army Doctrine" released in 2017, seems merely an update of the previous classified document written more than six years back. The present one being unclassified, does not seriously address the issues pertaining to "Jointness" in amongst the three Services and hence can be presumed to be a work in progress howsoever ill written it may appear to a common reader.

Comparative Military Balances: China, India & Pakistan

A comprehensive comparison of military balance from open sources like IISS Mil Balance, SIPRI YEAR BOOK, CIA Yearly Report shows that out of a total of 126 countries currently make up the GFP ranked list. China ranks at No. 3 out of the first 106 countries, India at No.4 out of the first 106 countries and Pakistan No.17. out of the 106 countries.

The Chinese military-industrial complex continues to promote its technological gains while increasing its military strength through show-of-force initiative. India is looking to advance beyond its title of top military importer to that of top military exporter. Pakistan Armed Forces have been put to test by internal unrest, UN peacekeeping initiatives, and disaster relief operations.

INDIA	CHINA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 80-100	NUCLEAR WEAPONS : 400
MANPOWER Total Population: 1,236,344,63 Available Manpower: 615,201,057 Fit for Service: 489,571,520 Reaching Military Age Annually: 22,896,956 Active Frontline Personnel: 1,325,000 Active Reserve Personnel: 2,143,000	MANPOWER Total Population: 1,355,692,576 Available Manpower: 749,610,775 Fit for Service: 618,588,627 Reaching Military Age Annually: 19,538,53 Active Frontline Personnel: 2,333,000 Active Reserve Personnel: 2,300,000
RESOURCES (PETROLEUM) Oil Production: 897,500 bbl/day Oil Consumption: 3,300,000 bbl/day Proven Oil Reserves: 5,476,000,000 bbl/ day LOGISTICAL Labor Force: 487,300,000 Merchant Marine Strength: 340] Major Ports and Terminals: 7 Roadway Coverage: 3,320,410 Railway Coverage: 63,974 Serviceable Airports: 346	RESOURCES (PETROLEUM) Oil Production: 4,372,000 bbl/day Oil Consumption: 9,500,000 bbl/day] Proven Oil Reserves: 17,300,000,000 bbl/day LOGISTICAL Labor Force: 797,600,000 Merchant Marine Strength: 2,030] Major Ports and Terminals: 15 Roadway Coverage: 3,860,800 Railway Coverage: 86,000 Serviceable Airports: 507
FINANCIAL (in USD) Defense Budget: \$38,000,000,000 External Debt: \$412,200,000,000 Purchasing Power Parity: \$4,990,000,000,000 Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold: \$295,000,000,000	
GEOGRAPHY (in km) Square Land Area: 3,287,263 km Coastline: 7,000 km Shared Border: 13,888 km Waterways: 14,500 km	

ASSESSING CHINA'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN 21ST CENTURY

Deciphering China's White Paper

In November 1995, the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued the first defense-related white paper on "Arms Control and Disarmament", the first "defense white paper" was issued in 1998, called "China's National Defense." Following this publication, defense-related white paper has been issued every two years from China. On 26th May, 2015 China released the tenth white paper called "China's Military Strategy"

A critical analysis of the above mentioned White Paper entitled "China's Military Strategy" is essential to understand the aggressive nature of Chinese decision making to achieve her goals and objectives in the new world order. Needless to add that the great challenge in the 21st Century is the rise of China and the impact that she has already created in the international system. We must ask the fundamental question behind China's reasoning to publicly innumerate her defence strategy. However, before that there are a number of questions whose answers we must have to predict to a certain degree of possibilities to decipher China's intent to utilize the capacity and capability that she is developing militarily. First, is China's Economic, political, technological and strategic agglomerations as we are seeing to be projected by her sustainable for the coming 50 years from now. Second, Is China seeking to change the global order and also change the balance of power in such a way that what happens in Asia will represent a new era to unfold. Third, Is China trying to curve out a new strategic blueprint, which in turn will produce new security architecture for Asia. Fourth, given the possibility of the emergence of a new architecture, how will the existing architecture of global security respond to it. Fifth, how the Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping assess and react to the now emerging India as perhaps a game changer under the present leadership dispositions.

It is in the context of the above observations that we have to seriously consider the aims and objectives of China's Defence Strategy document. When China burst into the world scene some twenty years back with the largest purchasing power parity surpassing that of the United States, with the projection that it may become the world largest economy, India had not still not emerged from the stranglehold of the "license raj" nor had the economic liberalization been instituted. It is not very certain today whether China will truly become the world's largest economy considering the changes that are taking place in India in particular. India is well poised to be major economic, social, political and military power in Asia, though to surpass China will take more

time and other collateral achievements. However, it should not be lost sight of that “China, by the centenary of its founding, intends to restore itself to the global position of pre-eminence that it once enjoyed in Imperial times”.

It is essential to note that the China's White Paper 2015, dubbed as “China's Defence Strategy in the 21st Century has been in making with the same meticulousness as the previous ones. However, it is to be seen that this document, has some of the unique features as it postulates on its national security strategy to cover the domain of maritime, cyber security, strategic nuclear capability, and her attempt to be a lead player in space technology. China has in its history been a major maritime player when it came to trade and commerce over the centuries but the White Paper makes it specific in terms of China's attempt to qualify as an emerging maritime power with the ultimate aim to equal with the United States' naval presence and capability globally. The attempt has been to take out China from its slumber of isolationism, subjugated nation status suffered under the colonial powers, fragmented politics and insular policies.

The release of the White Paper coincided with the China's declaration to invest USD 46 bn on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with a view to give her access to Western Indian Ocean region through the Pakistani port of Gwadar. On the politico diplomatic front, both during the 2014 and 2015 Shangri-La Dialogues, China has spared no horsepower to showcase her military decision making team to match that of the United States to project her strategic rationale related to the South China Sea. The White paper while addressing the maritime challenge, the white paper's statement turns the PLA's traditional approach to operations and strategy on its head, if not on its side by stating that “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” Therefore, the PLA Navy “will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection’, an evolutionary development from what was announced in the 2006 white paper, the “Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations.”

The white paper has thereby acknowledged the need to shift the balance in PLA thinking from ground operations to joint naval and aerospace operations—something that has been signalled for years (going back officially at least to 2004), but will require change in all aspects of future military modernization. The impact of this admission on the PLA as an institution cannot be understated. It will have effects on everything from force size, structure and composition to personnel polices, doctrine, training, logistics and equipment acquisition.

It is also pertinent to quote Balasko on two integrative process that he underlines in his deliberation and the role of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. He states that:

“First, “That joint operation command authority under the [Central Military Commission], and theater joint operation command system, will be improved” and decided to “optimize the size and structure of the army, adjust and improve the proportion between various troops, and reduce non-combat institutions and personnel. Though no details of these changes have been announced publicly, we can expect them to be rolled out in the coming years and take several more years to implement and trouble shoot....and second through an integrated program consisting of all these elements, the PLA seeks “to enhance [its] overall capabilities for deterrence and warfighting.” Results will not come overnight. Many changes will have major impact on long-standing “rice bowls” and institutional prerogatives. A careful reading of the white paper will see the word “gradual” is used multiple times. The changes envisioned, though still not revealed to the public, will take years and could result in the temporary loss of combat readiness as units and organization undergo transformation.”

China’s Approach to India

Chinese President Xi Jinping has invited India to join the Chinese Silk Route through South Asia. China From historical point of view India is the converging point of Maritime Silk road (MSR) and the ancient Silk Road on land. China has already showcased to Indian Diplomats and Journalists China’s preparations to build the New Silk Road (NSR) from the historic city of Xian, once the flourishing capital of imperial China. The Chinese government believes that India naturally is an important partner in this One belt and One Road. China has denied that the new projects were aimed at establishing China’s influence, saying Beijing is not aiming to establish influence nor will it establish a new mechanism for the Silk Roads. China has put forward the second Silk Road, which is called the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM), and the third one was the revival of the MSR connecting China’s Fujian coast with Asia and the world. China also links its proposed Economic Corridor through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as part of Silk Road project. The (China-Pakistan) Energy Corridor will be built on the ancient Silk Road, which practically passes through Pakistan and link with Middle East and India. China has already invested over USD 1.2 trillion of its USD 3.95 trillion in US Treasury bonds besides billions of dollars and Euro and other international bonds and can also attract some of the 100 million Chinese tourists. India has expressed reservation as the Economic Corridor in Pakistan runs through disputed territory. India does not have direct link

with NSR as it runs through parts of Pakistan. ON BCIM, India has sought more details from Beijing and about MSR for which China plans to make effective use of the newly developed port in Sri Lanka and Pakistan posing strategic concerns to India. India's concerns were also emboldened after two Chinese submarines were allowed to dock at the Colombo Port last year.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor

On 10 August 2015, NDTV published a report on China's approach to India with special reference to the Economic Corridor and the Energy Corridor to be established through Pakistan. Appended below is the full report appended below.

"Xian, China: Giving final touches to its most ambitious plan to build a wide network of new silk roads on land and seas to enhance global connectivity, China has invited India to join President Xi Jinping's pet project that would revive the ancient trade route and benefit the region.

Gao Zhenting, Councilor, Department of International Economic Affairs, told PTI. "So in China we have a belief that China and India both placed the trail of silk roads and MSR and we both have benefited from the roads," said Gao, who oversees the Silk Roads projects that involves a maze of highways on land and port connectivity by sea. Gao said that "The Chinese government believes that India naturally is an important partner in this One belt and One Road.....We are open to all friendly neighboring countries to participate in this one belt and one road but of course we will not force any one to join nor we will give up if someone is not taking part." Gao denied the new projects were aimed at establishing China's influence, saying Beijing is not aiming to establish influence nor will it establish a new mechanism for the Silk Roads.

Stated to be the most ambitious project of its kind, China's plans included revival of the ancient Silk Road, starting from Xian and possibly to Constantinople through parts of Pakistan, central Asia and Turkey. The second Silk Road is called the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) and the third one was the revival of the MSR connecting China's Fujian coast with Asia and the world. China also links its proposed Economic Corridor through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as part of Silk Road project. India has expressed reservations as it runs through disputed region.

A Pakistani diplomat in China, Shazab Abbas, who was part of the delegation, said his country will be the "harbinger" for implementing the Silk road project. He further stated that "The (China-Pakistan) Energy Corridor will be built on the ancient silk road which practically passes through Pakistan and link with Middle East and

India,” He further said that adding the corridor will be game changer for the entire region and a driving force for real cultural and economic integration. For its part, India do not have direct link with NSR as it runs through parts of Pakistan. The Wagah border point is closed for Indian goods other than selective bilateral trade. India has no direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. India, however, is linked to BCIM and the MSR. While New Delhi has endorsed the BCIM, it sought more details from Beijing about MSR for which China plans to make effective use of the newly developed port in Sri Lanka and Pakistan posing strategic concerns to India.

Gao said the silk road projects brings about new opportunities of cooperation between Indian and Chinese business firms as well as an opportunity to increase Chinese investments in India as it involved development infrastructure including building of roads and rail and highways, power stations and heavy equipment.

“We are now having good cooperation and will have more opportunities in future with potential for further opportunity development infrastructure,” he said, referring to India’s latest five-year plan placing emphasis on infrastructure development. This provides advantage for Chinese firms to work with their Indian counterparts, he said. This will also help India to attract some of about 100 million Chinese tourists who visited abroad last year. “To promote infrastructure and facilitation of visa services will bring more Chinese tourists into India,” Gao said.”

Important Strategic Implications

China’s worldview in the 21st century involves the evaluation of China’s hopes, aspirations and strategic rationale to contain South Asian and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. In the 1950s, China had economic relations with only 40 or so countries. China’s overseas economic interests were therefore limited to trade with these countries. By the beginning of the 1980s, China had established economic and trade relations with 178 countries and regions; obviously, the scope of its economic interest had expanded .”

It is unlikely that China and India will be able to resolve the Boarder issue in the near future. China has 17 international border issues to be demarcated with her neighbours. One of the most contentious one is the Sino-Indian Border. China’s zeal to have a corridor to the Arabian Sea and hence its presence and capacity to do so by a land route has made it initiate the China Pakistan Economic Corridor which passes through disputed territory as per India. Hence rather than reducing tension in the bilateral relationship between India and China, it may become a permanent irritant in the International as well as the strategic rationale in South Asia. By supporting Pakistan, which is nearly a failed state, harbouring on the threshold of acting as a

reinter state, the absence of the United States from Afghanistan, China will now become the third nation to further continue to perpetuate external powers operating in the erstwhile North Western Frontier. The massive financial investment by China in the China Pak Corridor and in the Energy sector is an indication as to where the Chinese priority lies in South Asia.

Deciphering the Asian Balance of Power

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the four decade long Cold War structure, the entire nature of the geopolitical landscape in the Asia- Pacific region has dramatically changed. The bipolar equilibrium of the two superpowers broke down. As a result, regional players have commenced a new game of balance of power. The relationships among the five Great Powers in the region (United States, China, Japan, Russia and India) are now geared to both cooperation and competition, instead of collusion and confrontation. There is a group of Middle Powers. These countries do not have great influence on the developments in the region, but they play an important role in balancing power, as they occupy strategic geopolitical positions and are the objects of the Great Powers' rivalries. They are countries like Indonesia, Korea, and Vietnam. There are Small Powers (Laos, Cambodia, Singapore) and some very small states like Brunei (with a population of 300,000 people), and the Marshall Islands (with a population of 40,000 people). Those countries can only make worthwhile stands when they are engaged in alliances or alignments with other actors. In addition, some scholars believe that new transnational actors, such as international and regional organizations, NGOs and multinational corporations, are gradually playing a greater role in international affairs.

Geostrategic Significance

The Indo-Pacific region is an emerging geostrategic and geo-economic concept that has been gaining significance in the in geopolitical circles. It represents the centre of gravity of the world's economic, political and strategic interests. It is rich in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons which fuel the industrial engines of the world's economies. The established and emerging powers are competing over these resources. In recent years, with the global economic power shift, it has swiftly emerged as a centre of international trade and investments. It indeed embodies a large market which is defined by nearly half of the world's population. This is obvious from the economic issues currently dominating the regional politics. In this context, regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation and maritime security have become very important as over 90 per cent of the world's trade by volume is by sea. The region consists of

many of the world's vital choke points for global commerce, including the Straits of Malacca which is very critical for the growth of world economy. In the recent past, the increasing flow of raw materials, oil and gas into the region has led to the rise of Asia. Labour, capital and consumer goods are also increasingly flowing from Asia to other regions of the world. As a matter of fact, the region constitutes the engine of global economic growth and development. ⁸ In essence, the Indo-Pacific envisages new frameworks that feature competitive and convergence security interests which are evident in the light of global power shift to the region.

The US Rebalance Strategy

The US rebalance strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region a comprehensive strategy which aims to protect and promote American national interests in the region by accelerating its economic and diplomatic engagements with its traditional allies and emerging partners, namely, India and Indonesia. It also has military, strategic and ideological dimensions. It is essentially driven by the geostrategic imperative of the economically fast-growing Indo-Pacific and its implications for the US interests and dominance in the region. China and its assertive foreign policy has created geostrategic flux in the Indo-Pacific region, which poses serious military, economic and political challenges to the US interests in the region. The US, after exhausting military and economic resources over a decade-long involvement in the Greater West Asia crisis, seeks to shift its focus to the world's fastest growing region (Indo-Pacific) for reviving its economy as well as creating jobs and new opportunities for Americans and seeks to correct its imbalance in power projection in the world by repositioning its military forces and resurrecting its leadership in the region as a Pacific power. Thus, as the geostrategic significance of the region has rapidly increased, the US has redefined its broader foreign policy engagement with the region. It strongly believes that its foreign policy interests would be best served by moving from an earlier emphasis on just the 'Asia-Pacific region' to one based on a broader 'Indo-Pacific region'. The US also states that peace, stability and freedom of navigation are crucial for the entire region's prosperity, including that of the US and China. However, the US rebalance strategy is still evolving. There are important questions and doubts arising on its feasibility, given the US financial constraints, deeper involvement in the West Asian crisis and the military commitment and capability to protect its allies and partners in case of a major conflict.

CHINA

Rising China is clearly a key factor in the Indo-Pacific, China's rise is swiftly altering the geostrategic equations in the region. Its assertive foreign policy, backed by growing economic and military power, has also changed the geo-economics and geopolitics of the region. Though China's rise has benefited regional countries in the economic field, its increasing expenditure on military modernization and power projection, particularly in the East and South China Seas, have caused major concerns for them, including for the US. Moreover, while the US still remains the most powerful country in the world in terms of its military and economic power, China's growing comprehensive national power has created important strategic space for itself. It is, however, China's nationalistic leadership and aggressive pursuit of national interests that has created a regional flux. Regional and extra-regional countries are therefore trying to fix this regional flux by founding new regional economic and security architectures. In this regard, the US' rebalance strategy is seen as an attempt to address this strategic flux.

On the other hand, Beijing perceives the rebalance strategy as an attempt to contain China and doubts the US' growing engagements with its regional allies and emerging powers. China's maritime boundary claims, increasing military activities in the East and South China Seas and nationalist rhetoric are seen as China's strategy to keep the US out of its sphere of influence. It is also following a periphery strategy which aims at developing good relationship with its east, south and western neighbours. It seeks to achieve this goal not through multilateral approach, but rather by increasing bilateral engagements. This aggressive Chinese approach has certainly generated severe uncertainties and dangerous security situations in the region.

Most of the US' regional allies and partners welcome the rebalance strategy, which they believe would help in balancing China's growing economic and military assertions in the region. At the same time, they seek to constructively engage with rising China, which they consider important for the region's overall peace and prosperity. Moreover, it is also not possible and practical for either side to keep rising China isolated in the time of increasing economic interdependence in the world.


China is surrounded by major power competitors, such as Russia, Japan, and India. Furthermore, even the smaller states previously deferential to China at some point in the past, such as South Korea and Vietnam, are now successful, self-regarding entities that, despite their weaknesses, demonstrated no interest in being subservient to China. Facing this new environment, Beijing has advanced a variety of policies aimed toward pacifying its periphery. First, it has used its deep economic ties

with its Asian neighbours to “reduce regional anxieties” about the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while “creating mechanisms for Beijing to increase its influence with these regional neighbours.” Second, it has sought to make common cause with some states, such as Russia, which, despite their own suspicions of Beijing, have reasons—the Ukraine crisis and Western economic sanctions in the case of Moscow—to resist joining the larger balancing against China now under way in Asia. Third, Beijing has embarked on a concerted modernization of the PLA with the intention to amass military power capable of both defeating local adversaries and deterring the United States from coming to their defense in a crisis. Fourth, it has now renewed older efforts to delegitimize the U.S. alliance system in Asia, acting on its recognition that Washington remains the critical obstacle in Beijing’s quest for a neutralized periphery.

Accordingly, China has actively promoted “a new security concept” that rejects U.S. alliances as anachronisms; demands that Asian security be managed by Asians alone; and privileges China as the regional security provider of choice in a situation where, as Xi Jinping recently put it, “development is the greatest form of security.” The desire to pacify the periphery thus signifies a modern adaption of the traditional aim to entrench China’s centrality in Asia. If Beijing can successfully achieve these aims alongside a backdrop of continued internal stability, sustained economic growth, and expanding military capabilities, China’s ambition to dominate Asia would over time recreate a bipolar system internationally. This achievement, in turn, would further reinforce the CCP’s central domestic objective: delivering material benefits to the Chinese population while further increasing the country’s security and standing, thereby assuring its continued grip on power.

China’s Strategic View

China’s recent White Paper on Military Strategy identifies three new challenges emanating from ‘hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism’, and asserts that international competition is intensifying for ‘the redistribution of power, rights and interests’. In particular, the paper highlights the perceived threats emanating from the US ‘rebalance’ to the Asia Pacific, threats associated with Japan’s overhaul of its military, the ongoing threats from ‘Taiwan independence’ forces, and threats from external nations meddling in China’s affairs in the South China Sea. The paper does not directly refer to India. China does not want to give India the satisfaction of being rated as a strategic threat. It is also because India does not ‘provoke the high level of concern that the US or Japan does. Nevertheless, it is clear that India does rate in China’s strategic calculus. With a



China Pakistan Economic Corridor

complex contemporary relationship, shaped by a history of tension and mistrust, there is unevenness in the perceptions that India and China hold of each other. This perception is marked by the China's official policy to 'deride, if not ignore' the rise of India and its 'regional ambitions and economic development, whereas China is central to India's strategic calculus'. China sees India as an expanding threat to its core interests, identifying Chinese concerns that:

- 'India is a hegemonic and expansionist power that intends to re-establish India's dominance over the entire subcontinent ;
- The Indian navy wants to dominate and control the Indian Ocean; and
- India aspires to become a great world power, in league with the US, Russia and China, armed with nuclear weapons and a UN Security Council veto.'

China's ultimate objective in Asia is to challenge the US as the dominate power and to curb the influence of India in South and Southeast Asia. In order

to achieve this objective, China must position itself as the key player in South Asia by steadily extending its reach through its expanding economic and strategic influence over the region.

China's strategy in relation to India would seem to comprise six elements. First, China needs to generate a larger amount of resources than India for its political and military purposes via a continued high economic growth rate. Second, China needs to minimize a conventional arms race with India, while taking into account that India poses a significant nuclear threat. Third, China needs to contain the rise of India by either denying it access to or marginalizing its influence in regional and international organizations such as APEC and the Asian Development Bank. Fourth, China needs to continue its support to Pakistan in order to ensure Pakistan's military strength remains an important factor in India's calculations, thus maintaining a two-front threat to India. Fifth, Beijing needs to continue its policy of inaction to resolve Sino-Indian boundary disputes, so as to keep India under 'continuous pressure until the regional balance of power shifts in China's favour and disputes can be resolved to its own advantage'. Finally, China needs to continue bolstering its military, economic, trade and development engagement with nations of South and Southeast Asia in order to extend its strategic influence and contain India's influence. It is telling to note that, in contrast, China's strategic objective in its engagement with the states of Central Asia is neither expansionist nor militaristic; rather, it is focused on securing stable hydrocarbon resources, and the development of infrastructure and commercial interests.

South Asia

South Asia is among the least integrated regions of the world. Official intra-regional trade, to take one indicator, hovers around 5 percent of total trade of the countries of the region. South Asia has three attributes that make it extremely well-suited for integration by trade: the highest population density in the world; linguistic and ethnic overlap across borders and the presence of a large number of cities close to the borders. This potential has not been adequately tapped for at least two reasons. One of the legacies of colonialism has been ambivalence about free trade in most South Asian countries (with the early exception of Sri Lanka). This problem was compounded by the economic and political consequences of partition, which not only set the stage for many protracted disputes but also overturned the political economy of the region. Before 1947, the region had an almost unimpeded flow of goods, money, people, and ideas. Restoring these links is a central economic objective for India. An integrated Southern Asian

market would make eminent economic sense as well as help take the sting out of uneasy political relationships. Finally, South Asia confronts a series of non-traditional security challenges, ranging from public health to migration to water. Environmental issues, in particular, pose serious problems for the region

India is by far the largest, most populous, and most powerful country in the region, where it accounts for 70 percent of population, nearly 80 percent of GDP, and about 75 percent of trade. Its conventional forces are the largest in the region. Moreover, India shares a boundary with every country in the neighbourhood, but most of them do not share a border with another South Asian country. Given India's potential to be the 800-pound gorilla in the room, it is not surprising that most of its neighbours regard it with wariness and resentment, if not suspicion and fear. Stability in its ties with its Southern A neighbours remains a key geopolitical objective for India neighbours remains a key geopolitical objective for India as a whole.

The Smaller States of Southern Asia

China's growing economic, political, and security footprint in other parts of Southern Asia—Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh—complicates India's dealings with these countries. India's objectives vis-a-vis these (and other smaller countries) have been to reassure them politically, to hold out the prospect of deeper economic engagement, and to ensure that their internal politics and policies do not undermine India's interests. China's growing presence in these smaller countries offers them some leverage against India, which they have unsurprisingly sought to use. That New Delhi needs to develop a strategy to counter this trend is widely understood. But the contours of such a strategy remain contested in India. Part of the problem stems from differences in assessing China's aims in expanding its clout in the region. Is China seeking to develop strategic facilities in these countries—the so-called string of pearls—in order to militarily contain India? Or is it primarily aimed at securing access to raw materials and an opening to the Indian Ocean? Are these necessarily mutually exclusive? Is every form of Chinese engagement in these countries necessarily inimical to India's interests? These questions are being debated in India with increasing urgency.

New Delhi's ability to counter Chinese influence in South Asia is not just a function of what China wants to do, but also of what India can do. India needs, above all, to build its credibility in delivering on its promises and intentions. This is important not just to secure India's interests in the region but also to ensure that it does not see itself as being locked in a zero-sum game with China in these

countries. After all, India's interests in Southern Asia do not stem from the fact of a growing Chinese presence. In its engagement with Southern Asia, India has quite properly paid attention to the two key peripheral states of Afghanistan and Myanmar. Both of these countries are important to India's security and geopolitical objectives. Both have in the recent past provided havens for insurgent groups that have operated against India. Ensuring that this situation does not prevail in the future remains a central objective of Indian policy. However, the importance of Afghanistan and Myanmar transcends these narrowly defined security concerns. For one thing, they are the gateways of South Asia to Central and West Asia, and to Southeast Asia. India's ability to project its influence in these wider areas is contingent on its relationship with these two countries. For another, they are crucial to South Asia's economic links with other parts of Asia. Afghanistan and Myanmar are the hinges on which the open economic doors of Southern Asia will revolve.

India's relations with Afghanistan and Myanmar are not antithetical to China's interests in these countries. In Afghanistan, India has expressed its willingness to work with China in joint projects for economic development. Further, India has stated that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could be a useful forum for considering the problems of Afghanistan after the drawdown of U.S. troops. As far as Myanmar is concerned, India is a very distant competitor to China in securing markets and influence. China's presence and clout in Myanmar far outstrip those of any other country, including India. Nevertheless, both China and India support and stand to gain from the ongoing reforms in Myanmar. There is little reason to believe that China will lose sleep over India's engagement with Myanmar. That said, India's relationship with Myanmar could help Myanmar reduce its reliance on China. Recent developments, such as placing Chinese-sponsored hydroelectric projects on hold, underline the fact that Myanmar's relationship with China may not always work in its interests. Indeed, as its reforms gather pace, Myanmar will want to move away from excessive dependence on China and diversify the range of its external engagements. India could potentially play an important role here.

INDIA

India still has a number of sovereignty and territorial integrity issues with its neighbours that it inherited from British colonial times. Both the unresolved Kashmir issue (with its attendant "cross-border" terrorism) and the India-China territorial dispute demand huge allocations of resources—financial, human,

and military-related—from India. Given the all-weather friendship between China and Pakistan, under which China has supplied conventional and strategic weapons, platforms, or technologies to Pakistan, there is always a likelihood of a possible two-front war for India. With a population of more than a billion, India has the responsibility to lift millions out of poverty. For this to happen, its overall national security paradigm should be aimed at long-term peace and stability in the neighbourhood and retaining strategic autonomy in international and regional orders. Hence, India is attempting to craft a national strategy under which its sovereignty and territorial integrity needs are satisfied by gradually enhancing its conventional and strategic deterrence posture, while at the same time maintaining uninterrupted economic growth figures through mutually beneficial diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements. Enhancing India's comprehensive national power, both hard and soft, has engaged Indian attention of late.

PAKISTAN

The Impact of China

An important factor in the Indian-Pakistani relationship is China. Pakistan's all-weather friendship with China has provided it the capabilities to pursue a confrontational course with India while sheltering it from potentially adverse consequences. Indeed, over the past five decades China has regarded Pakistan as a useful counterweight to India in South Asia. The relationship with Pakistan has enabled Beijing to pursue an India strategy on the cheap, while maintaining its own focus on other areas of more immediate interest. There is little reason to believe that China will abandon this approach anytime soon, and there is some reason to believe that the strategic relationship with Pakistan might actually be tightening. China is, of course, concerned about instability and extremism in Pakistan. Terrorism is on the agenda of the strategic dialogue between China and India.. New Delhi believes that there may be marginal payoffs to engaging China on terrorism originating in Pakistan. But there is no illusion that China can help nudge Pakistan toward a less antagonistic stance vis-a-vis India.

On the economic front, though, India's relations with China are a complex amalgam of elements of competition and cooperation. Economic ties between India and China have burgeoned in recent years. Yet this relationship remains asymmetric, with a mounting trade surplus in China's favour. Politically, the two countries have found it easier to work together on global issues such as climate change, and in arenas such as the BRICS (the developing economies of Brazil,

Russia, and South Africa in addition to India and China). Yet, the core bilateral dispute on the boundaries remains unresolved. On the security front, the peace and tranquillity agreements have helped avoid military standoffs along the disputed borders. Yet, the gap between the overall military capabilities has widened in China's favour, as to a lesser extent have the local military balances along the borders. If India's relationship with Pakistan has complicated its ties with China, it is mainly due to the manner in which China has sought to use Pakistan vis-a-vis India. China's support for Pakistan, especially in the military and nuclear domains, remains a matter of serious concern for India.

China has been playing an active role to maintain a balance of power between India and Pakistan by supporting Pakistan economically and militarily. China and Pakistan consolidated their alliance through strategic engagement. China supplied Pakistan huge military hardware. A stronger Pakistan meant a stronger Chinese defense against any threat from India. China was keen in Pakistan to make a route to Middle East, because of Pakistan's unique strategic position. From Islamabad's perspective, Beijing is a reliable strategic partner that counterbalances India in its unequal relationship with Pakistan and is able to be consistently relied upon. The centrality of China in Pakistan's strategic calculus, at the expense of its relationship with India, has further soured the mistrust between India and Pakistan.. The alliance has also provided critical strategic benefits to Pakistan, to the detriment of India's balance of power. These benefits include diplomatic support, military-to-military cooperation, and nuclear capability. Diplomatically, China has consistently defended Pakistan in international forums and provided Pakistan with moral support in times of need. The Sino-Pakistan military-to-military cooperation has been the most enduring pillar of their alliance and is aimed at their shared anxiety of India. The alliance has emphasised the need to counterbalance the relative strength of India's military capability in comparison to Pakistan's. A key component is based on China's assessment that it must ensure that Pakistan has the appropriate military capabilities to defend its interests from the perceived threats of its rival India.

Chinese assistance to counter India is not just confined to military equipment sales; it also involves the modernization of Pakistan's military industrial complex. The modernization is focused on Pakistan's naval capability and developing its military aircraft manufacturing capability. This support is aimed at countering India's military strength in South Asia and meets 'Beijing's long-standing policy to arm Islamabad with every weapon system that India has (and will have) in order to maintain a favourable balance of power in South Asia'

The final component of Sino-Pakistan military cooperation, aimed at countering India, is the development of Pakistan's nuclear capability. China has also supported Pakistan's development of its short- and medium-range ballistic missile capability and the transfer of technology. This nuclear cooperation is seen as a critical pillar of the alliance and is aimed at balancing India's conventional and nuclear capability, if not ensuring that 'Pakistan enjoys an edge over India in the nuclear sector'. Beijing views the Sino-Pakistan alliance as a lasting partnership which has helped contain India despite the pressures of time and shifting geopolitical and geostrategic landscapes. The alliance meets China's strategic goals in South Asia as 'Beijing prefers a powerful and well-armed Pakistani military that helps mount pressure by proxy on India'. However, from India's perspective, Beijing's overt conventional and secretive nuclear support to Pakistan only adds further to India's mistrust of China's intent in South Asia. It is evident that despite the current rhetoric of a cooperative Sino-Indian rise, there is a deep-seated lack of trust and longstanding competitive tendency between India and China. This lack of trust reflects the situation during the 'Great Game', which is being repeated in the 'New Great Game'. It is 'a critical impediment to the normalization of China-India ties'

China's perceived encirclement of India

China's strategic alliance with Pakistan and its developing relationships with India's other neighbours have heightened tensions between China and India, not least because China's actions are perceived by India as a deliberate strategy of encirclement. China's penetration into South Asia is a calibrated plan to challenge India's dominance of its neighbourhood. In their view, China's plan is designed to keep India focused on the sub-continent in the expectation that it will constrain its influence from spreading wider into Central and South East Asia. Vikram Sood, a former head of India's foreign intelligence agency, states that the Chinese tactics to achieve this are simple—'keep borders with India tranquil but do not solve the disputes, trade with India but arm Pakistan, and wean away Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar'. These actions also are consistent with China's intent to limit India's ambition to establish pre-eminence in South Asia, both on the land and on the sea.

To India's north, China has been increasingly developing its military capability in Tibet Autonomous Region, adjacent to Arunachal Pradesh. China has developed sophisticated military infrastructure in the area, including the 'construction of new railways, 58,000km of all-weather roads, five air bases,

supply hubs and communication posts', which would assist China to strike with power and speed if it decided to seize the territory which it claims as its own'. To further pressure India and keep its focus to its north, China also implemented an aggressive patrolling and incursion strategy in the border areas from 2003 to 2010. China is also developing its relationship with Nepal with the objective of decreasing the influence of India. This has included the use of 'no strings attached' concessional loans and economic aid. It has also offered military logistics and training assistance to the Nepalese Army. However, of most concern to India are China's plans to develop railway lines through Nepal, connecting to Tibet, which would make India's northern flank more vulnerable to China.

Indian Ocean Region

As China and India's economies grow, and their energy needs increase, their respective areas of interest have expanded to include the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. China's increased presence and influence in the Indian Ocean region has included its cultivation of partnerships with a number of India's neighbours, the development of Pakistan's Gwadar deep-sea port and the expansion of naval activities in the Indian Ocean, all of which have caused Indian policy makers to become increasingly concerned that China is implementing a strategy of maritime encirclement.

In recent years, China has developed multi-dimensional relationships with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which have included major trading partnerships, investment in infrastructure development, funding of socio-economic needs, and assistance in developing the energy production of these partners. However, a critical element has been its investment in the port facilities of these nations. These have included Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and the Kyaukpyu deep-water port in Myanmar, as well as naval facilities on Myanmar's Great Coco Island. These so-called 'String of Pearls' provide China with increased access and influence in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea—and are seen by New Delhi as a direct threat to India's interests and influence in the Indian Ocean region. Pakistan has also provided a critical strategic node for China's access to the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, particularly via the Chinese-funded deep-water port at Gwadar in western Pakistan. April 2015, Pakistan granted China approval to operate this port for the next 40 years as part of the development of the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Contrary to Chinese claims that Gwadar has been developed only as a trading point, analysts have concluded that the facilities

could provide the Chinese Navy with strategic naval support infrastructure in the Indian Ocean. Such enhanced access to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf would effectively enable China to become a two-ocean maritime power. That, in turn, would potentially impact on the freedom of navigation of US maritime forces; it would also be seen by India as further evidence of China's ambitions to contain India and challenge India's influence in the Indian Ocean.

There is, however, concern that 'the Indian Ocean Region could witness a major military surge by China, turning it into an arena of great power competition in Asia.' China has rapidly developed its relationship with Indian Ocean rim countries, which is perceived as a 'string of pearls' strategy, to contain emerging India. In response to the Chinese strategy India has sought to further improve its naval and security cooperation with the South-East and East Asian countries, including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc. However, India's strategic leverage, particularly in East Asia, is not comparable with that of China's growing clout in the Eastern Indian Ocean. China has recently gained its influence in the region by funding huge maritime infrastructure projects such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. These infrastructural facilities currently may be for commercial purposes but, they also 'have a considerable scope for military applications'.

CONCLUSION

India is clearly concerned that the 'peaceful rise' of China masks a covert policy of the containment of India. As a result, India is responding with counter-encirclement measures through a range of strategic initiatives with other powers, including the US, Japan and Australia, and with a number of other nations in Southeast and East Asia.

Looking East

India's efforts to counter China's strategic encirclement have included extending its strategic ties with nations towards its east, outside of the immediate South Asia region. This move is part of India's 'Look East' policy and has included engaging and developing strategic dialogue and agreements with nations in the Asia-Pacific, such as Vietnam, Japan, Singapore and Australia.⁵ The development of these relationships, particularly in the defence and security areas, has largely focused on the maritime field. India's strategic push eastwards includes the development of its bilateral relationship with Vietnam. India and Vietnam share

a common history with both nations having lost limited wars with China in 1962 and 1979 respectively. As a result, both nations share a common concern regarding the 'rise of China', particularly since both have unresolved border disputes with China. In 1994, India and Vietnam signed a defence agreement, which could be seen as a reciprocal 'geographical pressure point' on China in the same way that China's long-term alliance with Pakistan has on India.

More recently, India-Vietnam strategic ties were revitalized with a new agreement signed between Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and India's Prime Minister Modi on the former's visit to India in 2014.¹³⁹ The agreement included defence and security cooperation, and came at a time of increased tensions in the South China Sea between China and its neighbours. This cooperation has seen India commit to provide Vietnam with four maritime patrol vessels in order to bolster its maritime security capabilities. The agreement was further enhanced with the signing of a 'Joint Vision Statement' in May 2015 between Vietnam's Defence Minister and his Indian counterpart, which outlined a trajectory for their bilateral relationship out to 2020 and for further defence cooperation, including coast guard cooperation.

More broadly, India's growing strategic ties with Vietnam, Singapore, Cambodia and Australia are clearly part of its strategy to counter China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In May 2015, for example, the Indian Navy deployed four warships to the Asia-Pacific, which included participating in a maritime exercise with the Singapore Navy in the South China Sea and making port calls in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and Australia.

Connecting North

The final leg of India's counter-encirclement strategy is its 'Connect Central Asia' policy. India's interests in Central Asia relate to its concerns regarding Sino-Pakistan encirclement, access to energy resources and the possible threats from Islamic extremist groups on Kashmir. India is increasingly attempting to engage with Central Asia. It has focused particularly on improved relations with Tajikistan, with which it developed military ties in 2003, resulting in an undeclared Indian military presence at an airbase at Farkhor. This was followed in 2007 by the establishment of an overt military base.

FOOT NOTES / REFERENCES

- 1 The word security derives from the Latin word *sine cura*, meaning 'without care' which is quite elastic term since 'cares' may be major fears or minor frustration. Therefore, delving into an enquiry into security in global politics has to focus on most meaningful fears which is centered around the threats to lives of people. A deepening approach to security studies by the Pluralists and Social Constructivists in International Relations(IR) naturally widens the range of issues to be considered and hence shifts the focus of the discipline to the realm of security of the people i.e. on human security rather than of the states. In an opinion poll in 2005 the South Africans identified war as their biggest security threat. (Human security Centre, 2005). The Realist paradigm of IR has dominated the study of security and focused on the military aspect in international relations so far. With the end of cold war came a reassessment of the Realist orthodoxy of Security Studies because there has been a diminishment in military threats and the logic of maintaining a 'balance of power' as a fundamental principle has been compromised as well as undermined. However, a certain section of neo-Realist still argue that Security Studies should still give the primacy to achieve the security to the state and military matters howsoever much the risks being too diverse subject, yet must focus on the security of the state and military issues. The Pluralists on the other and consider a 'deepening approach' to security studies while the Social Constructivists in IR have tried to further widen the focus of the discipline by incorporating the security of the people and securitizing the non-traditional areas of ecology, environment, pollution, energy, the rights of the unborn and the international political economy.
- 2 The term international order is generally used to refer to the collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, and norms that are intended to organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period. Key features of the U.S.-led international order established at the end of World War II—also known as the open international order, liberal international order, or post-war international order, and often referred to as a rules-based order—are generally said to include the following: respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of changing international borders by force or coercion; a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use or threat of use of force or coercion; strong international institutions; respect for international law and human rights; a preference for free markets and free trade; and the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and (more recently) cyberspace as international commons.
- 3 For discussions of these actions, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.

- 4 For citations to articles by or about observers who have concluded that the international the international security environment has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new and different situation, see Appendix A
- 5 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Work: ‘Great Power Competition’ Has Returned,” *National Defense*, November 22, 2015. See also Andrew Clevenger, “Work: Future Includes Competition Between US, Great Powers,” *Defense News*, November 20, 2015. Ellipsis as in original. Similarly, in a December 14, 2015, speech, then-Deputy Secretary Work stated I firmly believe that historians will look back upon the last 25 years – I actually snap that 25 years between May 12, 1989, when President Bush said containment would no longer be the lens through which the defense program was built. That was the end of the Cold War for all intents and purposes for defense planning, even though it took a couple of years for the Soviet Union to finally implode. And I’d look in December 2013, that’s when China started to do its land reclamation project in the South China Sea and in March 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and started to send its troops and support separatists in east Ukraine. So that 25-year period, I believe, is remarkable and is unlike any other period in the post-Westphalian era, because during that period, the United States reigned supreme as the only world’s great power and the sole military superpower. It gave us enormous freedom of action. But the circumstance is now changing. The unipolar world is starting to fade and we enter a more multipolar world, in which U.S. global leadership is likely to be increasingly challenged. So among the most significant challenges in this 25 years, and one in my view that promises to be the most stressing one, is the reemergence of great power competition. Now, for the purpose of this discussion and for the purposes of building a defense program which is focused on potential adversary capabilities, not necessarily intentions, I’ll borrow John Mearsheimer’s definition of a great power: A state having sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the dominant power—that would be the United States—and possessing a nuclear deterrent that could survive a first strike against it. And by that narrow definition, getting away from what are their economic peers or what is the attractiveness of their soft power and their stickiness, from a defense program perspective, if Russia and China are not yet great powers, they’re well on their ways to being one. (Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, CNAS Defense Forum, As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, JW Marriott, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2015, accessed December 21, 2015,
- 6 See, for example, Gideon Rachman, “The West Has Lost Intellectual Self-Confidence,” *Financial Times*, January 5, 2015; Garry Kasparov, “The Global War on Modernity,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 20, 2015; Anna Borshchevskaya, “Moral Clarity Is Needed In Countering Anti-Western Propaganda,” *Forbes*, March 14, 2015; Ellen Bork, “Democracy in Retreat,” *World Affairs Journal*, May 11, 2015; Christopher Walker, “The New Containment: Undermining Democracy,” *World Affairs Journal*, May/June 2015; Michael J. Boyle, “The Coming Illiberal

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- 7 See, for example, Howard W. French, “China’s Dangerous Game,” *The Atlantic*, October 13, 2014.
 - 8 See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, “Who’s to Blame for a World in Flames?” *The American Interest*, October 6, 2014.
 - 9 The term grand strategy generally refers to a country’s overall strategy for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national tools at its disposal, including diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools (sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues.
 - 10 The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or strategy relating to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads, railways, and waterways.
 - 11 For citations to articles discussing grand strategy and geopolitics for the United States in the new international security environment, see Appendix B.
 - 12 Bradley Peniston, “Work: ‘The Age of Everything Is the Era of Grand Strategy,’” *Defense One*, November 2, 2015.
 - 13 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, *Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design*, by Ronald O’Rourke.
 - 14 For further discussion, see CRS Report R43698, *NATO’s Wales Summit: Outcomes and Key Challenges*, by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R44550, *NATO’s Warsaw Summit: In Brief*, by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R43478, *NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe*, coordinated by Paul Belkin.
 - 15 For citations to articles discussing possible U.S. strategies for countering Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, see Appendix C.
 - 16 See CRS Report R42784, *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O’Rourke.

- 17 For more on China's military modernization effort, see CRS Report R44196, *The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress*, by Ian E. Rinehart; and CRS Report RL33153, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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- 23 See, for example, CRS Report R44175, *Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke. CRS Report RL33745, *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.
- 24 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF10337, *Challenges to the United States in Space*, by Steven A. Hildreth and Clark Groves.
- 25 See, for example, CRS Report R43848, *Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress*, by Catherine A. Theohary.
- 26 See, for example, Cheryl Pellerin, "Hagel Announces New Defense Innovation, Reform Efforts," *DOD News*, November 15, 2014; Jake Richmond, "Work Explains Strategy Behind Innovation Initiative," *DOD News*, November 24, 2014; and memorandum dated November 15, 2015, from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other DOD recipients on *The Defense Innovation Initiative*, accessed online on July 21, 2015, at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf>.
- 27 See, for example, Cheryl Pellerin, "DoD Seeks Novel Ideas to Shape Its Technological Future," *DoD News*, February 24, 2015.
- 28 See Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, *Reagan Defense Forum: The Third Offset Strategy, As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work*, Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, November 7, 2015, accessed December 21, 2015, at <http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/628246/reagan-defense-forum-the-third-offset-strategy>, and Deputy Secretary of Defense

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